

Vol. V

1925

Part IV

THE
BRITISH JOURNAL
OF
MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGY

BEING THE MEDICAL SECTION OF THE
BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY

EDITED BY

T. W. MITCHELL

WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF

JOHN RICKMAN


AIDED IN THE SELECTION OF PAPERS BY

H. G. BAYNES

ERNEST JONES

WILLIAM BROWN

GEORGE RIDDOCH



Cambridge University Press

LONDON : Fetter Lane, E.C. 4

also

H. K. LEWIS & Co., LTD., 136, Gower Street, London, W.C. 1

CHICAGO : The University of Chicago Press

(Agent for the United States)

BOMBAY, CALCUTTA, MADRAS : Macmillan and Co., Limited

TOKYO : The Maruzen-Kabushiki-Kaisha

Price Ten Shillings net.

Issued 1 April 1926]

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE INTERNATIONAL
PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

DIRECTED BY SIGM. FREUD

EDITED BY ERNEST JONES

WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF

K. ABRAHAM
BERLIN

D. BRYAN
LONDON

J. C. FLÜGEL
LONDON

G. BOSE
CALCUTTA

J. VAN EMDEN
THE HAGUE

E. OBERHOLZER
ZURICH

M. WULFF
MOSCOW

A. A. BRILL
NEW YORK

S. FERENCZI
BUDAPEST

C. P. OBERNDORF
NEW YORK

ISSUED QUARTERLY

Subscription 30s. post free per Volume of Four Parts,
the Parts not being sold separately

Bound Copies of Volumes I, II, III, IV,
V and VI, 40s. plus carriage

VOLUME VII, PART I, 1926

OBITUARY NOTICE: KARL ABRAHAM.

ABRAHAM, K.: The Psychological Relations between Sexuality and
Alcoholism.

GLOVER, E.: The Neurotic Character.

KLEIN, M.: Infant Analysis.

NUNBERG, H.: The Will to Recovery.

ABSTRACTS.

BOOK REVIEWS.

BULLETIN OF THE PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION.

*Lists of Contents of Vols. I, II, III, IV, V & VI
will be sent on Application*

Published for

THE INSTITUTE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

by Baillière, Tindall & Cox, 8 Henrietta Street, London, W.C. 2

George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

Principles of Psychotherapy

By PIERRE JANET. 10s. 6d.

Translated by H. M. and E. R. GUTHRIE.

"As a descriptive psychopathologist Janet is unrivalled....The book is full of shrewd observation."

LANCET

Psychological Healing

By PIERRE JANET. In Two Vols. £2. 2s.

Translated by EDEN and CEDAR PAUL.

"The book is an almost exhaustive account of what has hitherto been accomplished, and a testimony to the crying need for future research."

TIMES

40 Museum Street, London, W.C.

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Third Edition

The Essentials of Mental Measurement

By WILLIAM BROWN, M.A., D.Sc.
and GODFREY H. THOMSON, D.Sc.

Royal 8vo. 17s. 6d. net

CAMBRIDGE PSYCHOLOGICAL LIBRARY

"This book is one which will take its place as a standard work on the subject with which it deals so thoroughly and so clearly that under its guidance no reader can fail to master its many intricacies."

THE MEDICAL TIMES

FETTER LANE

LONDON, E.C. 4

The CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS



A TEXT-BOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY.

By C. S. MYERS, M.A. M.D., ScD., F.R.S., and F. C. BARTLETT, M.A. *Third edition.* Demy 8vo. 16s net. In 2 parts. 1, Text-book, with 1 plate and 24 figures, 10s 6d net. 2, Laboratory exercises, with 40 figures and diagrams, 7s net

AN INTRODUCTION TO EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY.

By C. S. MYERS, M.A. With 2 plates and 20 figures. Royal 16mo. 2s 6d net. CAMBRIDGE MANUALS

INSTINCT AND THE UNCONSCIOUS. A CONTRIBUTION TO A BIOLOGICAL THEORY OF THE PSYCHO-NEUROSES. By W. H. R. RIVERS, M.A., D.Sc., LL.D., F.R.S. A new and cheaper edition. Demy 8vo. 7s 6d net

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INSANITY. By B. HART, M.D. Royal 16mo. 3s net. CAMBRIDGE MANUALS SERIES

Fetter Lane



London, E.C. 4

THE CAMBRIDGE PUBLIC HEALTH SERIES

Under the Editorship of

G. S. GRAHAM-SMITH, M.D., F.R.S., AND J. E. PURVIS, M.A.

Infant Mortality. By HUGH T. ASHBY, B.A., M.D., B.Ch. (Camb.), M.R.C.P. (London). Second edition. Demy 8vo. With 9 illustrations. 15s. *net*.

Post-mortem Methods. By J. MARTIN BEATTIE, M.A., M.D., Professor of Bacteriology, University of Liverpool. Demy 8vo. With 8 plates and 3 text-figures. 15s. *net*.

The Causes of Tuberculosis. Together with some Account of the Prevalence and Distribution of the Disease. By L. COBBETT, M.D., F.R.C.S., University Lecturer in Pathology, Cambridge. Demy 8vo. With 23 plates and 8 diagrams. 26s. *net*.

Flies in Relation to Disease. Non-Bloodsucking Flies. By G. S. GRAHAM-SMITH, M.D., F.R.S., Lecturer in Hygiene in the University of Cambridge. Demy 8vo. Second edition, revised and enlarged. With 27 plates, 32 text-figures and 20 charts. 15s. *net*. *Out of print. New edition in preparation.*

Flies in Relation to Disease. Bloodsucking Flies. By EDWARD HINDLE, B.A., Ph.D. Demy 8vo. With 88 text-figures. 18s. *net*.

Sewage Purification and Disposal. By G. BERTRAM KERSHAW, M.Inst.C.E., Engineer to the Royal Commission on Sewage Disposal. Second Edition. Demy 8vo. With 59 illustrations. 18s. *net*.

Occupations from the Social, Hygienic, and Medical Points of View. By Sir THOMAS OLIVER, M.A., M.D., LL.D., D.Sc., F.R.C.P., Professor of Medicine, University of Durham. Demy 8vo. 8s. 6d. *net*.

Isolation Hospitals. By H. FRANKLIN PARSONS, M.D., D.P.H., formerly First Assistant Medical Officer of the Local Government Board. Second edition, revised and partly re-written by R. BRUCE LOW, C.B., M.D. Demy 8vo. With 55 text-figures. 25s. *net*.

The Chemical Examination of Water, Sewage, Foods, and other Substances. By J. E. PURVIS, M.A., University Lecturer in Chemistry and Physics as applied to Hygiene and Public Health, Cambridge, and T. R. HODGSON, M.A., Public Analyst for the County Boroughs of Blackpool and Wallasey. Second and enlarged edition. Demy 8vo. 20s. *net*.

The Bacteriological Examination of Food and Water. By W. G. SAVAGE, B.Sc., M.D., D.P.H., County Medical Officer of Health, Somerset. Second edition. Demy 8vo. With 16 illustrations. 15s. *net*.

Food Poisoning and Food Infections. By W. G. SAVAGE, B.Sc., M.D., D.P.H. Demy 8vo. 17s. 6d. *net*.

Canned Foods in Relation to Health. (Milroy Lectures, 1923.) By WILLIAM G. SAVAGE, B.Sc., M.D. (Lond.), D.P.H. Demy 8vo. With 6 text-figures, 19 tables, and 1 chart. 8s. 6d. *net*.

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, *Fetter Lane*, LONDON, E.C. 4

**THE
BRITISH JOURNAL
OF
MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGY**

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

LONDON: FETTER LANE, E.C. 4



H. K. LEWIS & CO., LTD., 136, GOWER STREET, LONDON, W.C. 1

WHELDON & WESLEY, LTD., 2-4, ARTHUR STREET, NEW OXFORD
STREET, LONDON, W.C. 2

CHICAGO: THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
(Agent for the United States)

BOMBAY, CALCUTTA, MADRAS: MACMILLAN & CO., LTD.

TOKYO: THE MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA

All rights reserved

THE
BRITISH JOURNAL
OF
MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGY

BEING THE MEDICAL SECTION OF THE
BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY

EDITED BY

T. W. MITCHELL

WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF

JOHN RICKMAN

AIDED IN THE SELECTION OF PAPERS BY

H. G. BAYNES

ERNEST JONES

WILLIAM BROWN

GEORGE RIDDOCH

VOLUME V 1925

CAMBRIDGE
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
1925

ZOOLOGY LIBR.

1901

ENG.
FISH.
LIBRARY

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

CONTENTS OF VOLUME V

PART 1. JANUARY 1925

	PAGE
On Consciousness. By CHARLES S. MYERS	1
Professor Freud's Group Psychology and his Theory of Suggestion. By WILLIAM McDUGALL	14
Suggestion and Personality. By WILLIAM BROWN	29
William Sharp and <i>The Immortal Hour</i> . By H. CRICHTON-MILLER	35
Technical Terms for the Various Dynamic States of the Mind. By P. YOULDEN JOHNSON	45
Reviews	58
Notes on Recent Periodicals.	61
Proceedings	64

PART 2. APRIL 1925

The Neural Sub-Strata of Reflective Thought. By GEORGE G. CAMPION	65
An Unwarranted Accretion to the Freudian Theory. By IAN D. SUTTIE	83
The "Synthesis" of an Anxiety Neurosis. By A. WOHLGE-MUTH	92
A Method of Self-Analysis. By E. PICKWORTH FARROW	106
Abstracts	119
Reviews	144
Notes on Recent Periodicals.	154
Proceedings	160

PART 3. AUGUST 1925

The Conception of Sexuality (I). By J. A. HADFIELD	161
The Conception of Sexuality (II). By JAMES GLOVER	175
The Conception of Sexuality (III). By ALEXANDER F. SHAND	189
The Conception of Sexuality (IV). Reply, by DR GLOVER	196
The Conception of Sexuality (V). Reply, by DR HADFIELD	208
A Suggestion towards a Theory of Manic-Depressive Insanity. By WILLIAM McDUGALL	212
Abstracts	228
Reviews	242

RC 321
J375
v. 5-6

BIOLOGICAL
LIBRARY
PSYCH.
LIBRARY

PART 4. DECEMBER 1925

	PAGE
Spinoza's Anticipation of Recent Psychological Developments. By M. HAMBLIN SMITH	257
The Neurotic Character. By EDWARD GLOVER	279
Psychiatry as an Objective Science. By TRIGANT BURROW	298
Some Clinical Aspects of Certain Emotions. By DONALD E. CORE.	310
Francis Thompson: a Psycho-Analytical Study. By ELLA FREEMAN SHARPE	329
A Psycho-Analytical Study of a Phantasy of St Thérèse de l'enfant Jésus. By I. F. GRANT DUFF	345
Abstracts	354
Reviews	359

SPINOZA'S ANTICIPATION OF RECENT PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

BY M. HAMBLIN SMITH.

THE study of two subjects has occupied my leisure time for a number of years, that of the works of Spinoza, and that of psycho-analytic theory. These studies were, at first, carried on quite independently. Later, I began to realize that they ran concurrently, and that they were, in fact, closely connected. I do not claim the idea of this connection as original. But, so far as I am aware, the connection has never been worked out in any detail. This task I am now essaying. Every great discovery has had its anticipators, who have groped after the truth without finding it, and whose work has influenced their successors, whether those successors have, or have not, been conscious of such influence. This was the case with the Darwinian and other theories, and so it has been with Freud. But it is surprising, or so I venture to think, how far the Freudian theory has been anticipated by Spinoza, and how the latter's views, having regard to his phraseology, and to the time at which he wrote, can be accepted, without much alteration, by students of psycho-analytic theory to-day.

The special work of Spinoza to which I shall have to refer is the *Ethics*¹. I may, perhaps, be allowed to remind my readers that the title "ethics" is used in a sense somewhat different from that which the word bears in common parlance. Ethics, to Spinoza, is the study of man's relations to the universe as a whole, not merely the study of his relations to his fellow-men. The object of the book is to point out how a complete adaptation to reality can best be obtained. This is, in itself, remarkably like the object of psycho-analysis². The style of the *Ethics* is austere, and is, at first acquaintance, almost repellent. And the arrangement of the book is peculiar. A geometrical system is adopted, the subject being dealt with in a series of propositions and corollaries, with definitions, axioms, and postulates, quite in the manner of the text-books of Euclid

¹ Except where otherwise stated, all references are to the *Ethics*, the Roman numerals indicating the Part, and the Arabic numerals indicating the Proposition. Quotations are from the translation by Boyle (Everyman's Library).

² It is not, of course, implied that the 'reality' of Spinoza, and of other philosophers, is identical with the 'reality' referred to by writers on psycho-analysis.

258 *Spinoza's Anticipation of Psychological Developments*

of our school-days. But this plan was not adopted arbitrarily. On the contrary, we shall see, later, why it was that Spinoza deliberately elected to present his subject *ordine geometrico*, as he puts it.

It would be interesting, but it would take us too far afield, to consider how far Spinoza's early training influenced his mental development. (He, like Freud, was a Jew by birth; and his family had been obliged to flee from their native land.) Nor can we consider here his expulsion from the synagogue, for the holding of heretical opinions, indicating his early breach with that authority which most people find so comfortable in religious matters, and his putting forth on the sea of uncharted thought. But there is one feature in Spinoza's system which we must deal with at the outset. He, like Freud, is an uncompromising determinist. I need not expand the fundamental position of determinism in Freud's system. Spinoza has well been called the "apostle of determinism." And scientific determinism, in its modern form, descends from Spinoza. I do not fail to recognize that determinism was taught before Spinoza's day, or that a theory, practically identical with determinism, has been held by many who would have regarded the views of Spinoza as anathema. But it seems to me that he was the first to teach determinism as a logical system in itself, and as quite apart from its effects upon ideas as to man's destiny in some supposed future state. In this connection, as in others, he has done much to clear away the anthropocentric view of the universe, as well as the anthropomorphic conception of God, although that is prominent enough even to-day. I need not elaborate the importance of this latter conception from the point of view of psycho-analysis, nor deal with its influence on the production of the father-complex. Spinoza's uncompromising exposition of determinism cannot be surpassed for convincing and logical clearness, and has, I venture to think, never been equalled. His insistence on determinism was one great cause of the opposition to Spinoza, as it is the cause of the opposition to Freud. For the longer I go on, the more convinced I am that it is his determinism which upsets Freud's opponents.

It is this which has caused the followers of Jung to break away from the great master. And to take matters into another field for a moment, it is this which is at the root of all difference of opinion upon the question of punishment. The ordinary man must have something for which he can blame those who offend against the laws of society. It is often said that determinism leaves practical questions exactly as they were before. Generally speaking, this statement is true. But it is not true in one important particular. All ground for blame, in the ordinary sense of

that word, has been removed. This deprives the ordinary man of what he finds a great comfort. It is not necessary to consider the origin of the conception of blame. But we may point out that man always wants to blame others for what he finds in himself. The matter goes much deeper than the influence of the primitive instinct of vengeance. Man is always trying to get rid of something which makes him unhappy. If this something happens to be a wrong, according to the ethical standard of the herd, he attempts to escape his personal responsibility for it. In punishing an offender, man is trying to get rid of a wrong which he feels is resident in himself. Hence the offender becomes a convenient scape-goat. And, by punishing the offender, man "bolsters up his self-respect," as Dr William A. White has put it¹. Of course, the instincts which prompt society to punishment are sublimated under present conditions. But the necessity of getting down to fundamentals is shown. Determinism, while ruling out the retaliatory theory of punishment, is in no way contrary to the deterrent theory. For the possibility of punishment is an additional motive in the case. And Spinoza himself maintains the need of punishment².

The *Ethics* is divided into five parts. It is with the last three of these that we are mainly concerned. But we must give some preliminary attention to the first two. Part I is entitled 'Concerning God.' Now with Spinoza's theological views, as such, we have nothing to do. We may merely say that on few men have there been passed, in this particular respect, such divergent opinions. He has been abused and execrated, and the term 'atheist' has been applied to him. On the other hand, he has been styled, by one of his admirers, a 'God-intoxicated man' (*ein Gottbetrunkener Mensch*). But Spinoza uses the term 'God' so often, and uses it in a sense which differs so much from that which it bears in common parlance, that we must, for the sake of intelligibility, give some description of what the *Deus* of Spinoza is, and also (what is perhaps easier to say) what the *Deus* of Spinoza is *not*. Spinoza rejects entirely the conception of a 'personal God.' To him, God bears no relation to an earthly monarch, whether despotic or constitutional³. In other words, he rejects every kind of anthropomorphic view of God, and this is a severe blow to man's narcissism. But, in beginning his work with God, he is not selecting any arbitrary starting-point. In Spinoza's view, we must begin with the whole, if we desire to comprehend any part thereof. For the nature of the part is derived from its relation to the whole.

¹ *Insanity and the Criminal Law*, by William A. White, 1923.

² iv, 37, note 2.

³ i, 32; I Appendix; ii, 3.

260 *Spinoza's Anticipation of Psychological Developments*

And, on Spinoza's theory, God is "A being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence¹." Of these attributes, two are known, or known in part, to us, namely those of extension and thought. God therefore is, among infinite other things, all extension and all thought. Whether Spinoza's distinction between extension and thought is, or can be, logically worked out, is a question which is beyond our present purpose to consider. Spinoza regards God as free, but not as exercising choice. All God's works are necessary, and the law of their necessity is the law of his own being. The acts of God do not arise from design. As there is no choice with God, there can be no deliberation. A God who contains the entire universe is self-sufficient. Neither intellect nor will appertains to the being of God². In one place, Spinoza uses the word 'predetermined' with reference to the decrees of God³. But it is not certain whether this should not be 'determined,' for he is most clear in asserting that with God there is neither past nor future, no before or after⁴.

It would, however, be erroneous to say that Spinoza regards God as unconscious. It is true that God's consciousness bears no relation to human consciousness; but a proposition that it did so would be denied by quite orthodox theologians. Human consciousness is a state of a mental organism, corresponding in the attribute of thought to a state of the human body in the attribute of extension. But it is an essential part of Spinoza's theory that God is a thinking being who can think infinitely in infinite ways⁵. Where Spinoza is unorthodox is that he does not regard God as exclusively, or even as mainly a thinking being. The consideration of this subject is much complicated by the fact that Spinoza has no term corresponding to the modern word 'consciousness.'

The old problem of fitting in the existence of evil with the conception of a perfect God is treated by Spinoza in a manner altogether unlike that in vogue in orthodox or semi-orthodox circles. He deals with it by simply denying its existence. So far as God is concerned, all things are perfect, in their kind. The contrast between good and bad has no meaning as applied to God. The terms "indicate nothing positive in things considered in themselves, nor are they anything else than modes of thought, or notions, which we form from the comparison of things mutually⁶." What we regard, from our point of view, as good and bad will be considered later. And it will be seen how much Spinoza's view

¹ I, Def. 6.

⁴ I, 33, note 2.

² I, 17; I, Appendix.

⁵ II, 1.

³ I, Appendix.

⁶ IV, Preface.

has in common with that of the psycho-analytic theory. Unlike orthodox Christian writers, he makes no attempt to call relative evils absolute goods.

Spinoza also rejects the idea of personal immortality, in the ordinary sense. It is true that in Part v he does claim that we are, in a sense, eternal¹. But he is most clear in asserting that the human mind does not survive the death of the human body, although he does not tell us wherein this death consists. Time after time, he rejects the idea of a future state of rewards and punishments, which depends upon what a man's conduct has been in this life. It is true that he uses the phrase 'eternal life.' But this is, to him, not a state to be attained in any future form of existence, but something which can be attained and enjoyed here and now. In other words, it consists in a complete adaptation to reality, thus closely resembling the object of psycho-analysis.

In Part II we are brought face to face with Spinoza's metaphysic. We come to the problem of the psycho-physical relation. There is a sharp distinction between the two main forms of human experience, but there is also a constant connection between them. Spinoza does not look for any explanation of the correspondence of two such dissimilar things as mind and body; he simply says that they are the same thing, and that they differ only in being two aspects of the same thing. There is thus no mystery about the parallelism or the mutual interaction of mind and body. The mystery is resolved into an elementary fact. To ask why mind should correspond with matter is like asking why the convexity of a curve should answer to the concavity. Mind and body are distinguishable but not separable². It is not necessary for us to spend any more time on this most fascinating of problems. Psycho-analysis is not dependent upon any particular view of the psycho-physical relation. For our present purpose, it suffices that we should carefully keep in mind the essential identity of mind and body, from Spinoza's point of view. I would remark, in passing, that the words objective and subjective were used in Spinoza's day with exactly opposite meanings to those which are now attached to them. Or we may more correctly say that Spinoza's *objectivus* is more or less equivalent to the modern term subjective. The corresponding term, when we consider a thing, as we should now say, objectively is *formaliter*. Some of Spinoza's propositions are unintelligible, if this point is not remembered.

It is in Part II that we get our first suggestions of modern psychological theories. Spinoza tells us that if the human body has once been affected at the same time by two or more bodies, when the mind after-

¹ v, 23, note.

² *Spinoza*, Sir Frederick Pollock, Chap. VI.

262 *Spinoza's Anticipation of Psychological Developments*

wards remembers any one of them it will straightway remember the other¹. From this, he explains what memory is, and how one passes from the thought of one thing to the thought of another. Free association depends upon this.

Intellect and will are, on Spinoza's view, one and the same thing². He holds that will and intellect are nothing but individual volitions and ideas. But an individual volition and an idea are one and the same thing. Hence intellect and will are identical. This definitely contradicts the theories upon which depends the conception of what is called 'moral imbecility,' that is to say, irregularity of conduct without intellectual disorder. The legal definition³ of a 'moral imbecile' does, however, require proof of a permanent mental defect coupled with strong vicious or criminal propensities. But most of those who accept the conception of 'moral imbecility' do not, in fact, agree with this legal definition.

Spinoza concludes this second part with a disquisition upon the advantages of determinism. It is needless to quote this, except to show that he completely routs those who contend that the acceptance of determinism would be inimical to social welfare. For, as he points out, and all determinists will agree, the doctrine, besides bringing complete peace to the mind, has this advantage also, that it teaches us in what our greatest happiness or blessedness consists, namely in the knowledge of God, by which we are induced to do those things to which love and piety persuade us⁴. Not for the sake of any future reward, but because virtue and the serving of God is the happiness itself and the greatest liberty. It teaches us that we should expect and bear both faces of fortune with an equal mind, for all things follow by the eternal decree of God: and he illustrates this by his favourite example, that of the three interior angles of a triangle necessarily making two right angles. Spinoza also points out how determinism confers advantages upon social as well as upon individual life, inasmuch as it teaches us not to despise, hate or ridicule any one, to be angry with and envy no one⁵. Further, it teaches us that each one should be satisfied with what he has, and should be ready to help his neighbour, from the guidance of reason⁶. Can more than this be claimed for psycho-analysis? As regards social offenders, the insight given by psycho-analysis certainly teaches us not to despise or to be angry with them, but to endeavour to understand them and their actions.

¹ II, 18. Also *De Intell. Emend.* 81-84.

² II, 49, note.

³ Mental Deficiency Act, 1913, Sect. 1 (d).

⁴ II, 49, note.

⁵ II, 49, note.

⁶ *Ibid.*

In Part III Spinoza commences to deal with the subject which most directly interests us, namely the origin and nature of the emotions. And it is here that he explains his adoption of the geometrical method. He points out that most of those who have written on the emotions have regarded them as being something outside nature. Writers have, as he says, conceived man in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom, and have believed that man disturbs rather than follows the order of nature, in that he has absolute power in his actions, and is not determined in them by anything else than himself¹. This view is, of course, a necessary corollary from the anthropocentric idea of the universe. For although man sometimes describes himself as a 'worm,' he really believes himself to be the most important thing in creation. Men have attributed the cause of human weakness and inconstancy, not to the ordinary power of nature, but to some defect in human nature, which defect they deplore, ridicule, or, most frequently, abuse. Spinoza, however, maintains that nothing happens in nature which can be attributed to a defect of it, nature being always the same and one everywhere. And he holds that man's emotions can only be understood by means of the universal rules of nature. He contends that such emotions as hate, envy, etc., follow from the same necessity of nature as do other individual things. He holds, in short, that the emotions are exactly like any other natural phenomena, and follow natural laws, which laws it is our task to study. He admits that many emotions are opposed to reason. But he deprecates considering things opposed to reason as being vain, absurd or disgusting². Hence he defends his geometrical method, because he wishes to deal with human actions and desires exactly as if he were dealing with lines, planes, and bodies. It is not so much that he regards the geometrical method as the best, absolutely, but that he is determined to conduct the investigation of human conduct in a scientific spirit. Such, also, is the aim of psycho-analysis. In his uncompleted treatise, *De Intellectus Emendatione*, Spinoza urges that, while it is our duty to make as many concessions as possible to the vulgar, by speaking in a manner comprehensible to them³, it is only by regarding man as a part of universal nature that the understanding can be so purified as to attain the greatest perfection for human society⁴. This is just what psycho-analysts contend, that we shall only have the power to control human emotions, in so far as we endeavour by study to understand them. In so far, says Spinoza,

¹ III, Preface.

² *Ibid.*

³ *De Intell. Emend.* 17.

⁴ *Ibid.* 14, 16.

264 Spinoza's Anticipation of Psychological Developments

as the mind understands all things as necessary, it has the more power over the emotions, or is less passive to them¹.

He commences Part III with certain important definitions, which must be mentioned if we would understand his argument. He defines an Adequate Cause as one whose effect can clearly and distinctly be perceived through it; while an Inadequate or Partial Cause is one whose effect cannot be perceived through itself². He says that we Act, or are Active, when something takes place within us, or outside of us, whose adequate cause we are; and that we Suffer, or are Passive, when something takes place in us, or follows from our nature, of which we are only the inadequate or partial cause³. He defines emotion (*affectus*) as the modifications of the body by which the power of action in the body is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time (for body and mind are one), the ideas of these modifications⁴. And he postulates that the human body can suffer many changes, and yet retain the impressions or traces of objects, and consequently the same images of things⁵. He next argues that the ideas of every human mind are some adequate and some inadequate or confused. The adequate ideas are adequate in God in so far as he constitutes the essence of that particular mind. The inadequate ideas are also in God, but are adequate not in so far as he contains in himself the essence of the given mind, but in so far as he contains the minds of other things at the same time. From any given idea some effect must necessarily follow. And our mind, in so far as it has adequate ideas, necessarily acts certain things, and, in so far as it has inadequate ideas, necessarily suffers certain things⁶. Once again he expounds determinism, giving the famous dictum as to man's supposed power to speak or to be silent, just as he wills. For, says he, surely human affairs would be far happier if the power in men to be silent were the same as the power to speak; whereas experience teaches that men can moderate their desires more easily than their words⁷. Men think themselves free because they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes of them. The decisions of men's minds are nothing save their desires, which are various according to various dispositions. And the decision of the mind, and the desire and determination of the body, are simultaneous in nature, or rather are one and the same thing, which when considered under the attribute of thought we call decision (*decretum*), and when considered under the attribute of extension we call determination (*determinatio*). Further, he contends that we can do

¹ v, 6.

² III, Def. 1.

³ III, Def. 2.

⁴ III, Def. 3.

⁵ III, Post. 2.

⁶ III, 1.

⁷ III, 2, note.

nothing by a decision of the mind unless we recollect having done so before¹, and that it is not within the free power of the mind to remember or forget anything². This last point is of much importance, although the process of repression, by which the memory of painful experiences is removed from the conscious mind, must not be forgotten. Nor does Spinoza forget it. We shall see that he has grasped the idea of repression, although, of course, he does not use the term.

Spinoza then proceeds to a most important point. He has already made the distinction between *actio* and *passio*. He now lays down the rule that the actions of the mind arise from adequate ideas alone, while passions arise from inadequate ideas alone³. Emotion is a confused idea wherewith the mind affirms a greater or less power of existing (*vis existendi*) of its body or any part of it than before, and which being granted, the mind is thereby determined to think of one thing rather than another. He does not mean that the mind compares the present condition of the body with the past, but that the idea which constitutes the *form* of the emotion affirms something concerning the body, whereby more or less reality is involved than before⁴. What exactly he means by reality we shall see later.

We next have two propositions which lay down (1) that everything so far as it is in itself endeavours to persist in its own being⁵, and (2) that the endeavour wherewith a thing endeavours to persist in its being is nothing else than the actual essence of that thing⁶. For individual things are modes in which the attributes of God are expressed in a certain determined manner. From the given essence of a thing, certain things necessarily follow, nor can things do anything else than that which follows necessarily from their determined nature. No one would refuse assent to this doctrine as applied to things outside human nature. For the endeavour just mentioned, Spinoza uses the word *conatus* (effort, or urge). He is most careful to guard against the idea that this tendency to self-preservation is some mysterious power, implanted in things, and antecedent to their existence. The *conatus* is nothing but the thing being what it is. In my judgment, there is much to be said in favour of the psycho-analytic use of *conatus*, in place of the somewhat unfortunate term *libido*.

Granting all this, I think it is possible to translate Spinoza's statements into terms which imply the essential character of the sex instinct.

¹ Vide Wildon Carr's *Theory of Monads*, Chap. VII.

² III, 2, note.

³ III, 3.

⁴ III, Gen. Def. of Emotions.

⁵ III, 6.

⁶ III, 7.

266 *Spinoza's Anticipation of Psychological Developments*

We must bear in mind the importance for man, as for all other animal and vegetable beings, of the reproduction of his species. The self-preserving instinct subserves this. All other activities of man are, as Michael Foster said many years ago, merely "the by-play of ovum-bearing organisms¹." When we remember, as we always must remember, the extended meaning which Freud attaches to the term 'sex,' we shall find that the essentially sexual character of the emotions can be quite well fitted in with Spinoza's definitions.

Freud teaches, as Darwin taught, that man can no longer regard himself as a unique creation, as the supreme example of a rational creature. Freud has shown that all the most complicated actions of man are instinctive in origin. Further, he has shown that the mainspring of human conduct lies in an instinct which has hitherto formed man's most cherished taboo. This has hurt man's estimation of himself. Had Freud promulgated the view that the mainspring of human conduct was some instinct hitherto regarded as highly laudable, love for our neighbour let us say, the theory would have been welcomed. Instead of this, Freud has shown that many 'lofty' ideas of man, including religion, are of sex origin. It is Freud's great offence, as it was Spinoza's, that he insists that man should regard himself as part of nature, and not as something outside and above nature. Spinoza's teaching is exactly that. Human motives must be analysed in just the same way as the relations of lines, circles and planes.

But we must not suppose that Spinoza had overcome his own sex repressions. There are many indications that he had not done so, in spite of his insistence on the principle that we are to regard nothing in nature with repugnance. He speaks, for instance, of the genital organs as the "parts of shame and excreta²," almost in the terms used by one of the old anatomists. Again, he defines *libido* as "desire and love in sexual intercourse³," and clearly means to attach some sense of reprobation to the term. Later, however, he uses *libido* in a much wider sense⁴, much more like that which we should now assign to the term. And, in another place⁵, he uses the term as identical with 'pleasure,' contrasting it with riches and fame. Of Spinoza's own sex life, in the narrow sense of that phrase, we know next to nothing. If we except the story, probably apocryphal, of his early fondness for Clara Maria Van den Ende, the daughter of one of his teachers, it would appear that women played no

¹ *Text Book of Physiology*, 1891, vol. iv, page 1555.

² III, 35, note.

³ III, Def. Emot. 48.

⁴ v, 42.

⁵ *De Intell. Emend.* 3.

part in his life at all. Politically he was what now would be called an anti-feminist. He seems to have been fond of children. But probably most of his sex energy was sublimated into his great intellectual work. He appears to have taken a very limited view of the marriage relation, a view which would be commended by certain eminent ecclesiastics. For he tells us that marriage is only in accordance with reason if the idea of uniting bodies arises from the love of bearing and of wisely educating children¹. It is not easy to see why this aspect of the many-faceted sex act is more 'rational' than any other aspect.

Returning to the *Ethics*, we find that Spinoza deals with the endeavour to persist in being². This endeavour, when it has reference to the mind alone, he calls will (*voluntas*): when it refers simultaneously to the mind and body he calls it appetite (*appetitus*). And he distinguishes between appetite and desire (*cupiditas*), desire being appetite with *consciousness* thereof. Here we see a distinct appreciation of the difference between conscious and unconscious desire.

Next he proceeds to a most vital point, that of the meaning, to us, of the word 'good.' He shows that we deem a thing good because we endeavour, wish for, desire, or long for it. We do not desire a thing because we deem it good³. We desire certain things, these things we set ourselves to attain, and we apply the term good to them. I need not stress the importance of this. It is at the root of all the social applications of psycho-analysis. It will not, of course, be accepted by those who hold the idea of an absolute good, outside ourselves, at which we should aim. For Spinoza's view hurts man's narcissism, does not fit in with what is called the dignity of human nature. Hence we are disposed to rationalize. We invent the idea of some absolute morality. We say that certain things are to be desired because they are good in themselves, and we strive to obtain every possible sanction for this view.

Spinoza defines pleasure as the passion by which the mind passes to a higher state of perfection, and pain as the passion by which the mind passes to a lower state of perfection⁴. *Perfectus* and *realitas* are to him the same thing⁵. The more perfection anything has, the more reality it has. And he goes on to show that the mind, as far as it can, endeavours to imagine those things which increase or help its power of action⁶. When the mind imagines things which diminish or hinder the power of acting of the body (and body and mind are the same thing) it endeavours as much as it can to remember things which will cut off their existence⁷.

¹ iv, Appendix, 19, 20.

² iii, 9.

³ *Ibid.* note.

⁴ iii, 11, note.

⁵ ii, Def. 6.

⁶ iii, 12.

⁷ iii, 13.

268 Spinoza's Anticipation of Psychological Developments

Here we have distinctly the idea of repression. The mind is averse to imagining those things which diminish or hinder its power. From this we clearly see, says Spinoza, that love is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause, and hate is pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause. When the mind is occupied with some painful idea it will continue to remember it until its existence is cut off by some other thing, which other thing the mind as much as possible endeavours to imagine or recall.

If the mind were once affected at the same time by two emotions, when afterwards it is affected by one of them it will also be affected by the other¹. Here we have the germ of the conception of the association of ideas in the unconscious. If we imagine a thing, which is wont to affect us with the emotion of sadness, to have something similar to another thing which equally affects us with the emotion of pleasure, we will love and hate that thing at the same time². This disposition, which arises from two contrary emotions, he calls wavering of the mind (*animi fluctuatio*). It has the same relation to the emotions as doubt has to imagination³. *Animi fluctuatio* can easily be expressed in terms of what we should call mental conflict. Spinoza notes that doubt is an essential element in both hope and fear, thus anticipating the views of modern psychology⁴. He says that we endeavour to affirm concerning ourselves everything that we imagine to affect ourselves with pleasure⁵. And what we find repugnant or conducive to pain we endeavour to remove⁶. Here we have repression again.

Spinoza grasps the importance of the herd instinct in the production of conduct. We endeavour to do everything which we imagine men to regard with pleasure, and vice versa⁷. That is to say, the herd instinct tends to be accentuated by suggestions from those whom we regard with respect. He also has the idea of narcissism, which he styles self-complacency (*acquiescentia in seipso*)⁸, or self-love (*philautia*)⁹. Several propositions deal with this¹⁰. If we imagine that others have been affected with pleasure on account of anything which we have done we shall be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of ourself as the cause. Similarly, if we imagine any one to enjoy anything which only one can possess, we shall endeavour to bring it about that he does not possess it. Our narcissism is hurt by his possession of it, because we cannot possess it. We are able to dispossess another of his envied

¹ III, 14.

⁴ III, 18, note 2.

⁷ III, 29.

² III, 17. See also IV, 9, note.

⁵ III, 25.

⁸ III, 30.

³ II, 44.

⁶ III, 28.

⁹ III, 55, note

¹⁰ III, 30-35, 42.

possession by means of fantasy, and we often do this, when other means are unavailable. Spinoza counsels us to go back, in attention, to our childhood¹. We find, he says, that children whose bodies are in equilibrium, will imitate whatever they see others do, and will desire for themselves all things which they see give pleasure to others.

He who recollects a thing which he once enjoyed, desires to possess it under the same circumstances as those in which he first enjoyed it². We have here the idea of the gratification of desire by means of fantasy.

If any one begins to hate a thing loved, so that his love for it is clearly laid aside, he will bear greater hatred towards it on that very account than if he had never loved it³. We could hardly have the modern theory of the mechanism of paranoia more succinctly stated⁴. Hatred which is entirely conquered by love passes into love, and love on that account is greater than if it had not been preceded by hatred⁵. Here we have the idea of repression again.

Love or hatred towards a thing which we imagine to be free must be greater than the love or hatred towards a necessary thing⁶. This is why men prosecute each other with greater love or hatred than they do other things, because they consider themselves, and therefore other men, to be free. This conception lies at the basis of our present legal system, which was devised by those who believed in 'free-will.' There was a time when animals, and even inanimate objects, were regarded as 'responsible' and were 'punished.'

When the mind imagines its want of power it is saddened by that fact⁷. Wherefore each person will derive the greatest pleasure from the contemplation of himself when he regards something in himself which he denies in others. He will be saddened if he imagines his actions, when compared with those of others, to be weaker; which sadness he will endeavour to remove by wrongly interpreting the actions of others, or by adorning his own as much as possible. Men therefore have a natural proclivity to hatred and envy, which is aided by their education. For parents are wont to encourage their children to virtue solely by the promise of honour or the fostering of envy. It may be said, Spinoza urges, that we often venerate the virtues of men. Hence he adds the explanation that no one envies the virtue of any one save his equal⁸. A man is not saddened by the fact that he regards some virtue in some one dissimilar to himself; consequently, he cannot envy him.

¹ III, 32.² III, 36.³ III, 38.⁴ See Stoddart, *Mind and its Disorders*.⁵ III, 44.⁶ III, 49.⁷ III, 55.⁸ *Ibid.* Cor. 2.

270 Spinoza's Anticipation of Psychological Developments

Though each individual lives content and rejoices in the nature he has, yet the life in which each is content and rejoices is nothing else than the idea or soul of that individual¹. Among all the emotions which have reference to the mind, in so far as it is active, there are none which have not reference to pleasure or desire². Here we come to what Freud has called the Pleasure Principle, which is in constant conflict with the Reality Principle.

Spinoza takes love, which as we have seen he regards as pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause, in a very extended sense. He points out how love can be combined with many other emotions³. I feel that he would have been quite ready to accept the extended view of sex which is held to-day.

He next proceeds to a series of precise definitions of the various emotions which he has already dealt with. Of these definitions we need say no more than that they have generally been considered as his masterpiece. We may note that he expressly disclaims making any distinction between appetite and desire⁴. Desire is, as we have seen, appetite with a consciousness of itself. Desire is the very essence of man. Whether a man be conscious of his appetite or not, his appetite remains the same. Spinoza grasps the distinction between, and yet the identity of, the conscious and the unconscious mind.

He admits repentance into his list of emotions. But he is careful to preserve his deterministic doctrine intact. Repentance is pain accompanied by the idea of some deed which we *think* we have done by the free decision of our mind⁵. It is not wonderful, he says, that pain should follow all those actions which according to custom are called wicked, for this is the result of our education. Here is the core of Spinoza's whole 'ethical' philosophy. Right (*rectus*) and wrong (*pravius*) are purely relative terms⁶. Our conceptions of right and wrong arise from the pressure of society. Not that the ideas of right and wrong are not of much importance so far as *we* are concerned.

In Part iv Spinoza proceeds to the consideration of the Strength of the Emotions, which he calls Human Servitude. He means by servitude man's lack of power in moderating and checking the emotions. A man who is submissive to his emotions is not in power over himself, but is in the hands of fortune to such an extent that he is often constrained, although he may see what is better for him, to follow what is worse.

¹ III, 57, note.

² III, 59.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ III, Def. Emot. 1.

⁵ III, Def. Emot. 27.

⁶ iv, Pref. and III, Def. Emot. 27.

Spinoza is quoting here from Ovid, *Metam.* vii, 20, and St Paul, in Romans vii, 19, has the same idea, and is probably quoting from the same source. The solution, that we can only control our emotions by understanding them, is reserved until the final part. This method of controlling the power of the emotions is, of course the key-note of psycho-analysis. Spinoza speaks about what is good and bad in the emotions, but he is most careful to explain again exactly what he means by good and bad. By good he means what we certainly know to be a means of attaining that type of human nature which we have set before us¹. He distinguishes between things possible and contingent. By contingent he means that, in so far as we regard the essence of the things alone, we find nothing which imposes or excludes their existence necessarily². By possible he means that, while we regard the causes by which the individual things must be produced, we know not whether they are determined to produce them³. By end for the sake of which we do anything he understands desire⁴. Virtue and power (*potestas*) are identical⁵. And he lays down the axiom that there is in nature something by which any individual thing can be destroyed⁶.

He next argues that since man must be a part of nature, he is always necessarily subject to passions, always follows the common order of nature, and accommodates himself to it as much as the nature of things demands⁷. An emotion can neither be hindered nor removed save by another and a stronger emotion⁸. Here we have the idea of repression again.

The knowledge of good and evil, says Spinoza, is nothing else than the emotion of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious of it⁹. For the idea of pleasure is united to the emotion in the same manner as the mind is united to the body. And a man is affected with the same emotion from the image of a thing past or future as from the image of a thing present¹⁰. Leave aside the future, and we see the immense importance of past emotions, repressed, but not destroyed in the unconscious. A true knowledge of good and evil cannot restrain any emotion in so far as the knowledge is true, but only in so far as it is considered as an emotion¹¹. In psycho-analytic language, the emotion content is more important than the intellectual content. But Spinoza does not, as it might appear, argue that the intellectual content has no power over the emotions. For the whole of Part v is an argument as to the way in which the intellect

¹ *Ibid.*² iv, Def. 3.³ iv, Def. 4.⁴ iv, Def. 7⁵ iv, Def. 8, and see iii, 7.⁶ iv, Axiom, and see v, 37.⁷ iv, 4, Cor.⁸ iv, 7.⁹ iv, 8.¹⁰ iii, 18.¹¹ iv, 14.

272 Spinoza's Anticipation of Psychological Developments

(reason) can and should control emotions. He is showing here why it is that men are guided by opinion rather than by true reason¹, that is to say, why they are obliged to rationalize. And he shows that the desire which arises from pleasure is, *ceteris paribus*, stronger than the desire which arises from pain². For desire being the very essence of man, that desire which arises from pleasure is increased by the emotion of pleasure itself. He proceeds to point out how reason postulates that each man should love himself, and seek what is useful to him. But he qualifies useful, by the most important word *truly*³. So the dictates of reason lead to virtue, and not as some would say, to selfishness (*impietas*). And he deals with self-maintenance as the foundation of virtue⁴. For, he says, that to act according to virtue is nothing else than to act in accordance with reason, to live so, and to preserve one's being (for the three things have the same meaning)⁵ on the basis of seeking what is truly useful to oneself. So the analysed man has not only the utmost peace within himself, but is also the most useful to his fellow men⁶. Having dealt with intelligence as the foundation of ethical judgment⁷ (I am using the word ethical in the ordinary sense here) he goes on to consider the common nature and interests of man as the ground of social ethics⁸. Nothing, he says, can be more useful to man than man. The community, to Spinoza, is not merely the sum of the individuals who compose it, but that sum of individuals functioning as a whole. The definition of man as a social animal has been generally approved⁹. Men shall find that their needs are much best satisfied by mutual help, and that only by joining their strength can they escape the perils which beset them on all sides. He has worked out all this in greater detail elsewhere¹⁰.

Spinoza has been accused of teaching that might is right. Such a statement does not represent his teaching, and, on account of the sense in which he uses the word 'right,' would have had no meaning for him. But he certainly teaches that might is the source of right. Only that which can exist can have rights. The statement is simply a plain acknowledgment of the nature of man, as of other organisms. The statement does not express any ideal. It does not insist that things should move in any particular direction (nor does psycho-analysis). But, as Santayana has said, it describes a situation which makes ideals possible and intelligible. That which man, like any other animal, finds advantageous in his attempts to preserve himself he will call good.

¹ iv, 17, note.

² iv, 18.

³ iv, 18, note.

⁴ iv, 19-25.

⁵ iv, 24.

⁶ iv, 35, Cor. 2.

⁷ iv, 26-28.

⁸ iv, 29-37.

⁹ iv, 35, note.

¹⁰ *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*.

Things which tend in the opposite direction he will call bad. The battle between a man's passions constitutes his character, combined with the battle with other things existing in his environment. It is reason which enables a man to survey all these factors simultaneously. Reason therefore creates a state of mind which is resigned, and yet is most powerful. Its strength consists in the abandonment of striving after what is not attainable, and the acceptance of what is necessary. This state of mind, thus produced, Spinoza calls happiness. He also calls it the intellectual love of God. And this state of mind is precisely that which is produced by a complete analysis; or analysis is, at least, one of the conditions of happiness.

If every man lived under the guidance of reason, each would possess his right without any danger¹. But men are liable to emotions which far surpass human power. Men are thus drawn in various directions, and therefore need help from each other. Society has to create a State which can enact and enforce laws. This is much the same view as that of Hobbes. Spinoza makes no distinction between sin and crime. Sin is nothing else than disobedience which is punished by the state. Sin, in the sense of disobedience to the law of God, would have had no meaning for Spinoza. He would simply have denied that such a thing could occur. His view in this respect would have been not unlike that of Macaulay, as expressed in the latter's remarks upon the impossibility of falsifying a divine prediction².

Spinoza then considers what bodily and mental affections are good or bad with respect to man's common weal³. He deals with the conduct and duties of the reasonable man. The main argument is that desire which arises from reason can have no excess. This must always be kept in mind when we are thinking of his statement that pleasure can never be evil while pain is always evil. We see why it is that praise can be retained under his system, while blame, as already explained, must be ruled out. He gives a most interesting description of what we should now call a case of dissociation of personality, that of a Spanish poet who had been seized with sickness, and on his recovery had so lost his memory that he did not think that the tales and tragedies he had written were his own⁴. Merriment is always good, and melancholy is always bad⁵. This might, perhaps, be read in the sense of the "positive and negative emotional states," to which some psychologists have referred. We may also note that if men were born free they would form no conception of

¹ iv, 37, note 2.

² *Civil Disabilities of the Jews*.

³ iv, 38-73.

⁴ iv, 39, note.

⁵ iv, 42.

good and evil, so long as they remained free¹. This might be taken in the sense of the "golden age of innocence²."

It is not necessary for us to deal with the final propositions of this part in detail. Suffice it to say that nothing could exceed the care which Spinoza takes to demonstrate that his system would result in the greatest possible happiness of society. He contends that the wise man can never gain anything by making himself unhappy, but that he may delight himself with all ordinary pleasures³. He adds the most important qualification that this must only be done so long as no hurt to his fellow men results. *Perfectus* and *realitas* are the same. *Perfectus* consists in complete adaptation to reality. We see the social superiority of Spinoza's system over that of Nietzsche's 'will to power,' and his 'slave and master morality.' Spinoza's whole argument is a glorification of the free man, that is the man who is led by reason, the fully analysed man. A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life⁴. As Renan has put it, "Reason leads death in captivity, and to work for her is to work for eternity." Finally, Spinoza sums up all his maxims of social ethics, and restates them in an appendix.

We have seen that the first and second parts of the *Ethics* contain the essentials of Spinoza's philosophy. The third and fourth parts are particular applications of the principles laid down in the two former parts. It might almost seem that he had intended to close his work with Part iv, and that the final part was only added as an after-thought⁵. However this may be, it is certain that we could ill have spared this final section, although its interpretation raises problems of great difficulty, problems with which we are not concerned here. Had he left the work as it stands up to the end of the fourth part, his philosophy might be said to have a distinctly pessimistic cast. But in the magnificent final part he deals with the Freedom of Man as derived from the intellect, and to him may well be applied the title "serenest of the progeny of God." I hope also to show that there is much in this fifth part which is well worthy of the attention of students of psycho-analysis.

Having dealt faithfully with what he regards as the errors of Descartes⁶ he proceeds to develop his thesis, that as the power of the mind is defined by intelligence alone, the remedies for the emotions are to be determined from mere knowledge of the mind, and that from that knowledge we can deduce all things which relate to the blessedness of

¹ iv, 68.

² Ernest Jones, *Papers on Psychoanalysis*, p. 633.

³ iv, 45, note 2.

⁴ iv, 67.

⁵ Sir Frederick Pollock on Spinoza, Chap. ix.

⁶ v, Preface.

the mind. He starts with an important axiom¹. If in the same subject two contrary actions are excited, a change must take place in both or in one of them until they cease to be contrary. Here we have a distinct suggestion of the processes of repression and of sublimation. And he further develops this idea of sublimation. For, says he, if we remove disturbance of the mind or emotion from the thought of an external cause and unite it to other thoughts, then love or hatred towards the external cause, as well as waverings of the mind which arise from these emotions, are destroyed². An emotion which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it³. (The distinction between active and passive will be remembered.) From this he shows that the more an emotion becomes known to us, the more it is in our power, and the less the mind is passive to it (autognosis, as we should say to-day). There is no emotion of which we cannot (not of which we *do* not) form some clear and distinct conception⁴. Every one, therefore, has the power of understanding himself and his emotions. An emotion can be separated from the thought of an external cause, and united to true thoughts (sublimation again). All desires are only passions in so far as they arise from inadequate ideas. And the remedy for emotions consists in a true knowledge of them. Having again demonstrated the immense value of determinism, by showing that in so far as the mind understands all things as necessary it has more power over the emotions, or is less passive to them, he indicates that we cannot pity things which are necessary in the course of nature. We do not pity an infant for having been born helpless. But we should pity an infant, if most men were born full-grown⁵. We say, vaguely, that we are all 'miserable sinners.' But no one seriously thinks the less of himself or of any other person on that account. When a man really believes that he is the greatest sinner in the world, we then do pity him, and locate him in a mental hospital.

Spinoza discusses the power which we have of bringing it about that we are not easily affected by evil emotions⁶, that is by emotions which are contrary to our well-being, for he will not, of course, admit that any emotion is absolutely evil. He realizes that many people have no perfect knowledge of their emotions. He recommends that we should conceive some manner of living aright, or certain rules of life, commit them to memory, and apply them continuously to the individual things which come in our way frequently in life, so that our imagination may

¹ v, Axiom 1.² v, 2.³ v, 3.⁴ v, 4.⁵ v, 6.⁶ v, 10.

be deeply affected with them, and that they may be always ready for us. Thus he realizes the immense importance of good habit formation. Some ethical rules, religious or other, will always be wanted for the many. Where people found that their religion tended to a satisfactory manner of life, Spinoza never advised them to change their religion. He attempted to form no sect. There are many people who find that religion assists them to form a satisfactory adaptation to reality. If the religion happens to be one which possesses a definite code of morals so much the better. When people find such a religion satisfactory or helpful, there is no more to be said. It is the sick with whom we have to deal, and not with the well, although their standard of health may not be the same as ours. I mention this point, because determinism, and other parts of Spinoza's theory, has been objected to, as has psycho-analysis, on account of its supposed destructive effect upon religion and morality.

Hatred must be overcome by love and nobleness, and not requited by mutual hatred¹. If we always have in mind a regard for our advantage and the good which arises from mutual friendship and common intercourse, and remember that men, like other things, act according to the necessity of nature, then anger, although not perhaps easily overcome, would be overcome, even if with wavering of the mind. I cannot better describe the peace of mind induced by the full appreciation of the psycho-analytic theory.

Spinoza deals with the process of rationalization, giving various examples². A poor man who is greedy will not cease to talk of the abuse of money and the evils of riches. He rationalizes, but is really actuated by unconscious motives.

Some propositions follow which deal with the nature of God³. The principle is laid down that God is free from passions (a perfectly orthodox opinion⁴, even if not consistently worked out by the orthodox). The word rendered as 'free from passions' is *impassibilis*, i.e. impassive or incapable of suffering. On Spinoza's theory of *passio* this amounts to the same thing. But the point would not be clear to an English reader. Spinoza then deals with the old difficulty of God being the cause of pain⁵. He points out that, in so far as we understand the causes of pain, it ceases to be a passion, and therefore in so far as we understand God to be the cause of pain, we rejoice. Then follows the famous proposition which asserts that he who loves God cannot endeavour to bring it about that God should love him in return⁶. This is not the place to enter into

¹ v, 10.² v, 10.³ v, 15-18.⁴ See Anglican Articles of Religion, i.⁵ v, 18.⁶ v, 19.

the tremendous implications of this most pregnant saying. It is the basis of what Spinoza means by *amor intellectualis Dei*, with which he concludes the *Ethics*. We cannot enter into this. Suffice it to say that this intellectual love of God (which can easily be translated into psycho-analytic terms) is the secret of that peace, of which we may paradoxically say that it passes understanding because it is based on understanding. Spinoza, in his pious fashion, goes so far as to adopt Christian phraseology, speaking of the "beatific vision of God¹." There is nothing in nature which is contrary to this intellectual love, or which can remove it².

Finally, he deals with the problem of immortality. The mind can imagine nothing, nor recollect past things, save while in the body³. But in God there is necessarily granted the idea which expresses the essence of the human body *sub specie aeternitatis*⁴. Spinoza expressly guards against the confusion of eternity with duration of time. The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the human body, but there is some part of it which remains eternal⁵. But he carefully guards against the supposition that he is maintaining a conception of any kind of personal survival after death. We feel and know that we are eternal. We do not remember that we have existed before. But we feel that our mind, in so far as it involves the essence of the body *sub specie aeternitatis*, is eternal, and its existence cannot be defined by time, or explained by duration. In other words, the mind is eternal as being part of God, but this in no way implies the survival of personality.

We endeavour to change the body of an infant (body and mind are the same) so that it is capable of many things, and is referred to a mind which is most conscious of God, itself, and other things⁶. This is how infantile conditions are dealt with by psycho-analysis.

Piety and religion, in Spinoza's language, do not depend at all upon any idea of personal immortality, but upon reason⁷. He shows how contrary this is to the vulgar idea of blessedness being the future reward of virtue. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but is virtue itself (or power)⁸. The more the mind rejoices in this divine love or blessedness the more it understands, the more power it has over the emotions, and the less passive it is to emotions which are evil. And I cannot better sum up the whole of my argument than in the final words of the *Ethics*. "Thus I have completed all that I wished to show concerning the power of the mind over the emotions, or the freedom of the mind. From which

¹ *Cogita Metaphysica*, II, 8.

² v, 37.

³ v, 21.

⁴ v, 22.

⁵ v, 23.

⁶ v, 39, note.

⁷ v, 41, note.

⁸ v, 42.

278 *Spinoza's Anticipation of Psychological Developments*

it is clear how much a wise man is in front of and how stronger he is than an ignorant one who is guided by lust alone." (He uses lust, *libido*, in a much wider sense than that in which he employed it previously.) "For an ignorant man besides being agitated in many ways by external causes, never enjoys one true satisfaction of the mind: he lives, moreover, almost unconscious of himself, God, and things, and as soon as he ceases to be passive, ceases to be. On the contrary, the wise man, in so far as he is considered as such, is scarcely moved in spirit; he is conscious of himself, of God, and of things, by a certain eternal necessity, he never ceases to be, and always enjoys satisfaction of mind. If the road I have shown to lead to this is very difficult, it can yet be discovered. And clearly it must be very hard when it is so seldom found. For how could it be that it is neglected practically by all, if salvation were close at hand and could be found without difficulty? But all excellent things are as difficult as they are rare."

I must express the debt which I owe to Sir Frederick Pollock's great work, *Spinoza, His Life and Philosophy*. I also desire to make due acknowledgment of the assistance which I have received from the kindly criticisms of Professor Carveth Read, and the Rev. Lawrence Clare, of Birmingham.

THE NEUROTIC CHARACTER¹

By EDWARD GLOVER.

FROM time to time the psycho-analyst is called upon to treat certain individuals of both sexes whose illness cannot be classified under the usual categories. Indeed it may be difficult at first to understand exactly what urge has carried them to the point of undergoing a prolonged course of treatment. In some instances it is ostensibly a matter of matrimonial difficulties, in others an incapacity for social adaptation bringing with it a crop of emotionally tinged situations, in others again a tendency to 'breakdown' in phases of life requiring decisive action. Preliminary investigation does not bring much positive information: neurotic symptoms of a dramatic sort may be quite conspicuously absent, although leading questions in many cases uncover an obsessional disposition. Whatever symptomatic constructions are present have rather a larval character, for example a tendency to hypochondriacal pre-occupation, mild forms of compulsive doubt, slight phobia constructions, lesser conversion or pathoneurotic symptoms or in some instances abnormal jealousy reactions together with indications that the patient's projective systems are being overworked, attitudes of exaggerated suspicion, a tendency to regard himself as the victim of conspiring circumstances. Some form or other of psycho-sexual inhibition is usually present although it may not have been regarded as such by the patient. Two facts however can usually be elicited without much difficulty, first that the individual is faced with a series of crises which recur constantly and seem to have a stereotyped form even although the environmental setting may vary: secondly, that the most acute of these crises are associated with changes in the libidinal *milieu*, separations from or losses amongst the family circle, problems of marriage or of marital life, changes in occupation or decisions regarding a fixed career, sudden variations in social conditions or sudden assumptions of responsibility.

Should the case proceed to analysis it is not long before some of the preliminary surmises are easily confirmed. The analytic situation with its potentialities for libidinal satisfaction is accepted with suspicious alacrity, and analysis often proceeds with that smoothness and intellectualistic avidity which indicates unconscious libido gratification and

¹ Read before the Medical Section of the British Psychological Society, Nov. 25, 1925.

portends the most stubborn of affective resistances. Nevertheless from the mass of preconscious material which is produced, it becomes more and more certain that the situations of difficulty, doubt or emotional conflict have some patent resemblance. They may indeed be so identical as to merit the description 'repetitive,' but even where both stage setting and actors are widely different, the theme is worked out along identical lines, indicating an underlying mechanism common to all of the situations. Moreover it can be seen that the situations themselves although seemingly arising by chance are in fact unconsciously engineered to meet periodic stresses of instinctual tension.

The next point to be noted is the frequency with which everyday social contingencies are woven into an emotional climax and how the consequences also involve persons other than the patient. In short the latter stages show two stock situations; in one of these, owing to a seemingly perverse and malignant environment, he is injured in some way or other; in the other, seemingly from no fault of his own and with the best of conscious intentions he brings unhappiness to certain significant persons in his environment. In many respects the situation is similar to that existing when, within the family circle, the neurotic is the victim of misunderstanding and at the same time inflicts considerable damage on his own capacities and on those of his family. In the latter instance however the area affected is a comparatively circumscribed one, whereas with the type we have mentioned the family circle has been widened to include the whole range of his acquaintance, indeed society as a whole represented through laws, customs, business conventions and so forth. Indeed the mechanism may be so obvious that the individual comes to be regarded by candid friends as a 'poor devil dogged by ill luck,' or as 'his own worst enemy,' or as a 'pest,' which latter category is quick to merge with that of the 'ne'er-do-well.'

By way of illustration, let us consider the following typical case. A male patient whose reasons for coming to treatment were ostensibly concerned with some hypochondriacal symptoms and some obsessive thoughts, soon indicated that what aroused most of his concern was a feeling of ineffectiveness in life and a considerable preoccupation with money affairs. In addition it was clear that, although married, his psycho-sexual life was very much inhibited. It gradually transpired that as well as occupying his attention, financial affairs constituted almost his sole activity. They seemed to be of two sorts, a concern with speculations which were intended to fulfil dreams of quickly amassed wealth but which in practice either failed in their purpose or ended in

sometimes substantial loss. In these matters he played a lone hand although the consequences sometimes involved others. But there was another group in which he acted as a kind of fairy godmother to other people, mostly men, and embarked on a series of ventures which again resulted most often in loss to himself although not to his protégé. A third situation was that of rescuing certain types in financial distress. The striking feature of the case was the persistent way in which, ignoring all previous experience, he would bring about precisely similar situations, entering anew on speculations, being drawn into new ventures and successfully sponged on by an always needy entourage. Even when his operations were successful he usually made it the occasion to transfer substantial sums to other members of the family, *i.e.* he was no longer in pocket. It was as if the amassing tendency was inevitably opposed by a tendency to rid himself of masses, which ultimately gained the upper hand and resulted in quite appreciable losses. With almost uncanny precision he would dally with speculative dreams until the moment for effective action was past and would then fling himself into the market to be left with a 'parcel' of stock, which he could only realize at a loss.

Another case showed a somewhat similar reaction, with this difference, that he could allow himself to be effective to an appreciable extent but after these periods of success would bring himself to the verge of actual ruin. Again and again he would exhibit great skill in building up a business; this would be followed by periods of foreboding and ultimately by disaster which in the retrospect was seen to have been avoidable. He would then start all over again with a fresh venture. In both cases described the actual steps taken were however at the time based on seemingly unassailable rationalizations. This repetitive play with means of subsistence can be enacted with every possible variation. It is seen too, although in less dramatic form, with persons who turn from one occupation to another, always abandoning one activity when a certain degree of efficiency or futility has been demonstrated. An artist becomes an actor, takes up singing, dabbles in lecturing, turns to teaching and ends in so-called nervous breakdown. We might include here too individuals such as those described by Stekel¹ and Abraham², who spend their lives in dramatic representation of some quality or other which is suggested by their own surname, or who unconsciously model

¹ Stekel, "Die Verpflichtung des Namens," *Zeitschrift für Psychotherapie und medizinische Psychologie*, Bd. III, Ht. 2, 1911.

² Abraham, "Über die determinierende Kraft des Namens," *Klinische Beiträge zur Psychoanalyse*, 1921.

their behaviour on the pattern of some famous personage whose name or surname they happen to share.

Other common types are those who, although not necessarily unsuccessful in business affairs, expend much energy and ingenuity in getting into stereotyped emotional situations. Their lives seem to be a running series of clashes with authority, successfully engineered rebellions and superfluous martyrdoms. Others again involve themselves in a series of social situations where they deem themselves to be slighted, passed over or wronged; they bring themselves periodically to states of emotional misery and inflict not a little suffering on the involuntary actors in their dramas. Their reactions resemble very closely the reactions of a large group of seemingly normal persons whose love-life is made up of a series of repetitive affairs with different love-objects, the ultimate end of which is disappointment on one or both sides and a compulsive drive towards the next entanglement. In this connection Freud has shrewdly remarked how unhappy marriages, loss of money or bodily infirmity may resolve an otherwise refractory neurosis¹. Postponing for the moment analytical consideration of the mechanisms operative in the above types, we may say that they have a sufficiently pathological stamp to distinguish them from ordinary character reactions. On the other hand, although usually associated with some mild form of typical neurotic symptom, their general reactions do not conform to the accustomed modes of neurotic symptom formation. In fact from both descriptive and psycho-genetic points of view, it has been found convenient to distinguish the conditions with the special designation of 'neurotic character.' Needless to say, it does not follow that the cases described are the only ones which justify this diagnosis; as we shall see, there are other character abnormalities of a more glaring and compulsive nature which would seem to indicate the necessity for subdivision of the neurotic character or for a separate category or again for inclusion in a possible psychotic character grouping. The types illustrated have three features in common, first that the character reaction is pathological, secondly that it is diffused throughout everyday life, and thirdly that it is supported by a framework of cast-iron rationalizations, which on many occasions satisfy the onlooker as well as the patient.

Now it might well be argued by those familiar with the handling of neurotic patients that this so-called neurotic character is a matter of everyday analytical experience, hence that there is no need to isolate it

¹ Freud, "The Economic Problem of Masochism," *Collected Papers*, vol. II, International Psycho-Analytical Library, 1924.

as a distinct pathological state or to consider it as more than a sort of neurotic 'aura.' This would seem to be borne out by the frequency with which repetitive situations occur in the love-life of the neurotic and by the fact that in particular neuroses there is a notable accentuation of certain character traits, *e.g.* in obsessional neurosis an accentuation of anal character traits which are repetitive in type and exploited under varying conditions. Against this we have to put the facts that many pathological character changes do exist without symptom formations and particularly that treatment of character changes can give rise to a temporary exacerbation of larval neurotic symptoms. Perhaps the most satisfactory method of approaching the matter however is to consider the historical stages leading to the isolation of the neurotic character.

It is scarcely necessary to recall here the pioneer work in psycho-analytic characterology carried out by Freud¹, Jones² and Abraham³. Freud's original classification of orderliness, obstinacy and avarice as anal character traits was abundantly confirmed and amplified in numerous respects by all three writers. Almost simultaneously urethral character changes, ambition, envy and impatience were described, some of which were later traced back to a primary character-stamp affixed during the oral stage of libido development⁴. During the same period much individual work had been done on more general character peculiarities and psycho-analytic literature is replete with descriptions and interpretations of such conditions. Unfortunately these are as a rule sandwiched between material dealing with pure symptom constructions, but in some instances we can find evidence of more elaborate study of general character changes. Freud⁵ for example, in his description of the obsessive disposition, calls attention to the remarkable character changes occurring at the climacteric, how the sweet maiden, loving woman and tender mother may deteriorate into the 'old termagant,' becoming quarrelsome, peevish, argumentative, petty and miserly. The observation was not in itself original but Freud's explanation was both original and illuminating,

¹ Freud, "Character and Anal Erotism," *Collected Papers*, vol. II, International Psycho-Analytical Library, 1924.

² Jones, "Anal-erotic Character Traits," *Papers on Psycho-Analysis*, 1923.

³ Abraham, "Contributions to the Theory of Anal Character," *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, vol. IV, 4, 1923.

⁴ Abraham, "The Influence of Oral Erotism on Character Formation," *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, vol. VI, 3, 1925. Edward Glover, "Notes on Oral Character Formation," *ibid.* vol. VI, 2, 1925.

⁵ Freud, "The Predisposition to Obsessional Neurosis," *Collected Papers*, vol. II, International Psycho-Analytical Library, 1924.

namely, that it represented a post-genital regression to the former pre-genital anal-sadistic phase, and that what distinguished the character change from an obsessional change was the absence of conflict, or of any struggle against the regression by means of reaction formations or compromise symptom constructions. At a somewhat later date Freud¹ published a study indicating that he had come to grips with abnormal character formations, most of which had proved to be sources of powerful resistance during analysis. One need only mention his description of types claiming to be exceptions, exempt from all restrictions of the pleasure principle. These were shown to be individuals who had suffered libidinal thwarting during the infantile period. Women of this group who felt that they had been unfairly injured in childhood had moreover an unabsorbed castration situation. Still more striking was his analysis of patients who appear to wreck themselves on attaining success in life. It seems that in such cases unconscious wishes are tolerated so long as there is no appearance of fulfilment in reality. When however reality seems likely to gratify the forbidden phantasy, conflict breaks out and the consequent inner deprivation becomes pathogenic. Another important character study is that on "The God-Complex" by Ernest Jones² which in effect deals with certain transition types between normal and neurotic characteristics.

The next development in psycho-analytic characterology is illustrated by Abraham's³ work on the female castration complex. It belongs to the same group as descriptions of anal, urethral and oral characteristics, but, dealing as it does with situations centring round the Oedipus phase, we are shown more complicated specific reactions to external situations and objects. Finally we must refer to the classical study of Alexander⁴ on "Castration Complex and Character." Here he describes the part played by the castration complex in moulding a patient's love, business and general social attitudes, and discusses the relation of character formation to symptom formation, in the light of the Ego psychology available at the time. This comprised Freud's studies on narcissism, ideal formation, the repetition compulsion, and group psychology, but at that time his latest formulations had not been published. These were

¹ Freud, "Some Character Types met with in Psycho-analytic work," *Collected Papers*, vol. iv, International Psycho-Analytical Library, 1925.

² Jones, "The God-Complex," *Essays in Applied Psycho-Analysis*, 1923.

³ Abraham, "Manifestations of the Female Castration Complex," *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, vol. iii, 1, 1922.

⁴ Alexander, "The Castration Complex in the Formation of Character," *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, vol. iv, 1 and 2, 1923.

contained in "Das Ich und das Es" published in 1923¹. This latter is essentially a study which cannot be condensed but it is no exaggeration to say that it provided a stable framework in which earlier fragments of characterology could be pieced together, jig-saw fashion. To give but the barest outline of essentials we may say that Freud distinguishes three systems in the psyche. The first is the 'Es' or Id (literally the 'It'), a great reservoir system or hinterland of instinct tendencies. A part of this Id-system is highly modified, is ranged round perceptual consciousness as round a nucleus and is essentially corporeal. This highly modified part constitutes the Ego, includes the preconscious system and guards the approaches to motility. The Ego however comes to be sharply separated from the repressed, which therefore is included within the Id. Now here we have a fact of fundamental importance for character study. On the one hand the Ego is separated from the repressed: on the other the Ego, being a modified part of the Id, is not sharply separated from it and is in fact infiltrated by the Id, especially in its more primitive formations. So that there is a possible roundabout way of communication between the repressed and the Ego namely at the region where the Id infiltrates the Ego. There is however a third system to be bargained with, the Ego ideal or Super-ego, which is set up as the result of individual struggle with the Oedipus situation. Its exact structure and tendency depends on the nature of primary identifications with the parents and the fate of erotic strivings towards the parents, but it illustrates the special mechanism whereby abandoned Id-strivings towards an object are dealt with by introjection and identification. It is known of course that all object relations leave some imprint on the Ego either through identification or introjection, but this particular series is unique in that it, so to speak, incorporates the parents in the individual and continues to function as an instigator of repression.

For example when the Oedipus phase in a boy or girl is overcome, it is sometimes possible to observe an accentuation of masculine characteristics on the part of the girl and of feminine in the boy. This illustrates not only one of the ways of dealing with the Oedipus complex but represents the typical mechanism of character formation by introjection, after an erotic striving has been abandoned. Coming back to the formation of the Super-ego, we have to note that its activities are of a twofold

¹ Freud, "On Narcissism, an Introduction," *Collected Papers*, vol. iv, International Psycho-Analytical Library, 1925. "Beyond the Pleasure Principle," "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," International Psycho-Analytical Library, 1922. "Das Ich und das Es," *Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag*, 1923.

nature represented in the imperatives "Thou shalt" and "Thou shalt not." The latter imperative gives us a hint as to what is happening when an individual is shattered by success. Now whilst the formation of the Super-ego represents a climax in character processes, the ground has been by no means unprepared previously. Throughout each of the phases of infantile libido development, similar imperatives have been urged from without and have been accepted from within although on a strictly business footing, the terms being, so to speak, the hard cash of libidinal gratification. In this way manifestations of component sexual impulses have been partly controlled so that, when the final stage is reached, there is already in existence a loosely organized system of primitive morality which in normal individuals is then welded together. Ferenczi¹ has in fact described the development of various sphincter controls as a kind of sphincter morality, a physiological forerunner of the Super-ego. It is easy to see however that in the early stages of scattered Ego formation, direct Id components must be more strongly represented, Ego control must be less exacting, reaction formations more crude and real sublimation rudimentary.

A bird's-eye view of character formations at the end of the infantile period might well be compared with a geological formation, each stratification bearing a typical imprint, increasing in complexity from the most primitive post-natal impressions, through the auto-erotic, narcissistic stages to the point at which the struggle over love and hate of the first complete external objects, the parents, is reached and passed. Each imprint will have positive and negative features, representing the "Thou shalt" and the "Thou shalt not" of each period, and will reflect moreover the prevailing mode of gratification and the prevailing mode of reaction formation forced upon the individual.

The nature and outline of surface formations will depend partly on the underlying order and partly on the age and vicissitudes of the individual. We know that from childhood onwards the Ego is less pliable to character alteration or is somewhat selective. It is of course common experience that the process of introjection and Ego alteration still holds to some extent for emotionally significant personages in later life, as we can see in the gradual character absorptions which take place between married couples, but of course, unconscious selective processes have already been at work here. Again we are familiar with the regressive character changes already mentioned when libido involution lights up pregenital character traits.

¹ Ferenczi, "On the Psycho-Analysis of Sexual Habits," *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, vol. VI, 4, 1925.

In the case of neurotic character we would expect to find either exaggeration or distortion of the imprint at one or all of the primitive levels, having in either case the same ultimate result, a warping of characteristics acquired during the Oedipus phase. To return to the case first described, we have seen that this patient showed exaggerated reactions to money affairs, and brought about states of financial self-punishment. His methods of getting rid of money were particularly reminiscent of the neurotic reaction described by Abraham¹, where states of anxiety are met with by disbursing sums of money. The opposing tendencies to acquire and to get rid of accumulations seemed to dominate his activities and it was not surprising to find that these tendencies were illustrated by reactions dating from different pregenital stages of development. As might have been surmised from his interest in speculation, there was a definite accentuation of oral reactions. These were always of an exaggerated type. On the one hand he would show signs of anxiety when eating or drinking with strangers or in a crowd, and on the other would so order his social life that he gave hospitality to people who either had no means or no inclination to return it. At the same time his speculative interests were always attracted by concerns dealing with natural products and foodstuffs, whilst his phantasy life was busy with luxuriant tropical pictures of lands where food exists in abundance and is obtained without effort. The usual character traits of the anal stage were quite patent in his case, but there was in addition an elaborate series of anal reactions which penetrated into every detail of his daily life. As a matter of interest, his excretory tempo varied from constipation to diarrhoea, and he observed a mild series of excretory rituals of a contamination sort, which were definitely exaggerated but not sufficiently pathological to be called obsessional ceremonials. He had innumerable peculiarities in regard to money, apart from the major reactions described. They seemed invariably to centre round ideas of affluence and philanthropy or of poverty and rescue. He would typically go about with no change in his pocket and would depend on some female member of the household to rescue him from numerous minor financial embarrassments. At the same time accumulations of money disturbed him. This was paralleled in other activities by apprehensions about every conceivable variety of stoppage. Traffic blocks excited him strangely and he had constant intestinal preoccupations of a like sort. Obviously this was associated with pregnancy phantasies but here again he could

¹ Abraham, "Das Geldausgeben im Angstzustand," *Klinische Beiträge zur Psychoanalyse*, 1921.

find vent for his ideas in financial activities, dwelling particularly on anticipations of luxuriant growth of speculations. On the other hand, loss of money would immediately stimulate phantasies of falling into consumption. His incapacity feelings were clearly associated with castration anxiety and unconscious passive homosexuality and again his reactions were exhibited in everyday life, his ethical and political views and prejudices, his relations to family, friends and acquaintances, his games and hobbies. Finally his love-life had been determined on the same basis and his marriage represented a climax in his attempts to reproduce and yet avoid the Oedipus situation. In short the whole of his life was honeycombed with character peculiarities representative of a thwarted pregenital and genital development.

So far we have described the clinical appearances of one type of neurotic character, and have given a somewhat vague outline of character structure, but have as yet produced no working definitions of either normal or neurotic character. To understand the function of normal character and the pathological nature of neurotic character we must turn our attention to the position of the neurotic and psychotic symptom. Perhaps the simplest approach to this subject is to consider what happens when a situation of instinct tension arises in any individual. This tension necessitates some modification, calculated to bring about relief. Instinct tension being a tension from within, modification can conceivably take place within the individual (*e.g.* in meeting sexual need by autoerotic discharge). This is the autoplasic method, to use the phrase coined and adopted by Ferenczi and Freud¹. But as the Ego develops instinct tension has come to be bound up with outer objects. Hence effective discharge involves modification of environment. This is the alloplastic as opposed to the autoplasic method. Now modification of external environment implies a sound reality sense, and effective displacement, but even if these are not sound or effective, it is still possible to deal with tension through environment by giving up reality, and projecting on to environment an emergency reality. This is the psychotic method. The neurotic has however in effect an unimpaired 'sense of reality proving,' as can be seen by contrasting the subjective attitudes of patients to a phobia and to a delusion respectively. If one attempted to reason with a patient about a phobia and pointed out that it was nonsensical the answer would be "I know it," but if one told a psychotic that his delusion was nonsense, he would reply, "By no means, I'll

¹ Freud, "Neurosis and Psychosis" and "The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis," *Collected Papers*, vol. II, International Psycho-Analytical Library, 1924.

prove it to you." The neurotic knows that he cannot justify the situation, the delusional case gives the full force of reality conviction to his modification of environment. What then has the neurotic done? He has abandoned the normal alloplastic modification of instinctual tension in favour of an autoplasic modification. He has regressed to older methods of gratification but, as these are of a forbidden nature and contravene the imperative injunctions of the Super-ego, he has to produce them in a disguised symptom form, that is to say, at the cost of illness. He gives up real gratification but retains a practically unimpaired sense of reality testing. The result is that his symptom solution is completely out of touch with the Ego, it is irrational and dissociated. The psychotic, on the other hand, has ignored reality and at considerable cost substituted a reality of his own. Again, the neurotic by adopting the autoplasic method has obviously localized his solution to his own personality, and in the actual mode of symptom formation may localize it still further to a particular part or activity of his body. The psychotic may succeed in some degree of localization, as in paranoia, but it invariably involves the environment in some projective respect.

These two considerations, viz. (1) individual versus environmental modification, and (2) the degree of localization, enable us to take some measure of the neurotic character. It will be seen that whereas the neurotic can only tolerate an autoplasic solution of instinct tension and the psychotic solution involves giving up reality, the neurotic character takes advantage of the social situation disguising his solution broadly speaking under accepted social conventions. In so doing he is aided and abetted by the environment in that the social situation up to a point gives general toleration to character abnormalities and the patient's rationalizations tend to be accepted at face value by a society which itself exploits rationalization to the full during waking hours. In other words, the neurotic character justifies himself as the delusional case does, but his justifications, unlike those of the psychotic, are to some extent accepted by society. Clearly there is an absence of any localization in the neurotic character and there is a deficient sense of reality proving. Hence there have arisen two views as to its gravity, the first put forward by Alexander¹, who says that the neurotic character makes life his neurosis, that his life is interwoven with neurosis, and the second by Ferenczi who regards character abnormalities as private psychoses tolerated by the Ego².

Without taking sides in this discussion we may go on to consider

¹ Alexander, *loc. cit.*

² Ferenczi, *loc. cit.*

other aspects of the neurotic character. As we have seen, the neurotic character not only makes positive demands on environment but sees to it that the demands are periodically refused, or still further that environment should inflict injuries upon him. This is of course reminiscent of neurotic self-punishment, the difference being that in the symptom we can trace a symbolic punishment, whereas with the neurotic character although the injury has also a symbolic significance, it is a real injury which seems to be almost deliberately inflicted by circumstances or other objects, persons, parents, Gods, Fates, etc. This implies either that the Super-ego in neurotic character has never been firmly established or that the neurotic character represents a regression to a more archaic level of Super-ego formation and is dependent on environment for the drive which in other cases comes from within. Here we have an obvious link with the perversion. The pervert carries out Id-tendencies quite directly, not through disguised symptom formations, yet, as Sachs¹ has reminded us, he invokes a punishment situation which is real and is carried out definitely by environment. In fact the pervert's solution is emphatically rejected by society. Another resemblance between the perversion and neurotic character has been pointed out by Freud when considering by what means the Ego can reconcile the claims of the Id and of the Super-ego respectively. He remarks that the Ego can avoid a rupture of its relations by deforming itself and goes on to say, "Thus the illogicalities, eccentricities and follies of mankind would fall into a category similar to their sexual perversions for by accepting them they spare themselves repressions²."

Having thus correlated neurotic character with and at the same time distinguished it from neurosis and perversion through the relation to guilt, to social acceptance or rejection of demands and to the nature of punishment, we are immediately reminded of another link between neurotic character and the psychoses. We have said that the delusional idea is rejected more in sorrow than in anger by society, but there are cases where wide tolerance of psychotic characteristics is displayed. Freud³ has pointed out concerning jealousy that although, strictly speaking, this is not a normal reaction from the point of view of reality adaptation, nevertheless the condition can be regarded as a normal competitive reaction to the loss of an object. His next grouping is a

¹ Sachs, "Zur Genese der Perversionen," *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, vol. ix, 2, 1923.

² Freud, "Neurosis and Psychosis," *Collected Papers*, vol. ii, 1924.

³ Freud, "Certain Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality," *Collected Papers*, vol. ii, 1924.

projective one, when the individual's own faithlessness is obscured by an exaggeration of the unconscious signs of infidelity on the part of the object, *e.g.* where the unconsciously faithless husband interprets his wife's social relations in terms of infidelity. The third grouping is that of delusional jealousy where, to conceal an unconscious love for objects of the same sex, the man is convinced of his wife's love for other men. This last represents a paranoid state. Now to take an extreme instance, whilst expressions of ordinary suspicion may be based on good rationalizations, many paranoids regard themselves as supremely normal, and, what is more, are regarded by others as supremely normal. Many people however, although not paranoid, are paranoidal in type and we find that in the neurotic character exaggerated forms of suspicion exist, which, although essentially psychotic in type, are often accepted at their face value by others.

Apparently then it is going to be a difficult matter to define the neurotic character, without formulating at the same time an additional grouping of psychotic characters. This difficulty becomes more pressing when we meet with character types which have been studied and grouped together by Wilhelm Reich under the designation of 'Triebhaft' (governed by instinct) character¹. Reich includes these definitely under the heading of neurotic characters, but distinguishes them from instinct-inhibited characters on several grounds. The most important of these are (1) that they have a closer relation to the *repetition compulsion*, (2) that they give more direct expression in *action* to *unmodified* instincts in contrast to distorted expression, (3) that there is no single fixation point, but on the other hand a specific developmental disturbance of the Ego. His cases exhibited manifest ambivalence without reaction formation, faulty repression, sadistic actions unaccompanied by guilt and were usually associated with manifest perversions. In addition neurotic symptoms were quite a prominent feature, and although psychotic formations were not always present, the patients frequently presented schizoid characteristics. Broadly speaking, we might distinguish Reich's instinctual character from his 'inhibited' neurotic character and from the neurotic symptom respectively by comparing an individual who physically injures himself or members of his family with, on the one hand, an individual who shows an exaggerated characteristic of scrupulousness and, on the other, with a patient suffering from obsessive ceremonials calculated to neutralize unconscious ideas of aggression.

The question immediately arises whether the types he describes are

¹ Reich, "Der triebhafte Charakter," *Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag*, 1925.

pure enough to be included under the neurotic character, or whether they are not mixed types capable of further subdivision in accordance with their resemblance to severe neuroses, perversions, psychoses, etc. On the other hand, in Alexander's description of the neurotic character the irrational and apparently senseless behaviour of patients is emphasized, which would to some extent separate them from the types presented in this paper, with whom a feature of the situation is the existence of almost cast-iron rationalizations. Difficulties of this sort may be met to some extent in one or all of three ways. They may be regarded as the result of variation in intensity of character discharges, lighting up, so to speak, increasingly archaic levels of adaptation. Or broad differences in types of neurotic character may be correlated with the nature of the Super-ego formation, *e.g.* the more positive and unmodified the instinct drive the more compulsive and less rationalized the character reaction and vice versa. Or again, the difficulty might be lessened by isolation of a special group of 'psychotic characters.' For example, one of my cases went through a constantly recurring series of situations which ended in the abandonment of one occupation or hobby in favour of a new but symbolically related activity. Analysis showed that underlying each situation there was a network of ideas which were not distinguishable from delusions of reference. The patient had in early life experienced much positive gratification of component impulses, especially of an exhibitionistic sort and had evidently solved the problem of Oedipus deprivation and guilt by a concealed system of spying ideas. It seems probable that with a more adequate reality sense, this case would have developed either a severe neurosis or a manifest perversion.

But whatever justification there may be for a psychotic character grouping, it is evident that we have not advanced far enough to deal effectively with the classification of types whose reactions border closely on psychotic mechanisms, to say nothing of the social groups vaguely called defective and criminal. Nevertheless we cannot escape from the necessities of a neurotic character grouping in which the whole personality is permeated with reactions which, if localized and concentrated, would irresistibly remind us of a neurotic symptom. The fact that these permeations can in some cases be distinguished only with great difficulty from normal character formations is far from being a drawback to the classification. It is only another illustration of the commonplace that we can learn much of normal function from a study of exaggerated or positively abnormal function.

It has already been noted regarding normal character traits that they

represent the imprint of various stages in Ego and libido development, and that character reactions constitute an active exercise directly and indirectly of Id-gratifications and Ego reaction formations. A typical example would be that of the reaction formations of social pity and humanitarianism, which express the barrier against cruelty and yet by insisting on penalties for cruelty, give a certain scope for retention of the original impulse. We can recall here the fact that the Ego does not circumscribe the Id but is rather a localized, so to speak, external construction which guards the approaches to motility but is to some extent—a much greater extent than we like to imagine—infiltrated by the Id. From the point of view of rationalization, we might say that it forms a kind of veneer which draws attention to the finished surface, irrespective of the quality, grain or warp of the substructure. The simile is however too rigid to suggest the function of normal character. This might, very inadequately, be compared with a coarse surface filter made of some elastic sponge-like substance, which holds back the major incompatibilities of the Id-reservoir, but retains in its own interstices varying amounts of the same material which can then evaporate imperceptibly into reality. With too large a mesh or too much pressure from below we are faced with the neurotic character. To pursue the comparison further; if we regard normal character processes as having a kind of respiratory function in the psyche, acting, so to speak, as a pulmonary system, neurotic character could be compared to the laboured respirations of active and passive hyperaemia.

At any rate we have here the idea of a protective system with sufficient elasticity and 'give' to meet stresses both from within and without, operating normally as a sort of capillary anastomosis between the Id and reality. When for any reason there is an obstruction to the libido stream of the individual, this system can function as a collateral circulation, but at the possible cost of hypertrophy, *i.e.* of neurotic character. Should this collateral circulation fail, the psyche gets into a state of libido congestion calling for further repression, and in the absence of effective repression the road to symptom formation is open. As Freud¹ has pointed out, what distinguishes character formations from neurosis is the absence of miscarriage of repression. It is conceivable then that in normal character processes we have a boundary formation which prevents the establishment of a vicious circle in libido economy. This is in keeping with Freud's view that failure to sublimate is one of the contributing factors in falling ill.

¹ Freud, "The Predisposition to Obsessional Neurosis," *Collected Papers*, vol. II, 1924.

At any rate, if we are not in a position to define neurotic character with precision, our knowledge of it is sufficient to permit of increasingly exact formulations concerning normal character processes. We might provisionally define these as a *set of organized behaviour reactions founded on and tending to preserve a stable equilibrium between Id-tendencies and submission to Reality: they are characterized by more or less satisfactory adaptation along lines of displacement*. Having proceeded so far with caution we may remind ourselves that at least one non-analytical formulation concerning character was not hampered by scientific timidity and yet foreshadowed a psycho-analytical discovery. What strikes every observer of character processes, is not only their almost compulsive nature but the way in which they repeat over and over again the same situation. In extreme forms where external conditions are continually turned to disadvantage the impression is created that the individual has been pursued by some inexorable Fate. In the language of metapsychology we would say that his actions are governed to a large extent by the 'compulsion to repeat' which is a characteristic of instinct and is seen in a milder form in habit. But this is only to give academic form and understanding to that more terse generalization—"Character is Destiny."

Consideration of the prognosis and treatment of neurotic character affords a welcome opportunity of emphasizing that neurotic character studies are essentially tentative and have no claims to finality. We are as yet very unsure as to mechanisms and classifications, and consequently must be even more guarded on matters of prognosis and treatment. Nevertheless observations made by various psycho-analysts permit us to formulate certain points of agreement and to indicate sharp cleavages of opinion on these matters. For example it is generally agreed that character-analyses are more difficult and prolonged than the analysis of the transference neuroses, and Ferenczi¹ has added the rider that analysis of so-called 'normal' persons is for the same reason really much more difficult than has been imagined. There are many good reasons why this should be so. To take the last mentioned factor, the influence of the repetition compulsion: where this compulsion is very strong there is a greater tendency to repeat in action than to remember. Obviously then the prognosis would depend on whether the repetition compulsion can be got into the transference. For example a blind repetition in external situations provides an easy escape from recognition of repressed alloerotic tendencies in transference. Besides we have the

¹ Ferenczi, *loc. cit.*

additional difficulty that this blindly repetitive solution can be camouflaged as a real and thoroughly rationalized actual problem, a process which is strongly reinforced by somewhat blind acceptance, an unconscious conspiracy of silence, so to speak, on the part of society in which normality of character sometimes hangs by a perilous thread of rationalization.

In any case the modification asked for in analysis is not merely recognition and tolerance of libidinal trends but a complete reorganization of Ego structure. The problem of neurotic character formation is essentially an Ego problem and to be certain about the nature of prognosis or treatment, we must have definite information concerning the strength of Super-ego formations and the efficiency of the Ego in reality proving. In fact we have to reconsider the relation of neurotic character to normal character, to neurosis and to psychosis. Now here we find a very definite cleavage in opinion. Whereas all observers seem to be agreed that there is no sharp distinction between an exaggerated character trait and neurotic character, Alexander¹ holds that the latter is midway between health and neurosis, and that each neurotic character contains the germ of a neurosis. As opposed to this, Reich² believes that the neurotic character is more serious than neurosis, and that neurosis represents a peak standing out from a mountain group of neurotic character formation. This prognosis is therefore more grave. Now, whilst Ferenczi³, as has been said, regards character abnormalities as private psychoses tolerated by the Ego, it is clear that he does so only for descriptive and not for prognostic purposes, because he advocates for character analysis a form of 'active' treatment which is contra-indicated in the psychoses.

This variance amongst authorities would seem to suggest that no definite prognosis can be given in any case until a preliminary investigation of an analytical nature has been carried out. This is to some extent true and it is obviously good practice to delay opinion until one has taken measure of the patient's sense of reality proving and noted the exaggeration or otherwise of mechanisms of projection. But there is still a rough and ready method of arriving at prognosis. It is the relation of character peculiarities to symptoms and the nature of the symptoms if any. To take extreme cases, a severe neurotic character would appear to have more serious prognosis where there was neither insight nor any subjective signs of illness. Where however signs of neurotic illness were present the prospects of influencing character peculiarities would appear more favourable. Again the presence of

¹ Alexander, *loc. cit.*

² Reich, *loc. cit.*

³ Ferenczi, *loc. cit.*

neurotic symptoms associated with libido defect of late origin, *e.g.* phobias, anxieties, conversions, etc., would in many instances be regarded as a favourable factor.

. It was indeed this relation between symptom formation and character alterations which drew increasing attention to the possibility of treating character peculiarities by psycho-analysis. Four definite observations have been made in this direction; first, that deliberate analysis of character peculiarities arouses not only vigorous transference resistances but is associated with transitory symptom formation; second, that the analysis of neuroses is sometimes accompanied by temporary regressions of character to more primitive levels; third, that reduction of neurotic symptoms is frequently associated with improvement in character abnormalities; and fourth, that improvement in cases of manic-depressive insanity has been observed by Abraham¹ to coincide with the appearance of obsessional characteristics, implying advance from a primitive oral fixation to the anal-sadistic level. This would seem to suggest that as in the milder psychoses (Abraham) and in the curable perversions (Sachs) a middle stage may be necessary for the alteration of neurotic character, *viz.* the transformation of alloerotic impulses into neurotic symptoms and the uncovering of primitive forms of guilt and anxiety.

It is a commonplace of analytic practice to say that character analysis is often refractory and always difficult, and it is not surprising that various suggestions have been made concerning the employment of auxiliary devices. Two of these seem to be in direct opposition to one another yet have this in common that they represent purposive attempts to modify the structure of the Ego ideal or Super-ego. The first is the so-called 'active' method of Ferenczi, which is intended to produce increased libido tension by the imposition of various libido frustrations. They are directed mainly against certain set habits and concealed gratifications and are imposed under transference authority in order to force repressed material to the surface. The second, suggested by Reich for his 'instinctive' character cases, consists of a preliminary educational phase for the purpose of stabilizing the unbalanced Super-ego, to be followed by the usual analysis. A third method is suggested by the work of Wälder² on psychotics and of Aichhorn³ on reformatory cases, the

¹ Abraham, "Versuch einer Entwicklungsgeschichte der Libido," *Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag*, 1924.

² Wälder, "The Psychoses: their Mechanisms and Accessibility to Influence," *International Psycho-Analytical Journal*, vol. VI, 3, 1925.

³ Aichhorn, "Über die Erziehung in Besserungsanstalten," *Imago*, vol. IX, 2, 1923.

judicious encouragement of sublimatory activities during analysis. All of these methods are in the experimental stage and do not as yet justify definite conclusions. Nevertheless we can say definitely concerning the treatment of neurotic character that the ultimate success of any treatment depends on classical psycho-analytic methods which do not shrink from subjecting the seemingly banal routine of everyday life to detailed scrutiny.

PSYCHIATRY AS AN OBJECTIVE SCIENCE¹

By TRIGANT BURROW

WITHIN the accustomed sphere of our observation, that which we call our actual experience is often flatly contradicted by the facts of science. If one sets a match to a piece of paper, his experience tells him that he has "burnt it up" or destroyed it. But chemical experiment plainly demonstrates that his experience is wholly fallacious, that what he has actually done is merely to cause a re-arrangement of the parts or atoms composing the original substance. Likewise, conventional experience wholly repudiates the dicta of the astronomers when they postulate a universe revolving in space. We do not even experience by direct evidence the fact that our own earth is round in contour. We know very well that according to personal experience we may at any moment look out upon the horizon and point to the "dropping off place." The usage of language constantly justifies this casual mode of experience in violation of demonstrable scientific deduction. We do not hesitate to say that the sun 'rises' or 'sets' when we know perfectly well that it does nothing of the kind. We say that sound travels, as from place to place. But sound, as we know, is an attribute of matter, and an attribute cannot travel. We speak of day and night as though such planetary phases were localized conditions when we are quite aware that these phenomena are but the conditions of our own localization.

It is clear then that we are accustomed to employ two quite different modes of evaluation. The one we live by; the other we reason from. The one is subjective, immediate and internal to our habitual feeling; the other is objective, perceptual and external to us. Within the objective sphere that man reasons *from* he reaches out far beyond his localized and habitual inferences, and within this realm he makes contact with observable phenomena that are dependent upon widely remote but logically correlated data of judgment. Yet side by side with this more encompassing reach of man's reason there remains the phase of his experience that is personal, habitual and uncoded. We permit ourselves trivial, unscientific and inaccurate statements because there exists close at hand the scientific and stabilized principle to which we may return at a

¹ Read at the Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the American Psycho-pathological Association, Washington, D.C., May 7, 1925.

moment's notice. The discrepancy between the sphere of our subjective images and that of our objective observation involves no conflict because the line drawn between them is one that is generally accepted by us all. And so we pass easily from one mode to the other and express views in the street which would be wholly inappropriate to the laboratory, while in the laboratory we express views which would be quite ridiculous if introduced into the casual contacts habitual to the man of the street.

In our customary observations of the phenomena that comprise the outlying universe, there has been no need to take account of these subjective and habitual modes of thinking. As such casual modes are lacking in personal affective colouring, they have in no way interfered with our objective scientific evaluations, and the use of these parallel but contradictory modes of thought is rendered entirely legitimate in virtue of the social consensus by which they are universally endorsed. When we come to the subjective field of observation, however, the situation is completely reversed. For here our habitual, uncodified processes of experience with all their image-subjectivity become the materials of what is now our objective inquiry.

We all know too well to what extent our habitual and subjective views tend to cloud our perspective with respect to conditions that are personal and internal to our own lives. Such subjective images crowd upon us from every side. They are present in the prejudices of family interest, in our zeal for personal success, in the ever-pressing necessities of self-maintenance and the maintenance of one's family or kin, in the requirements of social approbation or professional recognition, in our obligations of private rectitude and external decorum. In these and a thousand similar acceptations belonging to our casual mood-life there exist subjective social images which exert a constant bias upon our clear observation of the native and inherent life of man's organism. When we come to an objective study of these casual processes our observation becomes seriously confused. The reason is that these processes may now no longer exist within the subject side by side with his accustomed outlook, but they must now be ranged in front of him where they take their place among the objective materials of scientific investigation. And so, in order to observe such factors in our mental life, it is required that we hold them off sufficiently far to view them in their objective delineation apart from our habitual, subjective interpretation of them.

In studying the materials of psychiatry or the elements of man's own personality we are confronted with the sensations, reactions and impressions that belong to this subjective, uncodified realm of his experi-

ence. In dealing with these, his own subjective processes, man's thought is obstructed by a very serious impasse if he fails to discriminate between his mode of subjective images or uncoded experience and the mode that is dependent upon the ascertained sequences of observable phenomena. Feelings which are habitually subjective or personal within us as a casual daily experience must become the external objective materials of a correlated scientific inquiry. The mode which we have lived by in our casual conventional experience must now become systematized among the materials of conscious laboratory recognition.

It is presumed that psychiatry confronts this subjective and habitual mode of man's experience, but in point of fact it does nothing of the kind. For psychiatrists and psychoanalysts are, through their own subjective images, necessarily implicated in this widespread social involvement. As part of a social scheme that unconsciously maintains this subjective image-outlook, psychiatry itself is necessarily too involved in these subjective moods to bring to their contemplation a truly objective observation of them.

In the following pages I should like to indicate in what way it seems to me that psychiatry, in unconsciously fostering the mood level belonging to man's casual and uncoded experience, lacks an objective criterion and in what way this need may be fulfilled. I should like to make clear, if I can, that the subjective states comprising the materials of psychiatry are not as yet amenable to scientific procedure because of the absence among psychiatrists of the organized principles of observation such as ordinarily govern scientific observers in estimating the data before them¹.

The accuracy of all observation rests upon the existence, among the several observers, of a common accord of sense perceptions that affords them an accepted basis of evaluation. This biological unanimity has been an organic condition of man's evolution. Such an organic agreement is so commonplace and automatic a condition of actual daily practice as not to have acquired the outline of conscious definition. This common neural basis of our human reactions resides in a physiological identity of perception that unites the sense organs of each observer with every other. This neural substrate obtaining among the different observers affords them a basis of perception that is organically continuous throughout the species. It affords us a typical or common basis for the reception of common and typical stimuli.

¹ See White, William A., "The Comparative Method in Psychiatry," *The Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases*, 1925, LXI. 1.

To describe a substance as large or small, smooth or rough, motile or inert, to record its reaction to heat or to light, to note its chemical or physiological structure—all involves a process that is dependent upon an established agreement among the perceptual sensations and reactions common to different observers of it. No arbitrary and casual mood element enters in to distort the unerring sequences of objective observation.

These features of agreement among the sense perceptions of men have, through the accumulated experience of thousands of years, grown to be enormously complex and of exquisite delicacy of discrimination. Through the development of verbal symbols or language the most sensitive shades of meaning have their mental or social correspondence among millions of the same people and, through their linguistic equivalents, even among millions of different peoples. So that it would seem that the authenticity of man's impressions is based upon a biological neuro-social continuum effected through the phylogenetic concurrence mentally among the various elements or individuals composing the receptive background for such impressions.

I think we have quite failed to consider the significance of this organic consensual factor in reckoning our human values. We have failed to recognize how completely dependent we are upon this element of accord for the substantiation of even the most insignificant of our judgments. This consensual generic requisite for the correlating of the data of observation is an ethnic condition upon which we are constantly dependent. But, as I have said, we have not as yet thought about it because we have not as yet been required to think about it. This organic code has been too close to the practical processes of our daily living to have acquired for us as a people the distinction of conscious stabilized recognition.

It is the function of science to make conscious use of these consensual terms of agreement with a view to securing conditions for accurate observation. Science, as I have said, has consistently employed this consensual basis of agreement in estimating external objective conditions. For these external conditions have in no way conflicted with the private subjective prejudices of the scientist. The astronomer may observe the stars without jeopardy to his daily subjective prejudices. But with psychiatry the situation is quite different. It is precisely the subjective prejudices of our daily living that are the objective scientific data of psychiatry. My position is that in the absence of the stabilized recognition of these subjective processes through a consensual agreement in terms, psychiatry has neglected an essential condition of scientific

observation. It needs to be recognized that through the omission of this consensual factor of observation there has grown up, quite without our awareness of it, a definite category of phenomena that has entirely escaped conscious recognition and tabulation as the materials of an objective science. These materials are no other than the uncodified mental states comprising our own habitual and subjective modes of experience. Accordingly, if we are to establish a scientific approach to these processes, it is required that we raise them to the level of conscious stabilized recognition.

Psychiatry comprises the observation and correlation of the mental reactions occurring within the individual. These are its objective materials. Among these materials may be reckoned the individual's thought and his way of feeling in response to this or that condition of stimulation. We must count among them what is called the individual's habit of life and its relation to the habits of others about him. With Freud we have studied mental fixations, sex obsessions, divided states of the personality and the hundreds of subjective symptoms included under our wide range of psychic disease entities, such as hysteria, psychasthenia, schizophrenia, paranoia, and many others. But from the point of view of observation in regard to these subjective reactions of the individual, the method of psychiatry is not objective because it lacks a basis of perceptual consistency or consensual observation.

In our relation to the external world, because of the common neural substrate uniting our individual perceptions, an object is not rough or smooth or brown until these words or symbols have attained a common neuro-social agreement among the several observers of it. An organic consensus of visual, tactile and other sense perceptions, together with a consensus of terminology, is requisite to my description of any object before me. In other words, there are organic conditions of agreement which are an indispensable part of my so-called objective determinations. Likewise, the mental state of a patient—be it fear, hate, anger, deception, infantile coquetry or what-not—does not become an objective mental state except as these words or symbols stimulate an equally organic concurrence among the several observers of such states. Just as in the outlying universe there is an organic concurrence of perception with its concomitant symbol equivalents, so within the universe of man's internal mood there is required concomitantly an organic concurrence of *feeling* with its corresponding concurrence of symbol equivalents. In other words, there cannot be a common organic accord in regard to subjective mental states of the individual in the absence of conscious, stabilized recognition

of these subjective states as they exist socially in the several observers of them.

The process by which we attain to conscious stabilized recognition is a social one. It is due to this social process that certain objective stimuli become registered as entities in our common experience as, for example, the sensation registered under the consensual symbol 'red' or 'dull'.¹ The same social process or agreement in terms is equally indispensable for the conscious registering of sensations that are the expression of man's emotional experience, for example, the sensation verbally symbolized as 'love' or 'hate.' Accordingly, only the social process of a consensual symbol experience can raise such emotional states to the level of conscious stabilized recognition. The emotional state which, under the routine of clinical description, we have been accustomed to regard as an isolated manifestation occurring in the reaction of the patient before us, but supposedly existing quite outside ourselves, becomes under the routine of consensual laboratory observation an emotional state shared in common by the several laboratory observers. Thus, through the operation of such a social process, the patient is provided with the consensual subjective symbols which lift his experience to the sphere of conscious stabilized recognition and give to his subjective emotions the outline of objective definition. Where our personal emotions are regarded only in isolation there is excluded the social process that makes possible their stabilized recognition. The purpose of the scientific laboratory the world over is but the stabilization of the processes of recognition through the conscious use of this consensual factor of a common symbol agreement.

If, as psychoanalysis demonstrates, an individual through a neurosis or a dissociation remains clinging to his mother, it means that emotionally he has withdrawn from the natural neuro-social bond uniting him with his fellows and he therefore becomes an object standing opposite to and withdrawn from his social medium. If his social fellows are not to corroborate his dissociated state through a like discontinuity of their own, their only recourse is to observe his reactions as objects apart from their own. In this recourse lies the only opportunity for the individual's self-recovery. But the scientific recognition of such a dissociated objective condition requires as definite a social consensus or symbol concurrence as the observation of the objects in the outlying universe.

¹ "The Meaning of the Psychic Factor," paper by the author, read at the Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Psycho-pathological Association, May 8, 1913. Published in *The Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, Dec. 1913-Jan. 1914.

In chemistry we require common terms or else we simply do not know what we are talking about. Also we must have common terms in the observation of the subjective states envisaged by psychiatry else we are likewise talking in the air. But this analogy between the data of chemistry and the commonly admitted data of psychiatry is so obvious that it may be completely dismissed. This is an objectively patent analogy and its validity is generally admitted. There is no psychiatrist who does not follow with routine fidelity a consistency of terminology that is directly parallel to that obtaining in the biological sciences. And so the question of the adequacy of our objective terminology in regard to the subjective materials of psychiatry is not at all my point. Any misapprehension in this connection can only tend to confuse the essential issue upon which this paper rests. The consideration here has to do solely with the identity of the subjective state of the observer and the state presented subjectively by the patient. Common subjective terms are dependent upon common subjective reactions precisely as common objective terms are dependent upon common objective reactions. It is my postulate that the terms of judgment of the observer depend wholly upon the admission by him of states of feeling within himself that are identical with those of the patient under observation. The consensual admission and utilization of these subjective concurrences of mood become the terms or symbol equivalents which render possible the requisite social synthesis of the patient's repressed material. In the absence of the recognition of these mood identifications and of their assimilative interaction in the process of conscious laboratory technique, there cannot be the subjective understanding and assimilation socially of these processes as they occur singly within the individual. In a word, we cannot possibly have common terms if we have private repressions in regard to the states subtended by these terms. If there is lacking in the social mind a consistency of terms or a consensual basis of observation in the subjective mood, we cannot make a truly objective observation of the disagreement in terms or of the condition of conflict as it exists subjectively in the individual mind.

Due to the present subjective involvement of psychiatry, every individual under observation, and every one of the so-called objective findings which psychiatry records, stands in a quite personal and detached position. There is no generic basis of correlation among them. The reason is that there is no consistency or established agreement among the social sense perceptions upon which the various observers depend for the establishment of their scientific determinations. A mode of subjective and

uncodified inference utterly obscures our clear objective evaluation of them. It needs to be recognized that this mode of habitual and uncorrelated inference represents a socially unconscious reaction that is identical with the unconscious reactions comprising the habitual and uncodified data of the individual. My position is that in the absence of a common social analysis there is lacking the consensual agreement among the several observers such as is the requisite basis for conscious stabilized recognition of the materials observed.

I do not say that psychiatry has not an objective aim. I do not say that in this objective aim psychiatry does not envisage objective data. What I do say is that the objective data envisaged by psychiatry are the external *signs* of subjective reactions and not the direct objective observation of these subjective reactions themselves. Under the stress of the analysis the analyst may observe the flushed face, the perspiring brow, the blanched lips, the trembling hands and the countless other external signs of the patient's emotional state. But because of the social barrier between the psychiatrist's own subjective feelings and his objective observation of them there is organically precluded the objective observation of these identical feelings as they exist in the patient before him. My point is that where the psychiatrist should confront the direct objective data comprising the immediate subjective states of the individual before him, these identical subjective states existing in socially repressed form within the psychiatrist intervene to cloud his clear laboratory observation of the subjective states in question.

The astronomer in his casual subjective mood speaks of the sun as rising or setting, but in his laboratory he refers to the diurnal cycle as due to the earth's rotation upon its axis. But does this discrepancy mean that the astronomer is lacking in a basis of mental consistency? Not at all. In both instances he is speaking in strict conformity to conceptual symbols for which there is the substantiation of an accepted social consensus. In the one he employs the symbols of *feeling* for which there is a subjective *mood* consensus. In the other he uses the symbols of *reason* for which there is an objective *thought* consensus. In neither instance does he employ an arbitrary and isolated standpoint. In neither case does he abjure the accepted canons of the social consensus governing the sphere in question. His reason and feeling, thought and mood, objective and subjective spheres, are easily kept distinct because of the accepted symbols through which a consensus has been established within each of these spheres.

But with the psychiatrist the situation is different. The psychiatrist

fails to keep distinct these two spheres—his mood experience and his thought experience—and this subjective confusion renders his processes definitely inconsistent. For in the study of psychiatry or of the reactions that are internal to man, the presumable sphere of observation is clouded throughout by the internal feelings and reactions comprising our own subjective states. And in the absence of a social consensus with its established symbol consistency we merely preserve the casual and uncodified mode of our habitual and subjective experience. In this view the study of man's subjective states is precluded through man's own involvement in his habitual subjective interpretations. He does not permit himself a consistency of observation based upon a conceptual consensus with its correspondingly accepted symbol equivalents. The result is that psychiatry and psychoanalysis fail to apprehend the objective materials proper to them. They represent unconscious artistry but not scientific observation.

With this requisite factor of a consensual basis of observation there will be secured to psychiatry the condition that is recognized as essential to all objective inquiry—the condition, namely, which provides that the substance or process to be examined shall come under direct observation and study. As every student knows, it is essential that the substance or process submitted to scientific examination shall be presented for immediate observation. No mere report about a substance can for a moment be countenanced in a scientific laboratory. No element in the analysis may under any circumstance be taken for granted or accepted on hearsay, but each step in the process must be actually presented for direct observation. In a word, the examination must occupy itself with immediate material. But psychiatry does not present immediate material for direct observation because it does not possess as yet a basis of consensual agreement among the observers as to what constitutes its immediate material.

It is conceded that the first condition of observation within the objective laboratory of science is the presentation of actual material and that the criteria of accurate observation presuppose a common basis of sense perception among the laboratory observers. In the biological laboratory we do not accept any second-hand description as to the nature of a tissue presumably under examination, but the tissue itself must be directly submitted for actual examination, and for this it is further provided that there shall exist a consensus of sense impressions among the several observers.

I think it must become clear that within the mental sphere or in

psychiatry there is an absence of both of these conditions requisite to scientific inquiry. There is not the immediacy of the material or condition necessary for examination, nor is there the continuity or perceptual consensus among the examiners. In psychiatry we depend upon the report of the patient or upon his family or friends for our knowledge as to his condition or feeling or for our objective material. The patient or his family or his friends tell us *about* the materials or reactions he presents. Such a procedure may have its value historically and philosophically but it is not scientific examination. It cannot be included among the processes of laboratory inquiry. As regards the neural consensus requisite to the determination of the condition under examination, no patient presents his emotions for immediate examination but, due to the covenant of social repression existing between himself and his examiner, he carefully guards his direct emotional expression and prudently discourses about what he conceives this emotion to be. He presents the material of his dreams, his childhood reminiscences and endless free associations, but his emotional feeling in the immediate moment escapes direct observation. The patient's actual feeling therefore is not submitted to direct scientific observation because of the subjective and internal states that obscure it. Or if he presents feeling at all, it is necessarily confused by reason of the subjective feeling of his examiner. Consider, for example, the patient who in his gentle bearing or demeanour brings up to one psychoanalyst the tender feelings associated with this analyst's mother. The same patient may offer a very different stimulus to the psychoanalyst to whom the patient's appearance or character recalls at once the feelings associated with this analyst's dominating and overbearing father. In other words, the same patient may stimulate in one psychiatrist the psychiatrist's mother complex and in another the father complex. Or he may in the same psychiatrist stimulate at one time the psychiatrist's father identification and at another his mother identification, with the result that the psychiatrist necessarily reacts in an entirely different manner under these two different conditions of so-called observation. Yet this reaction is called judgment or analysis. But "there needs no ghost come from the grave" to tell us that the patient who seeks the aid of the psychopathologist for his condition cannot obtain from him a consistent observation. Were it so, it would not be the very general custom of patients to go about from one psychoanalyst to another because they find a satisfactory and vicarious solace in the totally different interpretations of their several analysts. Nor would it be the unfailing practice among psychopathologists, whenever two meet privately together, to

criticize as inadequate the methods and results characteristic of a third psychiatrist. Such disparities in our analytic interpretations could not exist were there a consensual agreement of subjective states or common terms in relation to the material under analytic observation. If the psychoanalyst is not socially free from the limitations of the social repression, he cannot make a free and unrepressed observation of the socially repressed individual opposite him.

The idea that I should like to place uppermost is this. If there is a social consensus of repression, there cannot be a social consensus of observation. If in our individual minds there are repressed and private terms of interpretation, there cannot exist in the social mind mutually agreed and commonly accepted terms of observation. I cannot accept a social agreement in terms with respect to the evidences of emotional conflict in a patient unless I have accepted these same terms with respect to emotional conflict within myself. If my analysis and observation of myself lack social co-ordination—if I have not a pragmatic basis of organic symbol agreement in the observation of my own emotions and repressions—I cannot possibly bring the requisite basis of concurrence to the observation of others whose organic gestures of emotion and repression are identical with my own.

According to prevailing clinical methods, psychiatry is dependent, in what it calls its scientific judgment, upon quite whimsical reactions that are wholly unpredictable and beyond the control of a socially consensual basis of objective agreement. In view of this quite unconscious situation in the sphere of our subjective determinations it seems to me imperative that we secure conditions for a definite laboratory technique in the observation of the material presented by our psychiatric patients. There is definitely requisite a social consensus of observers—observers who are consensually preserved against the private interpretations of their private complexes and who accordingly possess a scientific basis of conscious recognition of the data under examination. There will thus be demanded the presentation of fresh and actual material and not any second-hand report of the material as recorded either by the patient himself or by his friends. Emotions that are to be recognized and studied must be demonstrated, and in order that they be demonstrated they must secure conditions of observation which preclude the private prejudices of the particular observer. In short, it is required in the subjective sphere no less than in the objective that we be presented with immediate data of laboratory observation and that our conditions of observation shall provide such controls as afford a consensual consistency or give

social continuity of interpretation dependent upon the social sense perceptions shared among the observers in question.

As a result of the group analysis with which I have in the last years been constantly occupied, it has been my experience that only the authority of a social consensus of receptive sense impressions is adequate for the unbiased observation of complexes in which we are all socially participants. The private interpretation of the individual psychiatrist or analyst is not competent to envisage the private position on which the individual neurosis bases its support. This private basis of outlook represents but the casual and uncoded mood-interpretation based upon social images that involve the physician no less than the patient. In the subjective involvement of each within this habitual image-sphere there is absent the condition of observation requisite to scientific inquiry. In the failure of psychiatry or of psychoanalysis to recognize its own involvement in a social mood-consensus, there is precluded the possibility of a thought-consensus such as may place this social mood-reaction among the materials of objective investigation. We are deceived in thinking that we can escape this habitual mood-involvement in the absence of an analytic challenge of our own social mood. Under our present social system of mood-evaluations the dilemma of the neurotic patient lies in the circumstance that his individual unconscious finds ready support in an equally unconscious social mood which the psychiatrist shares with him. When through the analysis of this social mood-involvement psychiatrists shall present a consensus of impressions based upon a consensually codified experience, psychiatry need no longer be the interpreter of private hearsay and report but the observer of actual material based upon a social agreement of organic sense perceptions. In this common consensual viewpoint the data of psychiatry will take their rightful place among the materials of an objective science.

There is the definite need of a psychiatric laboratory for the investigation of our human processes. In the modest beginnings of such an attempt on the part of my associates and myself there is clearly the promise of a saner basis of outlook not only for the individual patient but for the students of mental disorders whose function it is to relieve these sick and oppressed mental states as they occur both in the individual and in the social system of which our students and ourselves are also a part.

SOME CLINICAL ASPECTS OF CERTAIN EMOTIONS

BY DONALD E. CORE

THE object of the present paper is in the main twofold; to endeavour to correlate certain psychical phenomena with groups of clinical symptoms and, to assess as far as may be possible the biological value of the functional nervous disorders.

Since the time of Charcot investigation into these disorders has been concerned largely with the different emotions presumed to be operative in their formation; Dejerine laid the necessary stress on the importance of the emotions in this connexion and the majority of modern work has been directed to the different tones and their relative values. A certain degree of divergence of opinion has resulted and this has reflected upon current ideas of treatment and, of necessity, upon their classification also.

An emotional tone, being an integral part of an instinctive activity, may be considered as an index of the reaction of an organism to its surroundings. Two possibilities arise for consideration out of this relationship; the organism may either be in harmony with its surroundings or it may not; it may be in a state of discord. We should then at the very outset be justified in assuming that emotionalism, however amenable it may be to further and more detailed subdivisions, will be apparent as a characteristic of an animal in one or other of these states. Also, whereas an animal is occasionally terrified, occasionally angry, occasionally parental, it is always either in accordance with its environment or at variance with it, and this fact would appear to have an important bearing in the genesis of certain clinical states. The detailed subdivision of the different emotional tones has a positive value as far as social science is concerned, but from the clinical point of view it probably has no such value; whereas the recognition of the dual aspect of emotionalism has a clinical importance that is difficult to overestimate.

Quite apart from clinical medicine this duality is obvious and it is emphasised by a very superficial study of an animal under the influence of representative emotions. It is almost unnecessary to dwell upon well recognised facts in a paper of this description, but for the sake of completeness it may be pointed out, that, if we take as types the affective states associated on the one hand with behaviour proper to reproduction and

on the other that which subserves flight, there is an acute difference between the two according as to whether they are considered from such widely divergent standpoints as:

(1) *Inception.* With regard to the emotion of tenderness the rise into consciousness is never sudden and the period of maximum intensity is maintained for a considerable time. There is no diminution of intensity immediately after inception; there may, indeed, be an increase. The duration of the emotional tone is liable to be lengthy. The emotion of fear on the other hand is always of sudden incidence; its maximum intensity is attained immediately and provided the animal be given freedom of appropriate behaviour the intensity of the tone rapidly declines. With suitable treatment the maximum is capable of being reproduced at any period during this decline, differing acutely in this respect from the tender emotion, the intensity of which, once it has begun to decline, can never be reinforced for the specific object in the ordinary course of events. For the re-induction of the tender emotion the preliminary body changes associated with reproduction must be passed through. (A case illustrating this fact is the following. One of the laboratory cats kittened and the survivor of the litter was brought up by its mother in the usual way and in the usual way parental solicitude was replaced by indifference and to a certain extent by irritability. In the course of time the mother cat again kittened and the whole litter was destroyed; at once the mother demonstrated maternal solicitude and affection for the now grown cat of the former litter; its affectionateness, being adapted for younger kittens, was somewhat out of place in its new role.)

(2) *Mental State of the Animal under the Influence of the Emotion.* In the case of the emotion of fear, this is characteristically one of confusion, and when the emotion is present in very great intensity it may approach a condition of semi-coma. In the case of the tender emotion on the other hand the essential mental state is one of concentration on a specific object, and this does not prevent concentration being manifested for other objects in the environment.

(3) *Associated Somatic Manifestations.* In the case of the emotion of fear, these only occur at the time of incidence of the affect and are concerned entirely with efficiency of the motor mechanism necessary for escape. Such manifestations are liable to be transient and the sympathetic nervous system would appear to be intimately concerned in their production (Cannon). The actual muscular energy demonstrated by animals when under the influence of the emotion of fear in great intensity may

be very great indeed, and it is instructive to compare this with the conspicuous absence of the psychical (pictorial memorisation) activity which obtains at the time. We may I think recognise it as a fact, that promptness and forcefulness of motor behaviour are inversely proportionate to the consciousness of the animal (as represented by its pictorial memorisation power) prevailing at the time. In the case of the tender emotion special body changes precede the incidence of the tone and in many cases they are elaborate and of the nature of gross structural alterations. The interval of time necessary for their development may be one of weeks and months.

(4) *Re-inducibility of the Emotion.* In the case of the emotion of fear, this is possible at any time and there is no tendency for the intensity of the emotion produced to fade with the frequency of re-induction. In the case of the tender emotion this is not the case; once it has begun to fade for the specific object it can never again be revived for that object unless the whole gamut of preceding somatic changes has been re-experienced.

(5) *State of the Animal in the Intervals.* The animal is essentially normal in the intervals of its being terrified; as far as the tender emotion is concerned a considerable period of the interval is taken up with the anticipation of the coming emotional exacerbation.

The foregoing differentiating features are obvious on a comparatively casual study of the animal; in other respects also the resolution of emotionalism into its two aspects may be recognised.

For example; the value to the animal of *emotional control* differs in the two groups. (By 'emotional control' is meant the faculty possessed by some animals of modifying the specific conative behaviour biologically associated with a primary emotional tone in accordance with experience and pictorial memory.) As far as the tones which directly subserve reproduction are concerned it is probable that their control serves no useful purpose and may indeed be harmful; even in very highly evolved animals such control is liable to have an unsatisfactory result. In the case however of emotions of the other group, fear and repugnance, their value to the animal is reinforced by control; animals under such circumstances being rendered all the more secure in situations of potential danger. Of still greater importance is the fact that the amenability of the fear emotion to control bears with it the implication of added security of the race.

Again, the end-results in the psychology of an animal differ acutely according as to whether an emotion such as that of parental tenderness

be considered, or one such as fear. In the former case the specific object of the emotion is ultimately de-emotionalised and a state of *familiarity* is developed for that object. In the case of fear, familiarity is never an end-result; its place is taken by the formation of habitual action and the increasing perfection of somatic performance by *experience*.

(It is of interest in this connection to consider the affectionateness of the human parent for its offspring. The human differs from the non-human animal, among other things, in the great extension of its associational powers. The development of the child is accompanied in the psychology of the parent by a progressive growth of specific associations for it, associations constantly in activation through objective experience and constantly giving rise to the emotional tone initially operative. There is, so to speak, psychical growth on the part of the parent keeping pace with the physical development of the child and in the course of time the intense instinctive tenderness manifested originally on the part of the parent for the child is replaced by the secondarily induced emotion arising out of the constant reactivation of these associations. In the event of the child being brought up away from its parent, associations in the psychology of the latter are still liable to be formed and their re-activation tends to reproduce the tone at work in their formation.)

Apart from obvious objective differentiation of emotional tones and apart from their end-results, it may be suggested that these representative emotions differ from each other in another respect, and that is, their liability or otherwise to *psychical dissociation*. It would seem probable that emotional tones of the parental tenderness type are not so liable whereas those of the fear group essentially are.

Psychical dissociation is of great importance to the clinical psychologist. Its effects perhaps appear to have been more closely studied than the underlying mechanism operative, and it is possible that it has, unjustifiably, been made accountable for psychical phenomena, superficially similar, but in reality differing widely from each other when viewed from the standpoint of their genesis.

The operation of psychical dissociation is accompanied by an amnesia for the specific experience dissociated and, leaving on one side the mechanism at work in the formation of this amnesia, it is obvious that, were emotional tones of the fear order to be accompanied characteristically by such dissociation and those of the parental tenderness group never to be so accompanied, many, if not all, of the differentiating features enumerated above would of necessity arise.

For example; a terrifying experience subjected to amnesia is always

experienced *de novo*, as far as the empirical ego of the animal is concerned, when it recurs, and familiarity towards it is thereby rendered impossible. With the passage of each unit of time after the incidence of the experience there is a fading of the associated emotionalism and an ultimate disappearance, unless, owing to imperfect performance the initial experience recurs. In such circumstances the emotion concerned also recurs in maximum intensity.

In the event of performance being efficient the animal, subjectively, returns to the *status in quo*, and to all outward appearances it is exactly as it was before the experience occurred.

The degree of the amnesia developed would of necessity be inversely proportional to conscious attention at the time obtaining; in proportion with this degree the animal under the influence of such an emotion is dazed or confused. The psychical 'energy' developed in such an environment is, so to speak, devoted to vehement somatic response at the expense of attentive consciousness, and, given that a similar state of affairs again arises, a similar somatic response recurs. Not only however does such response recur, but it recurs all the more readily and, in the course of time it is capable of recurring in apparently undiminished efficiency with progressive lessening of the emotional intensity necessarily operative. That is, the animal is altered by experience in the direction of the development of habit action. This mechanism for the formation of habitual action is in all probability of the greatest utility to the animal; it enables it to modify its behaviour in surroundings in which at one time or another a dangerous situation has occurred with a minimum of conscious attention and, therefore, with a maximum of somatic efficiency. Given that a terrifying experience again occurs in such a situation, then the behaviour that proved efficient on a former occasion is reinstituted with increased readiness.

On the other hand, given that an incident associated with an emotional tone be not subjected to amnesia, the ultimate exhaustion of that tone leads to a de-emotionalised attitude of the animal to the incident; the latter becomes familiarised to the former. In the case of the emotion of parental tenderness we find that the more elaborate the precedent somatic alterations the more lengthy is the duration of the emotion likely to be; it is reasonable to associate the specific conation with these changes. In the absence of a specific amnesia there is nothing in the psychology of the animal to prevent conscious memorisation of the incident provided the animal has the necessary anatomical associational mechanism available, but in the case of such animals as the cat for example

it is difficult to assume this conscious or pictorial memorisation for its kittens in their absence, and much of the characteristic behaviour of the maternal animal is in all probability dependent upon physiological conditions specific to maternity, and the kittens to a certain extent may be looked upon as ectopic parts of the mother. (The replacement mentioned above of a kitten of a previous litter for those of the recent which had been destroyed is suggestive in this respect; the older animal made no distinction between the immature and comparatively mature kittens as far as behaviour was concerned. The emotional tone apparently corresponded rather with the somatic state of the mother than with the development of the offspring.)

In the event of the animal again developing the emotion, then the appropriate behaviour is all the more readily performed and to this extent perhaps such behaviour may be considered habitual. But it is not so in the true sense; in the sense, that is, of such behaviour being performed with uniform efficiency with a decreasing emotional tone intensity. Among the non-human animals it is found that with the fading of the emotion there is a corresponding fading away of the characteristic behaviour.

The absence of amnesia in such tones is accompanied by an absence of psychical confusion; there is nothing to prevent a high degree of attention in the case of animals manifesting the emotion of tenderness.

The difference in the re-inducibility of emotions of the two orders does not appear to depend so much on psychical dissociation as upon the presence or absence of specific body changes necessary for appropriate conation. The possibility of the same experience, however, uniformly re-inducing it in maximum intensity, is to be associated with this process, in the manner discussed above. The behaviour of an animal under the influence of an emotional tone therefore would appear, *inter alia*, to vary with two factors; the necessity or otherwise of preceding and succeeding specific body alterations on the one hand, and the presence or absence of psychical dissociation on the other. We may I think express this in a simpler form and say that the process of psychical dissociation is an essential associate of an emotional incidence in the non-human animals, unless such incidence is necessarily associated with preceding and succeeding gross anatomical alterations.

Arising out of the above, it would appear that pictorial memorisation among the lower animals, if it occur at all, is exceedingly incomplete, and can only occur in the sphere of those emotional tones which are not associated with the process of psychical dissociation. Experiences which

give rise to tones of the other order, being subjected to a specific amnesia, cannot be memorised; the behaviour of the animal in relation to such experiences shows a predisposition to habitual action.

The human differs from the non-human animal in that he is, normally, able to recall in pictorial memory experiences which were primarily associated with a terrifying emotional tone. An inquiry into the behaviour of the human under the influence of such a tone, as compared with one of the lower animals, reveals as a prominent difference the fact that the former is able to 'control' his behaviour; he does not necessarily give way to headlong flight or to blind pugnacity. The ability to control emotional tones in relation to their appropriate conative activities would appear to be almost exclusively a human attribute; the human race as constituted to-day shows a wide variation in the degree of control possessed by different communities and different individuals, a fact which emphasises the specificity of such control to the human being, and its comparatively recent genesis.

Anatomically the important differentiating feature between the human and the non-human animal is the very great increase in the former of the cerebral association-dispositions. It is of interest to realise that in the human we have this extended range of association-dispositions, the possibility of emotional control and the ability to memorise events experienced in a terrifying atmosphere. This amounts to saying that under such circumstances we do not have the operation of psychical dissociation for such experiences, and psychically this would seem to be the fundamental difference between the mental processes of the human and the non-human animal.

I would suggest that the chief factor in the human which militates against the operation of psychical dissociation is emotional control; conversely, that the defective development of such control in the human enables the process of psychical dissociation to be operative. Expressing this in other words we may say that the obtrusive manifestation of psychical dissociation in the human is an approach to the non-human psychology; clinical symptoms arising out of such manifestation are indications of a psychical retrogression.

The clinical condition which is characterised by the undue operation of psychical dissociation is hysteria; hysteria therefore may be considered as a retrograde manifestation; one in which the human approaches abnormally the non-human psychology. Furthermore, in that emotional control is acquired by the human during his early years and is absent or nearly so in the infant and young child, dissociation is to be expected

normally in the period of immaturity; the psychical processes of infants and young children are essentially of the hysterical order and differ from hysteria only in that they are normal to this stage of development. As they grow older their emotional control develops and they show no more of their 'hysterical' heritage than is normal to the generality of mankind. If however, through faulty environment of upbringing, their control does not develop as it should, then clinical hysteria is apparent when the environment of upbringing gives way to that of the community in which they have to live and work. But, even so, as such people do grow older, their control does increase, and their hysterical manifestations disappear, unless they are perpetuated as habits through persistent maltreatment.

It should be remembered that we all of us have developed out of this atmosphere of infantile uncontrol of our emotional tones and the psychical dissociation that goes with such lack of control; many useful elements of behaviour in normal man may be traced to this phase of his life. It is only when emotional control and psychical dissociation are allowed to persist abnormally that the subsequent behaviour becomes of clinical interest.

The function of emotional control, as pointed out above, is a recent acquisition of the human being and, as is often the case with such acquirements, its development may be irregular and unbalanced as far as emotional tones of the two orders are concerned. An important accompaniment of emotional control is the divorcement of a strongly felt emotion from the conative activity which through the ages has been associated with it. This separation in certain cases may be carried too far, and disordered functioning of the nervous system may result. The most obvious example of this was to be seen during the war in the form of the 'terror neurosis.' Here, as a result of the outrageous environment of danger, a number of apparently healthy men, fully conscious of the extremity of that danger, exerted their control and did not manifest the phylogenetically determined response of removing themselves out of the danger zones. In the course of time the strain on their control became too great and they broke down; their symptomatology manifesting in a bastard form the conation which they had denied themselves. This took the form of muscle activity in the form of tremors; dilatation of the pupils; pallor; sweating and so forth; and the experience of crude terror when their residual control was still further decreased during the impaired consciousness of sleep (terror dreaming). Owing to the absolute value of the environment at this time, all men tended to show signs of this disturbance after they had endured for a certain time; some breaking down sooner than others. In civil life this neurosis is uncommon, though it

does occur, and the features emphasised above are always to be recognised, though rarely in the same degree of intensity as was seen during the war years. Such patients are tremulous; they are confused, as indicated by their inability to concentrate and to memorise; they experience characteristic terror dreams and in their history there is always the factor of life among danger, or what they imagine to be danger.

In such cases we have the converse of the retrograde neuroses; instead of developing amnesia for terrifying experiences we have for a time a concentration of control with its ultimate straining and final failure. In that the acquisition of control is associated with evolution disorders of this class—'instinct-distortion' neuroses—should be considered as being progressive; separate and distinct from the regressive or hysterical disabilities.

The condition just described is associated with maltreatment of an emotional tone of the fear order; it is of interest to notice that a similar distortion directed to the emotions associated with reproduction also gives rise to morbid states. But whereas the former is as a rule sufficiently dramatic to bring the sufferer under medical attention, in the case of the latter this is not so. The fact that such a distortion does produce abnormalities of behaviour is in the majority of cases only to be recognised when the patient comes for treatment in a later stage of his condition, when the pure instinct-distortion neurosis has passed into a later and a different group.

A careful examination into the history of such cases however will often reveal the state of affairs represented by the following example.

The patient, a female aged 39, complains of severe pressure pain over the vertex, depression, irritability and sleeplessness. The onset of her condition was two or three years ago; she became unaccountably moody and irritable but at that time had no pain. She slept badly and her dreams troubled her. These were of the type which may be christened 'dreams of unsatisfied desire' and which, occurring infrequently, are common to the generality of mankind. In them the patient is always endeavouring to do something which is unattainable; attempting to overtake something, the feet being glued to the ground; doing some impossible task against time; trying to climb a mountain, the summit of which always recedes. The important feature of these dreams, in assessing their clinical significance, is that they waken the patient, and the state on waking is not so much one of terror as of utter misery; misery to the point of weeping. Furthermore, such dreams to have clinical significance occur frequently.

In such a patient, at this comparatively early stage of the disability, the concentration power is good; she complains of sleeplessness and her friends notice that she is moody and irritable; but the condition is not considered one for medical attention until pain of some kind develops. When such pain does develop the patient has passed from the instinct distortion phase of the disorder.

This early phase may be called the 'neurosis of unsatisfied desire' and its frequent occurrence in single women at the time of the menopause is of interest. I have found it particularly common in childless women approaching the menopause, and especially in schoolmistresses, whose daily work brings them in contact with children. Any individual who wants something badly and is unable to satisfy this want, and especially if this inability is dependent upon self-control, is liable to manifest the above symptoms. It is in my experience a condition more common in females than in males, but it occurs in the latter often enough.

These two conditions, the terror-neurosis and the neurosis of unsatisfied desire, are, so to speak, the elements of the progressive group of functional disabilities of the nervous system and they serve to emphasise the clinical duality of emotionalism. The word 'dysthymia' is a convenient synonym for the more cumbersome 'instinct-distortion neurosis,' and elsewhere I have referred these two groups into 'centrifugal' and 'centripetal' classes respectively.

Now, as one of the results of elaborate emotional control and pictorial memory, there has entered into human psychology the factor of *dread*, an associate of memorisation. In the course of time the dysthymic patient develops dread; dread of insanity, of malignant disease, of heart disease and, to the lay mind, its inevitable concomitant, sudden death.

Dread is a function of pictorial memory and in the absence of such memory there can be no dread. It is therefore an exclusively human trait and neuroses of which dread is an essential factor are necessarily progressive in type. It is more closely associated with control of the emotions than is fear pure and simple; a patient with the terror neurosis for example tends to develop dread when a certain degree of control has been established. The factor of dread in combination with a certain degree of control is liable to be accompanied by a rising blood-pressure and vascular or 'functional' pain; this may I think be made even more definite. Functional pain is always associated with a rising blood-pressure and the combination of the two postulates the existence of dread.

Many authorities I know will not hold with me here. They will

describe cases, apparently functional, in which the blood-pressure is low, but in such cases my own feeling is that some more frankly pathological 'cause' than psychical maladaptation is operative. It has always been my custom in such cases to institute a most rigid investigation for any possible toxic element; it is to this group of cases that the 'toxic' neuroses are to be found. In this group the predominating symptoms are generally dependent upon a sympathetic nervous system derangement; palpitation; nausea; asthma; abnormal sweating with coldness of the extremities; mucous colitis; pain over the major arterial trunks; subjective abnormalities of balance. Another group of the same kind is the hypochondriacal section of disordered nervous function. In this however we have much pain as morbid sensations other than pain, and sensations of abnormal consistence of different parts of the body.

In the true sense of the phrase, however, these toxic neuroses should not be considered as being functional. Subjective abnormal sensations in the absence of apparent organic disease and in the absence of a rising blood-pressure are in the majority of cases, at any rate, of toxic origin.

We may therefore say that, from the clinical standpoint, emotionalism falls into two groups, centripetal (emotions intimately concerned with reproduction) and centrifugal (those concerned with the safety of the individual apart from the community) and that disordered emotionalism, recognised in the human clinically as a functional nervous disorder, may arise out of—

(1) An absolute deficiency of emotional control dating from the earliest years of life and permitting the operation of psychical dissociation which would otherwise have been non-operative.

(2) An abnormal balance of emotional control as devoted to the two groups of emotionalism respectively. (The dysthymias or instinct-distortion neuroses.)

This may take the form of undue control applied to tones of the centripetal order (emotions concerned with reproduction) or to its deficiency in association with the centrifugal variety (subserving personal safety).

(3) Arising out of (2) through the intervention of pictorial memory (which is a function of emotional control among other factors) we have abnormalities in the sphere of dread; the memory- or mnemo-neuroses.

Emotional control being a faculty of the higher animals as compared with the lower, its defective development in the human may be looked upon as a reversion to a lower type of psychology and neuroses arising out of such a defect are retrograde. Hysteria is of course the type of this

state of affairs and hysteria should be considered as a regressive condition. Neuroses, for the formation of which emotional control is necessary, are progressive, and the dysthymias and mnemoneuroses are of this class.

Clinically the two groups of neuroses, retrograde and progressive, are sharply differentiated by the presence or absence of psychical distress.

Hysteria is essentially a protective mechanism, subserving the patient's egocentricity; being in conformity so to speak, with his self-respect. The earliest attacks are associated with a limitation of the field of consciousness and the performance of actions primarily associated with a centrifugal emotional tone provocative at one time of the mechanism of psychical dissociation. In subsequent attacks the abnormal behaviour is more and more habitual and the diminution of consciousness is less and less in degree; hysteria may be considered as the neurosis of habit action. The persistence of hysteria as a clinical state implies the dominance of the patient's egocentricity over his immediate surroundings; characteristically such people are apparently temperamentally placid.

On the other hand, the progressive neuroses implying as they do the inability of the patient to satisfy certain strongly felt emotions, are accompanied by temperamental instability; irritability, depression and so forth. And of the progressive neuroses, the mnemoneurosis is associated with pain.

The inability on the part of an individual to gratify a strongly felt emotion, however much it may conduce to behaviour in accordance with the dictates of the community to which he belongs, carries with it the implication of a psychical 'failure to make good,' and psychically speaking such individuals are failures in the psychical struggle for existence. Just as failures in the struggle for existence among lower animals are rapidly destroyed, so among human beings, in whom the struggle for existence is psychical rather than somatic, psychical failure to make good bears with it the potentiality of premature destruction. This is brought about through the rising blood-pressure and the premature occurrence of arterial involutionary disease; such patients dying of cerebral, cardiac or renal atheroma, one or more.

It is the memory neurosis which in the majority of cases brings the patient with a progressive functional disorder before the clinician, but a careful investigation into the history brings to light the symptomatology of the primary or dysthymic states, centripetal or centrifugal. These two primary states are in reality the elements of the progressive neurosis, upon which the more disabling condition is founded. As has been said above, however, often enough these dysthymic states are not considered

so much in the light of 'illnesses' as of 'perversity' on the part of the patient, and this applies especially to the centripetal variety. (It has been indicated elsewhere that a third dysthymic condition is to be recognised clinically in association with the emotion of anger. This also in the course of time is liable to pass into the memory-neurosis group of disorders.)

Clinically then the psychoneuroses may be classified into the following groups:

A. Retrograde; disorders associated with the abnormal operation of psychical dissociation hysteria and the exaggeration of habit action.

B. Progressive; disorders associated with a defective balance of emotional control as applied to (1) emotions subserving reproduction; centripetal dysthymias, (2) those subserving personal safety; centrifugal dysthymias. These dysthymic conditions tend to develop into the (3) memory neurosis through the intervention of dread.

The final phase, associated with involutionary vascular disease, is the outcome of the progressive group and predisposes to deletion of the individual, as psychically unfit. It is interesting that retrograde conditions by themselves never have this implication.

But now, a point of considerable interest arises. It has been suggested above that hysterical states are associated with the abnormal operation of the process of psychical dissociation and that such dissociation is the rule in the non-human animal psychology and has as one of its effects the non-registration in 'memory' of an incident accompanied by a terrifying emotional tone. That is to say, hysterical people in their psychology approach the non-human type closer in comparison than people who are not obtrusively hysterical and, therefore, amnesia developed in early life for experiences associated with a terrifying emotional tone in them would appear to depend rather on a non-registration of such an experience in pictorial memory than upon a registration subsequently made unavailable for the purposes of such memory by 'repression.' And, as a corollary of this, the more hysterical an individual may be, the more retrograde are his psychological processes and the more his amnesia under these circumstances represents not a repression but a non-registration of the responsible experience. (This non-registration applies to the possibility of recall in pictorial memory; the associated body behaviour proper to the incident at the time of its experience is perpetuated after the manner discussed above and is liable to form the groundwork of habitual action. But such habitual action cannot according to this view be considered dependent upon a psychical registration

repressed from pictorial memory and capable of a restoration to such memory.)

Take, for example, the case of a small child who is being brought up at home in an environment which does not conduce to emotional control and one therefore which is not subversive to the operation of psychical dissociation. In the event of such a child being thoroughly terrified in, say, an open field, the impulse to run away headlong will tend to be perpetuated in after life as a habit, if, and when, the child again encounters an open field capable of reproducing to a greater or less extent the original environment responsible. Once such a state of affairs has occurred in later life, then the habit of running away from such a field will be maintained by the element of expectation, although with the increased control necessarily acquired by the increase in age, the kinetic action may be restrained and the patient may merely feel the wish to run away or a vague sensation of unhappiness in such surroundings. Such an agoraphobia is genuinely hysterical in its inception, and no psycho-analysis, however skilled, will unearth the 'memory' of the initial incident, because such an incident was not at the time registered in pictorial memory. An approximately accurate conception of the nature of the incident may perhaps be gained by the examiner and by the patient by autosuggestion, but it must always be remembered that appropriateness of behaviour cannot be taken as proving that such behaviour is of necessity dependent upon the apparent incident to which such behaviour is appropriate.

The 'phobias' whose conative activity reproduces that characteristic of one of the primary instinctive activities would appear to fall into this group, of true hysterical behaviour, and therefore to depend upon habitual action and not upon an experience, registered in pictorial memory, dissociated from such memory and capable of ultimate recall to it.

The above statements may perhaps appear to conflict with clinical experience, which goes to show that many cases, even the majority, of patients suffering from obsessive fears, are undoubtedly relieved and even cured as a result of skilled psycho-analysis directed to the end of unearthing the psychical representation of an experience which has been subjected to amnesia. In such cases there can be no possible doubt but that a disagreeable experience has been registered in pictorial memory and has been so forcibly repressed that its recall in such memory is impossible to the patient unaided; with skilled assistance however it can be recalled and when properly presented to the patient the associated behaviouristic abnormalities disappear; the patient is clinically and academically cured.

But now, an inquisition into these types of cases shows that in many important respects they differ from the phobias described above. The patient with a true hysterical phobia certainly recognises the fact that in certain situations he or she may feel vaguely uncomfortable and may be anxious to change such situations and to keep away from them in future, but they are not worried, still less are they ill, with this recognition; unless the condition has been carefully fostered and elaborated by defective environment, my experience of these people is that they are very little disturbed by what they consider a 'constitutional' peculiarity. On the other hand, patients of the second group are definitely ill with their fear; it is always present and they manifest strangeness of behaviour in endeavouring to avoid specific objects and situations in which such objects are likely to be encountered. Also, whereas the true hysterical phobia is always associated with primary instinctive conation, the second group of cases is not so associated; often enough the conation is intensely complex and ingenious. Again, the hysterical phobia is to all intents and purposes constant, and only occurs in certain conditions, the patient remaining mentally placid otherwise; patients of the second class are constantly annoyed by their fear, and their behaviour towards it is liable to vary from day to day in accordance with the circumstances of the environment.

In other words, behaviour, loosely characterised as dependent upon a 'phobia,' is divisible into two groups; one of which originates as a result of psychical dissociation and is truly hysterical; it is perpetuated as a habit; it does not worry the patient and is only present in certain well-defined and primitive environments; its manifestation is either flight or recoil, or the desire to run away or to avoid. The other is never the result of psychical dissociation and is therefore never hysterical; it is associated with constant misery and efforts to modify a normal environment; the patients are depressed and uncontrolled in contrast to the former group in which they are placid. The former type of case is not dealt with logically by psycho-analysis whereas the latter is; the latter group is probably the larger of the two.

The *modus operandi* of the hysterical phobia has already been discussed; it is, so to speak, the perpetuation and reinforcement of primitive conative activity at the expense of a psychical registration in memory of an incident encountered in early life by the process of psychical dissociation. As regards the second variety, the non-hysterical, the mechanism is perhaps rather more obscure; in another place¹ I have endeavoured to explain it on the principle of "amnesia by relative inattention."

¹ Core, *Functional Nervous Disorders*, John Wright and Co., Bristol, 1922.

According to this theory an experience, not in itself at the time of its occurrence necessarily terrifying, is intimately associated after its registration in memory with terrifying attributes. The strength of the secondary emotion tends to perpetuate in memory these attributes at the expense of the memorisation of the initial experience, which sinks into oblivion; but which, having been psychically registered at the time of its occurrence, is therefore theoretically recoverable.

As an illustrative case I may perhaps quote the following¹: A child, which is developing in surroundings conducive perhaps to the stressing of emotional control, in playing with a pea, slips it up his nostril and immediately runs off to his mother to tell her about its disappearance. He is not at this time frightened; his mother however is horrified and after a somewhat disagreeable series of manipulations the pea is recovered. The child is then elaborately informed about the potential dangers of his performance; unpleasant information is imparted as to the liability of the pea growing into a 'tree' in his nose; the possibilities of 'ulcers' and 'discharges' are dwelled upon and he is made to realise the narrowness of the escape he has had from these dangers.

This deliberate inculcation of fright has the effect of emotionalising and therefore perpetuating the elements of the warning at the expense of the initial incident in memory. Both for a time pass out of consciousness, but of the two, the terror-laden secondary attributes of the initial experience are the more liable to make themselves felt in proportion to the greater degree of emotionalism attached to them in comparison with the initial incident. In the event at any future time of the emotional control of the individual being lowered, he will be liable to develop obsessive fears in the spheres of peas, his nose, nasal discharges and so forth; he will have no voluntary memory of the initial experience. Careful analysis however is capable of unearthing this experience, in that it has been registered in memory at one time, and the proper presentation of this experience in relation to the elements of the 'phobia' will resolve the trouble and will fulfil the ideal of a resolution in the patient's own consciousness, and, therefore is liable to effect an academically perfect cure.

Now, for this mechanism to be operative in the production of a 'phobia' it is essential that the superimposition of fear by means of the subsequent lecture, on the initial incident, should succeed that incident by a very short interval of time; the lecture should so to speak, form a periphery for the experience. Given that a period of time be allowed to

¹ *Loc. cit.*

elapse between the registration in memory of the initial incident and the secondary warnings, then, in accordance with the number of 'interim' memory registrations, the warning, when it does occur will not bring about a relative inattention for the original experience; the child will have a healthy disinclination to insert peas into his nose, but he will not develop an amnesia for the specific incident and a subsequent phobia is not likely to be built upon it.

These non-hysterical phobias are essentially dependent upon memory and therefore fall into the mnemoneurotic group of the progressive neuroses. Their actual manifestation in behaviour would appear to be associated with an impairment of emotional control in adult life, an impairment which is increased by the consciousness of an inexplicable dread, which in turn is reinforced by the progressive diminution of the control.

Throughout all the above argument it will be noticed that the factor of emotional control is constantly under discussion. It is to all intents and purposes absent in the infant; it is formed during childhood and is maintained and developed during adolescence and adult life; it disintegrates with the onset of the involutionary processes of old age. It is liable to diminution temporarily as a result of physical and psychical stress and strain at any time.

As regards the neuroses, it may be imperfectly formed during childhood, and provided the defect be sufficiently great, clinical hysteria in early adult life may be manifested. Its formation may be defective as regards its reaction on the two groups of emotionalism; that is there may be a wrongful balance of control in relation to these two groups, and this carries with it the liability to neuroses of the progressive group in later life, especially if there be a general impairment resulting from the stresses and strains mentioned above. A marked defect in the formation of control in childhood admits the operation of psychical dissociation and hysterical behaviour; a less severe defect results in behaviour, not in itself hysterical in that psychical dissociation is absent, but conforming superficially to such behaviour. Therefore in the secondary impairment of emotional control which is associated with the progressive neuroses there may be in the course of time behaviour which has certain points of resemblance to hysteria, but which is not hysterical in that it is not dependent upon psychical dissociation. Needless to say, the severe loss of control that is sometimes met with in the involutionary phases of life

can never give rise to hysterical behaviour owing to the organic lesions which underlie it.

A degree of emotional control which is less than that which is the average for the community in which the individual lives may for convenience be called 'hyperthymia,' and the hyperthymic state is therefore of all degrees of intensity. Hyperthymia may be primary or secondary; an intense primary hyperthymia constitutes the base of hysteria. A less intense primary hyperthymia leads to an undue emotional reaction to the surroundings combined with behaviour otherwise normal. Such people are commonly labelled 'hysterical' in general practice. Secondary hyperthymia may result from different physical stresses and strains and may also supervene on the course of any of the progressive neuroses. In the latter case there is a risk of the essential progressiveness of the disorder being masked by these secondary hysteria-like behaviour manifestations and in some cases the symptomatology may be complex.

Hysteria being a condition dependent upon defective education in the broad sense of the word is a condition which may reasonably be expected to disappear with an increase in knowledge of dealing with the developing child, though of course all of us will show traces for all time of its underlying mechanism in that all of us are born emotionally uncontrolled. But such traces will be confined to the sphere of the formation of useful habits and will not be found as clinical symptoms. On the other hand, the elimination of the progressive neuroses would appear to be a very much more difficult problem for the future, for it would seem to necessitate an elimination of the factors of worry and dread from everyday life, and in the present state of society it is difficult to see how this may be brought about. At the same time the trend of modern civilisation and enlightened thought is in this direction, and it is not only possible but probable that in the ultimate future these factors may be so greatly lessened as to become, to all intents and purposes, inoperative.

To summarise, we may say then that from the standpoint of clinical medicine emotionalism falls into two groups, centripetal and centrifugal respectively, and that the recognition of this duality is of utility in the classification of functional nervous disorders. It is of equal importance to realise that in the formation of such disorders emotional control would appear to play the most important role, and that abnormality of such control is an essential associate of these conditions. Functional nervous disorders would appear to arise out of an abnormal relationship between the emotionalism of an individual and his control; abnormal as considered in the light of the average for the community in which he is born and develops.

Defective formation of emotional control in the first few years of life, if sufficient in degree, conduces to hysteria in adolescence and to the perpetuation of certain symptoms as habitual action in later life in the event of the hysterical symptoms not receiving proper treatment. Hysteria therefore is a regressive condition.

A defective balance of control between the two groups of emotionalism is associated with functional disorders of the progressive order; the defect may consist of an overstraining of centrifugal control or an overdevelopment of a centripetal; the results in each case are clinically recognisable though in civil life the degree of invalidation may not be very great.

The occurrence of dread, independently or in the course of the above abnormal states, will, if it be allowed to persist, bring about definite and increasing invalidism. Prominent symptoms of such invalidism are pain and a rising blood-pressure, and this phase ultimately ends in organic disease through the supervention of vascular involutionary changes.

In the event of the emotional control being badly treated during childhood, in the direction of overdevelopment and overstrain, the elements of an obsessive neurosis in later life may be implanted through the possible mechanism of "amnesia by relative inattention," a neurosis which also in the course of time is liable to pass into the organic stage through the occurrence of dread.

These latter types of disorders, in that they depend upon the presence of emotional control and 'pictorial' memory, must be looked upon as exclusively human and therefore as being progressive.

The above conclusions have been arrived at as a result of clinical observation; it is therefore of considerable interest to find that Professor Jastrow¹ writing on "The Neurological Concept of Behaviour," has come to similar conclusions on a purely psychological basis.

¹ *Psychological Review*, vol. XXXI, No. 3.

FRANCIS THOMPSON: A PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL STUDY¹

By ELLA FREEMAN SHARPE.

I.

FRANCIS THOMPSON can, I suppose, be justly called the greatest religious poet of the nineteenth century. He surmised for himself an immortality through his verse, a surmise likely to be fulfilled. There are poets whose universality of expression is like great orchestral music which includes the individual instruments with their individual and peculiar music within the whole. There are poets who are masters of an individual instrument. To find Thompson is to be arrested as it were by a single experience, a few poignant cadences that are manipulated in different keys with an ever increasing complexity and astonishing beauty. With the true poet's intuition he can direct us to the scene of his poignant experience—the Eden of infancy which he never relinquished.

(A) Turn not your tread along the Uranian sod
 Among the bearded counsellors of God;
 For if in Eden as on earth are we,
 I sure shall keep a younger company:

 Pass the crystalline sea, the Lampads seven:—
 Look for me in the nurseries of Heaven.

In speaking of Shelley, Thompson has given us what one feels from the standpoint of psycho-analysis to be the *sine qua non* of poetic genius. He says Shelley had

An instinctive perception (immense in range and fertility, astonishing for its delicate intuition) of the underlying analogies, the secret subterranean passages, between matter and soul...the most rarefied mental or spiritual music traced its beautiful corresponding forms on the sand of outward things. He stood thus at the very junction-lines of the visible and invisible....He could express as he listed the material and the immaterial in terms of each other.

It is that direct spontaneous transcript of the unconscious experience into perfectly analogous expression that makes the poet, and in the case of Francis Thompson gives us so clear a picture of whence he drew his inspiration. Nor do I know elsewhere from a poet's lips anything so psycho-analytically accurate as this poet's swift intuition respecting the poet's nature. He says of Shelley: "He retained the idiosyncrasy of childhood, expanded and matured without differentiation. To the last he was the enchanted child." The phrase "without differentiation"

¹ Read at a Meeting of the British Psycho-Analytical Society held on 18th April 1923.

330 *Francis Thompson: A Psycho-Analytical Study*

touches one of the fundamental characteristics of the sources of Francis Thompson's own imagination.

We shall not do violence to Thompson's majestic verse in interpreting in the light of psycho-analysis those subtle analogies with which his work abounds, finding therein some way to the heart of his mystery. The exposition of that mystery in authentic poetry brought him for all too brief a period into an articulate relationship with his fellows. Nor shall we do violence to the man in interpreting those same analogies, for unexpressed, they made of him "an enfant perdu," "an alien guest," "unsharing in the liberal laugh of earth." For of himself might be written his own words on Coleridge:

Over that wreck most piteous and terrible...shine, and will shine...those...resplendent poems for which he paid the devil's price of a desolated life and unthinkably blasted powers.

II.

Francis Thompson was born in 1858 or 1859. He never knew which and said he did not care. His birthplace was Preston and he remembered his mother taking him to see the house in which he was born. It seemed to him "disappointingly like any other house." Thompson's father was a general practitioner and, like his wife, sister and brothers, a convert to Roman Catholicism. His rounds were his diocese and he was remembered after death for many unostentatious offices of kindness. Two of his brothers, Francis Thompson's uncles, were writers of uninspired verse. Mary Morton, the mother of Francis Thompson, was a convert to Roman Catholicism and it seems probable that an estrangement because of this caused her to leave home to earn her livelihood. She failed to enter the novitiate, an experience repeated in her son's life. A cousin says that Francis Thompson inherited his passion for religion from his father, but the poet himself considered he inherited his mental and physical traits from his mother.

Certain traits are interesting because of their perpetuation in diverse members of a very scattered family. One relative's life was a tragedy because she failed to enter a convent. Two aunts lived and died as nuns. Francis Thompson's own niece is in a Canadian Community. One relative recited the Psalms in a loud voice in the streets of his town while sleep-walking. The aloofness and disregard of worldly prosperity so marked in Francis Thompson himself, are characteristics to be found in the scattered branches of the family.

Francis Thompson was the second son, the first dying in earliest

infancy. There were three daughters: one died in infancy, the other two were his companions in the nursery and in his early lessons.

Childhood, he says, was tragic to him. He refers to the "long tragedy of early experiences adventured upon alone." That these were early and inner experiences, laying the foundations of a character that was never to be able to adjust itself to a world of men, is obvious. The outward events are clear enough. He attended for some months the school of the Nuns of the Cross and Passion. He reached the 'age of discretion' at seven and took his first communion. He was taught with his sisters by the same governess until he was twelve. At the age of seven he was reading Shakespeare and Coleridge.

There is no doubt that his father was a kind and just man: that his mother was tender and devoted. From the memoirs of Meynell we get glimpses that show how early the young boy manifested signs of that withdrawal from life that was afterwards so marked. As a child he would retire to a cupboard on the stairs and play alone, later he took his books. He was fond of toys. He had a little toy theatre in which he manipulated the puppets for hours. He had a toy theatre near him when he died, he had never tired of it. Once he lost a prize of a clockwork mouse to his sister and he was inconsolable. She gained it from him because of his dilatoriness. He could never be in time as a child. As a man, the clock meant nothing. Even till his last years he admonished himself to no avail by writing on his walls, "Thy sleep with the worms will be long enough," "Thou wilt not lie abed when the last trump blows." When playing cards he was always 'not ready.' He was always late for meals, always asking for ten minutes more, and his walking was described as 'unrecognised progress.'

He became as a child 'expert in concealment' and of the tragedy within no one knew. His notebook records an incident in childhood when he was lost. He remembered it thus: "The world wide desolation and terror of realizing that the mother can lose you, or you her and your own abysmal loneliness and helplessness without her. It is like fearing yourself to be without God."

He played with his sisters but he records that the game often meant one thing to them and quite another to himself. It was part of a dream scheme to him. But from boys' games he was tenfold wider apart than from girls'.

He resented the fiat "Thou shalt not hold a baby" and he could not shake the feminine prejudice, but he managed to wrest a succession of dolls from his sisters. He dramatized them, fell in love with them. In

332 *Francis Thompson: A Psycho-Analytical Study*

his essay on the "Fourth Order of Humanity" he remarks that he "did not father them." So he fell in love later with the bust of a woman in a Manchester Art Gallery. She succeeded the dolls, and of her he says, "She is the divinity of an accident—awaiting a divine thing impossible which can never come to her, and she knows it not."

Thompson himself recognizes that he was over young when he felt the charm of diction and beauty of words, the sense of words, to use his own expression, "suddenly becoming a marvel and quick with a preternatural life."

He first saw the sea at five. He bathed timidly, wearing his consecrated medal round his neck. The sea, it is worthy of note, is very little alluded to in his verse, it is never the occasion of a poem.

In 1870 the poet went to Ushaw College, Durham. He was then twelve and he met his first great trial timidly and doubtfully as he had met every previous trial, and did meet every later demand for adjustment to new conditions. In his words he did not want to leave "his tender home, his circle of just judging friends." He suffered from the moment of the train journey to school, during which he was teased by the boys in the carriage and the jam tarts in his pocket became a sticky mass, until he left school, rejected as a possible candidate for orders in the Roman Catholic Church and ordained by his father to become a medical student. The "Essay on Shelley" gives us some glimpse of the young boy. His tormenting playmates were devilish apparitions of a hate now first known. To his virginal soul they heralded a world's ferocity. He is a little St Sebastian sinking under an incessant flight of shafts. There is a note in his biography which reads, "If a little boy were let into Heaven he would chase the little angels and pluck the feathers out of their wings." Referring in later years to his schooldays he admits that his lot was no worse than that of other boys, but he says "a gash is as painful to one as amputation to another."

It is on record that he once organized a piratical band, putting episodes out of his omnivorous reading into concrete expression, but he soon forgot to play at pirates, and he never revived the game in any form in later years. He began surreptitiously to write verse. He was heard reciting Latin verse in his sleep. By his masters he was considered a good boy and was liked, although there was persistent complaint of his dreaminess and his unpunctuality. He shared in none of the school games. He is remembered on the play-afternoons as an unkempt figure, writing and copying poetry. What had happened we can read in the Shelley essay: "He threw out a reserve encysted in which he grew to

maturity unaffected by the intercourses that modify others into the thing we call a man."

At the close of Ushaw days his superiors decided that his abstraction of mind unfitted him for the calling of a priest. It was a lasting grief to him. He was thrust back into a world he had already abjured in spirit. Unfit for the discipline of the Church he proceeded to the severer demands of medical training. But he was indifferent to his prospects. What resolution he had, gathered around his conviction that he was a poet. But so deeply had he entrenched himself that he spoke of his literary aspirations to none, raised no voice against his training as a doctor, although he detested the thought of it, and dumb and apathetic he proceeded to Manchester. We have every reason to believe by the whole conduct of his life that the father's words were genuine when he said, years after, when the poems had appeared, "If the boy had only told me."

For six years Thompson pursued his medical course at Owens College, Manchester, never once voicing the utter distaste he felt. He confessed to Coventry Patmore in later years the repugnance to the dissecting room which he could stifle, but the sight of blood never ceased to fill him with abhorrence. He missed his lectures when he was not late for them. He would leave his father's door unkempt and with untied shoe-laces. He spent hours in the museums and reading-rooms. It was in one of these museums he was enthralled by the bust of the goddess, who succeeded his dolls. It is worth while remarking that in his essay he refers to her as a "Bacchante with vine strewn locks." It was during these years that Thompson's mother gave him a copy of De Quincey's *Confessions of an English Opium Eater*, and it proved her parting gift. She died suddenly shortly afterwards in December, 1880. Francis was then about twenty-two. The importance of this gift cannot be over-estimated. The allegiance to De Quincey's spirit was forged. Thompson's literary work in its mannerisms, its Elizabethan diction, tells us that both men drew from the same sources. In their lives are significant parallels—the same headlong courses to despondency; both fled from Manchester, both lived a life of hazard in London and both were succoured by an outcast woman of the street. Both commemorate this signal service in memorable language.

Thompson began spending money on opium, and it is important to remember that at this time he had not the consolatory knowledge of his genius as an offset to the pangs of conscience.

He failed his final examinations a second time, and after the years

334 *Francis Thompson: A Psycho-Analytical Study*

and money spent on training the long delayed reckoning with a considerate father came at last. The father accepted the son's account of himself and then set him to work for a surgical instrument maker. He worked for a fortnight and was discharged. At a final interview the son's demeanour suggested that he had been drinking (he was taking opium) and this was another cause for silence. He denied drinking and so his father was still further mystified. Finally, leaving a despairing note behind for his sister, Francis sold all but a few of his books, and fled to London. An uncle said of both sister and father that they were reserved and thought poetry a snare. Francis remarks in his notebook, "What does one want with a tongue when one has silence?" There is no wonder there was silence and yet it was quite true that Francis, who did not want to leave home, who still wanted to be under parental supervision, slammed the door more tightly when he went out.

The derelict years followed. The weekly allowance came from his father, but at last after Francis failed to go to the address to which it was sent, the money ceased. The poet starving could yet not bring himself to go for the money that would at least have fed him. He lived with poverty in its most appalling shapes—a frequenter of the poorest lodging houses, sleeping on the Embankment, holding horses' heads in the Strand and selling matches. Between the time of his despatch of a poem to Meynell's magazine and his receipt of an acknowledgment a year elapsed. It was during that year the young prostitute gave him food and a bed at night out of the pity of her heart. In the darkest hour of his despondency he went to Covent Garden with enough laudanum to kill himself. When half of it had been taken he had a vision of Chatterton standing by him and forbidding him to drink any more. He then remembered Chatterton's untimely suicide, and the fact that had the young poet lived he would have had help the following day. Thompson lived and by a strange coincidence the next day he saw the poem, sent a year before, printed in the *Merry England* magazine.

Meynell after difficulties tracked him down, and the ensuing friendship with the Meynell family lasted until his death. There was a period of abstention from opium, and this period coincided with the productivity of his genius, the poems that secured his fame. In these years, when his genius could command the patience and tolerance of those who recognized in him a great poet, there are certain aspects of his life to notice: the companionship of the Meynell children, especially the sisters to whom he wrote "Sister Songs"; the reverent love he poured out to Alice Meynell; the kindred spirit that he found in Coventry Patmore,

whose "crested and prevailing" name, as he calls it, stands as a dedication to one of his volumes.

But in these years the past is repeated, only that editors were patient and forgiving of his delays and broken promises, and friends who loved him bore in silence the forgotten trysts because of his suffering and the song. As in early years, he could wax wroth over writers and their articles if he hotly disagreed, but his remarks were written in a notebook and destroyed. As he himself said, "He had never killed a fly." His material welfare was in the watchful care of his friends: clothes, money and food they regulated.

His muse withdrew during the last few years and laudanum became a necessity. The last weeks were spent near Scawen Blunt's home in Sussex, where he became more and more silent, sinking into semi-consciousness, his mind gone, but his need for laudanum incessant. One day in the garden a wasp stung him and his wrist was bandaged. He called the wasp "a drunken brute" and asked that it should be killed. His swollen wrist was a source of great interest and solicitude to him. Later he was removed to a London Nursing Home and died quietly alone in November, 1907. His toy theatre, his notebooks, and his poems were all he left behind him.

III.

The finest poems written by Francis Thompson may be grouped roughly according to three main themes:

1. Those in which the poet orientates himself to Deity or some natural object of power and wonder. Such poems would include, for example, "The Hound of Heaven," "The Ode to the Setting Sun," "The Sinking Sun."

2. Those in which nature, earth and women are synonymous terms; for example, "From the Night of Forebeing," "The Mistress of Vision," the "Assumpta Maria."

3. Those in which children, flowers and song are equivalents; for example, "The Sister Songs," poems on the "Poppy," "The Making of Viola."

"The Hound of Heaven," Thompson's most widely known poem, may be taken as typical of Thompson's attitude towards Deity. The poet is in flight "down the nights and down the days"—"through the arches of the years," from the Divine Pursuer. This Pursuer is the God who smites and despoils. The poet says:

(B) Naked I wait Thy Love's uplifted stroke!
 My harness piece by piece Thou hast hewn from me.

336 *Francis Thompson: A Psycho-Analytical Study*

The pursued is an unmeriting, futile thing, "of all man's clotted clay the dingiest clot." He tries to shield himself from the pursuer by escape to nature, to children, to phantasies, but the strong feet follow, follow after. He is caught and capitulates at last to hear the divine voice of love saying:

- (B) All which I took from thee I did but take,
 Not for thy harms,
 But just that thou might'st seek it in My arms.
 All which thy child's mistake
 Fancies as lost, I have stored for thee at home:
 Rise, clasp My hand, and come!

The smiter, the despoiler, the tremendous Lover, the Father are one. The ultimate embrace is between father and child within the eternal home.

In the "Ode to the Setting Sun" he says:

- (C) I know not what strange passion bows my head
 To thee, whose great command upon my veins
 Proves thee a god for me not dead, not dead!

In the "Orient Ode" we may link together the Divine Pursuer of "The Hound of Heaven" with the Sun. He calls the Sun

- (D) A Divine assaulter, art thou come!
 God whom none may live and mark!

and the pursuit theme is clearer;

- (D) Thou as a lion roar'st, O Sun,
 Upon thy satellites' vexèd heels;
 Before thy terrible hunt thy planets run;

 Since the hunt o' the world began,
 With love that trembleth, fear that loveth,
 Thou join'st the woman to the man.

It is the terrible hunt of which Thompson is most aware, the God that smites, that demands sacrifice.

- (E) For all can feel the God that smites,
 But ah, how few the God that loves!

Having indicated briefly the dominant attitude in this first group of poems I would pass to the cycle of poems, "A Narrow Vessel," in the second group because of continuity of theme. There is the same allegory—the same pursuit—the same demand for surrender of strongholds—the apprehension of the final capitulation. "The Narrow Vessel" is a girl who is not great enough for the love that would be given her. The poem opens upon a girl's anger at the gift of a lock of hair to her lover, anger because it means the ultimate surrender. The theme reiterates

"The Hound of Heaven" and the poet's surrender to the Pursuer, of one stronghold after the other. She says:

- (F) With him, each favour that I do
 Is bold suit's hallowing text;
 Each gift a bastion levelled to
 The next one and the next.
- Behind me piecemeal gifts I cast,
 My fleeing self to save;
 And that's the thing must go at last,
 For that's the thing he'd have.
 My lock the enforced steel did grate
 To cut; its root-thrills came
 Down to my bosom.

Or in other language, spoken to Deity,

- (G) God! if not yet the royal siege
 Of Thee, my terrible sweet Liege,
 Hath shook my soul to fall;
 If, 'gainst Thy great investment, still
 Some broken bands of rebel Will
 Do man the desperate wall.

In the "Ode to the English Martyrs" he writes:

- (H) How sweeter than bee-haunted dells
 The bosmy blood of martyrs smells!
 Who did upon the scaffold's bed,
 The ceremonial steel between you, wed
 With God's grave proxy, high and reverent Death;
- The Bridegroom's arm, and that long kiss
 That kissed away your breath, and claimed you His.

The erotic motive of the chase, the Pursuer under the guise of God, the Sun, and reverent Death is unmistakable. The poet is the pursued, the sufferer, the maker of sacrifice.

In "Laus Amara Doloris" he finds the mirrored image of the Goddess Pain "in his own confronting eyes." He, as she, has not spared his heart's children to the sacred knife. The requiring eyes demand each song.

- (I) Ah, count, O world, my cost,
 Ah, count, O world, thy gain,
- In awful secrecy to hear
 The wind of thy great treading sweep afresh
 Athwart my face, and agitate my hair.
 The ultimate unnerving dearness take,
 The extreme rite of abnegation make,
 And sum in one all renderings that were.

Thompson's poems are the sacrifices, the utter abnegation that "sums in one all renderings that were." And in these lines we also can sum up the "renderings that were": mother and wife of her child, the maid of her virginity, the child of the mother's breast. Implicit in the yielding up of his songs, lie all these other renderings.

338 *Francis Thompson: A Psycho-Analytical Study*

To come to more perfect expression of his femininity one might turn to the triumphant verses of the "Assumpta Maria":

- (J) I, the flesh-girt Paradises
Gardenered by the Adam new,
Daintied o'er with dear devices
Which He loveth, for He grew.
I, the boundless strict savannah
Which God's leaping feet go through;
I, the heaven whence the Manna,
Weary Israel, slid on you!

That he, the poet, is Mary the Mother of God and Queen of Heaven, we find many confirmations—as for example when he refers to the poet himself as

- (K) ...that conduit running wine of song.
Then to himself dost most belong
When he his mortal house unbars
To the importunate and thronging feet
That round our corporal walls unheeded beat;
Till, all containing, he exalt
His stature to the stars, or stars
Narrow their heaven to his fleshly vault.

The recurrence of the "thronging feet that follow after" is noticeable as is his exaltation to the stars, or stars that take upon themselves the lowly human form.

Having established the poet's identification of himself with woman, one is led next to the fact that there are two types of women, under varying guises with whom Thompson is at one. We might call them the Pagan and Christian types.

It is the strength of the erotic motive underlying this feminine aspect of his soul that tortured Thompson. "Poetry that finds no room under the wings of the Holy One, finds it under the webs of the Evil One." From this quotation from the Shelley Essay it seems as though Thompson's rejection as a priest were linked with some deep disquiet in connection with poetry.

Thompson as the Pagan Goddess, and the theme of the "love-banning love" is plain in the poem "Daphne":

- (L) The river-god's daughter,— the sun-god sought her,
With the breath in her hair of the keen Apollo.
With feet less fleet than the feet that follow,
She throes in his arms to a laurel-tree.

Risen out of birth's waters the soul distraught errs,
She throes in his arms to a poet, woe's me!

A love-banning love, did the god but know it,
Which barks the man about with the poet.
And muffles his heart of mortality!

The reconciliation of the Pagan with the Christian woman was imperative. He became Mary, Mother of Christ, the Newer Eve, the After Woman, the Spouse of Christ, "to love her is to love the beauty of God's House." So once more he became The Church:

(M) When Christ is life, and you the way;
 When Egypt's spoils are Israel's right,
 And Day fulfils the married arms of Night.

Or as in another poem:

(N) And she sings the songs of Sion
 By the streams of Babylon.

So in actual life Alice Meynell became his benefactress in succession to the prostitute. The poet's songs to her breathe a removed reverence and adoration though they have the Pagan title of "Love in Dian's Lap," but the analytical interpretation of these poems is again that of identification, for her spirit is

...lineal to that
 Which sang *Magnificat*.

His soul is laid on hers.

(O) As maid's breast against breast of maid.

Unveil this spirit, lady, when you will,
 For unto all but you 'tis veiled still:
 Unveil, and fearless gaze there, you alone,
 And if you love the image—'tis your own!

A poem of great length and verbal magnificence called "An Anthem of Earth" gives us the psychological foundation of these types as arising in the ideal conception of the mother, and the subsequent disillusionment. I cannot do more than select two illustrative passages:

(P) ...Thought I not
 Thou set'st thy seasons forth processional
 To pamper me with pageant,—thou thyself
 My fellow-gamester, appanage of mine arms?

 Shook thy matron tresses down in fancies
 Wild and wilful
 As a poet's hand could twine them;

 Loving thy beauty in all creatures born of thee,
 Children, and the sweet-essenced body of woman;
 ...breathing warm of thee as infants breathe
 New from their mother's morning bosom.

And then:

(P) We stand and eye thee in a grave dismay,
 With sad and doubtful questioning, when first
 Thou speak'st to us as men: like sons who hear
 Newly their mother's history, unthought
 Before, and say—'She is not as we dreamed:
 Ah me! we are beguiled.'

 remainder flesh
 After our father's surfeits.

(F) ...That falling kiss
Touching long-laid expectance, all went up
Suddenly into passion;

(F) ...the wild train of life
 Reeled by, and left us stranded on a hush.
 This moment is a statue unto Love
 Carved from a fair white silence.

This static ecstasy, instead of dynamic ecstasy, is surely an image based upon infantile experience, not upon adult sexual maturity. The recurrence of such phrases as "enchanted movelessness," "passionless passion," "wild tranquillities," are frequent throughout the poems. It seems to me they are applicable to two early child situations, both of which involve oneness with the mother, the first in time being pre-natal, the child in the womb, the other post-natal, the child at the breast. The poem "The Mistress of Vision" has this quality of static ecstasy and the imagery of the poem just quoted, "Love Declared," recurs in it:

(Q) Secret was the garden;
 Set i' the pathless awe
 Where no star its breath can draw.
 Life, that is its warden,
 Sits behind the fosse of death.
 Mine eyes saw not, and I saw.

(C) Till Time, the hidden root of change, updries,
Are Birth and Death inseparable on earth;
For they are twain yet one, and Death is Birth.

This entranced hush, motionless motion, sound in silence, passionate tranquillity, by which Thompson images the consummation of love between man and maid (yet himself the maid) is paralleled by him both in the state of death and pre-natal existence. But there is one other analogous situation. It is that of the child at the breast, the immediate

post-natal experience. In speaking of his love for Alice Meynell and its swift onset, he says:

- (R) For swift it was, yet quiet as the birth
Of smoothest Music in a Master's soul.
...yea, it was still
As the young Moon that bares her nightly breast,
And smiles to see the Babe earth suck its fill.
O Halcyon! was thine auspice not of rest?

In the "Night of Forebeing" we read:

- (S) And all the springs are flash-lights of one Spring.
Then leaf, and flower, and fall-less fruit
Shall hang together on the unyellowing bough;
And silence shall be Music mute
For her surcharged heart.

Having reached this point I would venture the opinion that in Francis Thompson we have a unique psychical fixation of libido at the oral level. Psychically he was never weaned. Physically separated from the mother, he mourned and refused earth's meat through the remainder of his life. His life, his disasters, his poetry are all expressions both of that initial joy in gratification and that first sorrow of deprivation.

- (T) Then comes the incidental day
When our young mouth is weaned;
And from her arms we stray.
'Tis over.

So to Alice Meynell, speaking of his frustrated love for her:

- (U) A hand-clasp I must feed on for a night,
A noon, although the untasted feast you lay,
To mock me, of your beauty.
...make essay
What 'tis to pass unsuppered to your couch,
Keep fast from love all day; and so be taught
The famine which these craving lines avouch!

The analogy is, that to understand his drouth she must go unsuppered too; unconsciously he projects the same situation between herself and her husband as he wishes unconsciously between himself and the mother.

So we find him speaking of the sun as

- (C) Thou genitor that all things nourishest!
The earth was suckled at thy shining breast,
And in her veins is quick thy milky fire.

He speaks elsewhere of "God focussed to a point," of "When God was stolen from men's mouths stolen was the bread." This brings me to his conception of Deity as "twi-formed":

- (C) Thou twi-form deity, nurse at once and sire.
Or
(V) Behold, with rod twy-serpented,
Hermes the prophet, twining in one power
The woman with the man.
...In him allied
Both parents clasp.

342 *Francis Thompson: A Psycho-Analytical Study*

The nipple and the penis are one symbol. In suckling at the mother's breast he is suckled by the father too. When he is weaned "God is stolen from the mouth"—separation is weaning, which is equivalent to castration. Hence the significance of the Hound of Heaven.

- (B) All which I took from thee I did but take.
Not for thy harms,
But just that thou might'st seek it in My arms—

i.e. at the breast of the twi-formed Deity there is union again in the Godhead.

The cycle of pursuit is clear in "New Year's Chimes":

- (W) The chase that's chased is the Lord o' the chase.
(*And a million songs are as song of one*)
And the pursued cries on the race;
And the hounds in leash are the hounds that run.
The world above in the world below
(*And a million worlds are but as one*)
And the One in all.

The cycle is in the poet himself:

- (S) My little worlded self! the shadows pass
In this thy sister-world, as in a glass,
Of all processions that revolve in thee:
Not only of cyclic Man
Thou here discern'st the plan,
Not only of cyclic Man, but of the cyclic Me.
Not solely of Mortality's great years
The reflex just appears,
But thine own bosom's year, still circling round
In ample and in ampler gyre
Toward the far completion, wherewith crowned,
Love unconsumed shall chant in his own furnace-fire.

And note again, it is the bosom's year that is the cycle. The cycle may be represented as the circle of the sun, the moon, the breast, or the womb, "the Mystic Sun," "the Virgin's womb."

Addressing the sun he says:

- (D) To thine own shape
Thou round'st the chrysolite of the grape,
Bind'st thy gold lightnings in his veins.

The phases of this eternal cycle alternate thus:

- (J) Open wide thy gates, O Virgin,
That the King may enter thee.

The sun has been chasing the earth. This is the pursuit. We glimpse the wonderment of the primitive mind in the child in a riot of imagery. He sees the sinking sun touching the earth in the west. Then he thinks earth is held to the sun's bosom. "The earth is suckled at thy shining

breast." It may be that the earth mother is suckling the sun, for he says in one poem

- (X) The sopped sun—toper as ever drank hard—
 Stares foolish, hazed,
 Rubicund, dazed,
 Totty with thine October tankard.

The sun sinks into earth. It is night, and the sun and earth are one. The sun is in the earth, and it is night with "orgiastic revelries." It is also death, as well as the "Night of Forebeing," for the sun is the child too within the womb. The chase begins again with the Resurrection of the Sun, Christ risen from the Tomb.

But for the poet the magic circle is broken by an interlude, the sentence of life. Suckled at the mother's breast, he is still one with the mother and still suckled thus by the father. Separated from her "God is robbed out of his mouth" and he "must fare forward to the dull vale, robbed of his Godhead." But, psychically one with the mother, he, like her, remains the pursued, though pursuit means chastisement and despoiling, and never love. Love comes only when the magic circle is entered again. The third phase represents this.

- (J) 'Whence He sprung, there He returneth
 Mystic Sun,—the Virgin's Womb.'

Or, as he says in another poem, he enters "the sacred bridal gloom of death." In the nuptials of death the cycle is complete again. He is sustentant to the mother even as the sun suckles her—Father and son are one, "beyond the pillars of death and the corridors of the grave in the union of spirit to spirit within the containing Spirit of God."

Cyclic unrest is now balanced by 'cyclic equipoise.' The conscious life of Thompson is represented by the second of these phases—unsceptred, undiademmed, *i.e.* the weaned and castrated one.

- (P) He faring down
 To the dull vale, his Godhead peels from him
 Till he can scarcely spurn the pebble—

That the poet is omnipotent is shown in his life and work. He is a Creator, like God.

- (G) Poet! still, still thou dost rehearse,
 In the great *fiat* of thy Verse
 Creation's primal plot.
 And what thy Maker in the whole
 Worked, little maker, in thy soul
 Thou work'st, and men know not.

Song, "A Water-child like Earth," is the child he has created, as God created the earth. He calls himself a "conduit running wine of song"—a father image, or "The Four Rivers," "Fountain watering Paradise

344 *Francis Thompson: A Psycho-Analytical Study*

of Old"—a mother image from the "Assumpta Maria." Or he speaks of himself as putting on "swift quickening" and then of "Suckling the baby song." He speaks in one place of Earth as "God's daughter," and in another, of "Eve grown marriageable for God"—the Eve that God has produced: and here I would recall the passage about the body's interplay with the spirit:

(Y) This pair whose bond is at once filial and marital.

He was assured of the immortality of his name, an assurance paradoxical enough in the face of his hesitancy and his neglect of the world. In mighty metres and jewelled words, the Universe was his box of toys. He too, like Shelley, "tumbles in the stardust" and the "Moon is his sister, the stars his brethren." He swings the earth "a trinket at his wrist." His outward life expresses not only, as we have seen, an endless yielding up of all to the relentless pursuer, but it has this other significance too—a deep-seated infantile omnipotence. The evidences of this unconscious infantile omnipotence are to be seen in his timelessness, his neglect of all ties and obligations, his disregard of health, his dependence upon others for food and shelter, and that immunity in spirit that enabled him to live under such dire conditions. All alike point to a fundamental desolation of spirit when confronted by the limitations of time and space in a reality world. He died with the toy theatre near him.

We might formulate much of Freud's theory of infantile sexuality from Thompson's poetry so direct is the transcript from the unconscious mind to great verse. The world will accept its poets if not its scientists, and the poets know, although they do not know they know.

(Z) We speak a lesson taught we know not how,
And what it is that from us flows
The hearer better than the utterer knows.

QUOTATIONS FROM:

- | | |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| (A) To My Godchild. | (N) The Singer Saith of his Song. |
| (B) The Hound of Heaven. | (O) "Manus Animam Pinxet." |
| (C) Ode to the Setting Sun. | (P) An Anthem of Earth. |
| (D) Orient Ode. | (Q) The Mistress of Vision. |
| (E) Heaven and Hell. | (R) Sonnet IV: Ad Amicam. |
| (F) A Narrow Vessel. | (S) From the Night of Forebeing. |
| (G) Carmen Genesis. | (T) Of Nature: Laud and Plaint. |
| (H) The English Martyrs. | (U) Love's Almsman Plaineth His Fare. |
| (I) Laus Amara Doloris. | (V) Hermes. |
| (J) Assumpta Maria. | (W) New Year's Chimes. |
| (K) Contemplation. | (X) A Corymbus for Autumn. |
| (L) Daphne. | (Y) Essay on Health and Holiness. |
| (M) The After Woman. | (Z) Sister Songs. |

A PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL STUDY OF A PHANTASY OF ST THÉRÈSE DE L'ENFANT JÉSUS¹

By I. F. GRANT DUFF.

THE subject of this study is a French girl who died in 1897, and was canonized this year, only twenty-seven years after her death. Her autobiography² was published a few years ago. The greater part of it was written when she was twenty-two, at the request of her sister Pauline³ who was prioress of the convent where she was a nun.

The whole of the life is very interesting from a psycho-analytical point of view, but here I only propose to make a short study of a certain phantasy which persisted through her life, and was the chief unconscious factor in her resolve to become a nun, and led to a certain neglect of her health which probably hastened her death.

This phantasy is concerned with the Oedipus complex. Thérèse Françoise Martin was born on January 2, 1873⁴. Both her parents were intensely religious, and both of them showed neurotic symptoms, the father having such severe mental derangement towards the end of his life that he had to spend three years in some sort of an asylum.

There were nine children, four of whom died in infancy. Five girls survived. Marie, the eldest, was fourteen years older than Thérèse, who was the youngest.

Her mother died when she was four and a half years old⁵. The picture we have of her before this event is of a merry, nervous, precocious, much loved child. After this she was over-sensitive and tearful, until she was thirteen, when she says that a small miracle happened which enabled her to overcome this flaw in her character⁶. Unfortunately we are told nothing about this miracle except that it took place after Marie went into the Carmelites, and that it took place at Christmas. We shall see the importance of these two factors later. She spent a great deal of time with her father, and appears to have been his favourite. He was devoted to her. His usual name for her was "Little Queen." She in her turn

¹ Read before the British Psycho-Analytical Society on November 18th, 1925.

² *La Bienheureuse Thérèse de l'Enfant-Jésus*. Imprimerie de St Paul, 36, Bar-le-Duc, Meuse. [All page references relate to this work.]

³ p. v.

⁴ p. xvii.

⁵ p. xx.

⁶ p. 26, 87 ff.

was devoted to him and to her sisters. Her two eldest sisters were very literally mother-substitutes, looking after her in every way with the utmost affection. She was taught by them until she went to a convent day school¹. She was intellectually forward for her age, but owing to the fixations on the various members of her family she was timid and incapable of play. She claims to have had a very happy childhood.

When she was fourteen and a half she determined to enter the Carmelite convent at Lisieux, where they lived². Her father consented, but the convent authorities refused; a visit to the bishop was equally unsuccessful, and was followed by a pilgrimage to Rome, where she begged the Pope himself to give the necessary permission, and she was finally received when she was fifteen and a half. She died nine and a half years later of tuberculosis, in September, 1897³.

There are two very interesting extracts from letters written by Mme Martin, one quoted immediately after the other⁴. The first is unfortunately not dated:

The baby is an imp without her equal; she comes to me and while she is petting me she says that she wishes that I would die. "Oh how I wish that you would die, my poor little Mummie." When she is scolded she looks much astonished and says, "But it is so that you may go to heaven, since you tell me that you must die in order to get there." She also tells her father in her violent fits of affection that she wishes that he would die. The poor little dear will never leave me. She is always with me and follows me happily about, especially in the garden. When I am not there she will not stay there, and cries until she is brought back to me.

The second letter was written when she was just going to be three.

Little Thérèse asked me the other day if she would go to heaven. "Yes, if you are very good," I answered. "Oh, Mummie," she went on, "if I were not a dear good little girl, should I go to hell, but I know what I would do; I would fly off with you, who would be in heaven, then you would hold me tight in your arms and how could God get hold of me then." I saw by her look that she was quite sure that God could do nothing to her if she hid herself in my arms.

In these two letters the strong libidinal attachments to the parents of either sex are very clear, also the ambivalence of feeling towards them. They are an epitome of many of her future reactions, though later the hostility is better hidden. The short phantasy of flying to God in the mother's arms was the phantasy that dominated her life. The conscious phantasy even at the age of three years stops short at the exciting point

¹ pp. 45 ff.

² pp. 97 ff.

³ p. 288.

⁴ p. 10.

of the meeting with God. It is too exciting, and the censorship has to be brought into play. The interpretation is, I think, the child in her mother's arms (the womb) meets her father, that is, her father's penis, and so has intercourse with him in the mother's womb. She may seem young for such a phantasy but she was apparently sexually a precocious child. Later we find the idea of birth closely connected with the other elements in this phantasy, and nativity festivals were particularly attractive to her.

The little miracle referred to above took place at Christmas. She wished to enter the convent at Christmas. The day when she took the final vows (that is, the marriage vows) was the feast of the nativity of the Virgin. She writes,

The Nativity of Mary! what a beautiful feast on which to become the bride of Christ! It is the little blessed Virgin (the mother) of one day old who gave (carried) her little flower to the little Jesus (God)¹.

The name she took on becoming a nun was Thérèse de l'Enfant Jésus. She was talking to the prioress, and had just thought that she would like to be called by this name, when the prioress herself suggested it. This fact together with the fact that in taking this name she both remained herself, and could identify with the foundress of the order, made the idea most acceptable; she experienced great joy at the suggestion, and looked upon the incident as a "delicate attention of her well-beloved little Jesus²." So the mother is an intermediary between her and God as in the early phantasy.

Another feature of these last two stories is the importance of the mother, which is so striking a part of the three-year old phantasy.

She claims that her first memory³ is of hearing people say that Pauline, the second eldest sister and the most important figure in her life after her father and mother, was going to become a nun. The intensely religious atmosphere in which she lived would leave her in no doubt as to the fact that a nun went away and lived in a special relationship with God, and she resolved that she too would become a nun. "So it was her example," she adds, "that from the age of two years drew me towards the Spouse of Virgins." Pauline acts the mother's part, and draws her (carries her) to a sexual relationship with God.

When her mother died she at once replaced her⁴:

On the day that Holy Church blessed the mortal remains of our dear Mummie,...our nurse was full of pity for us, and turning to Céline (the sister next older than herself) and to me, she said, "Poor little things,

¹ p. 159.

² p. 63.

³ p. 13.

⁴ p. 25.

you are motherless." Then Céline threw herself into the arms of Marie crying, "You shall be Mummie." I who was always in the habit of following Céline ought to have copied her in this,...but I thought that Pauline might feel neglected without a little girl, so I looked at you (*i.e.* Pauline) lovingly...and said, "For me it is Pauline who shall be Mummie."

We get hints here that this is not only a choice of a mother, but a repudiation of a mother. "I ought to have copied Céline." She is doing something which needs an excuse, she gets it *via* a projection, "Pauline will feel neglected," meaning Thérèse will feel neglected unless she is the only one. Céline is got rid of, so is Marie, but she is at once replaced. We know that one way of dealing with the death wishes to the mother was never to let her out of her sight. The description of the complete change in herself after her mother's death shows how intense her feeling of guilt in connection with it was¹.

Her jealousy of her mother's sexual activities, and the attempt to hinder them by keeping her close to her, is exemplified in an episode relating to the time when she was waiting for Céline, who was the last of the sisters to become a nun, to join her in the convent. She writes²,

I had now only one wish left...this wish was for Céline to enter the convent....How I suffered in knowing her exposed to dangers that I had never known. One day she was to go to a party....I suffered more than ever about it. I cried in torrents and begged our Lord to prevent Céline from dancing.

A prayer which was heard, much to her satisfaction.

Pauline was received as postulant in the Carmelite convent at Lisieux in October, 1882, when Thérèse was nine and a half. This event was followed by a severe hysterical illness from which Thérèse suffered for many months³.

I said to myself Pauline is lost to me! My soul developed in such an astonishing way at the breast of suffering, that it was not long before I fell seriously ill. The illness by which I was attacked certainly came from the jealousy of the devil, who furious at this first entrance into the Carmelites wished to avenge himself on me for the great wrong which my family was going to do him in the future. But he did not know that the Queen of heaven watched faithfully over her little flower....At the end of the same year, 1882, I was seized with headaches which, although they never stopped, were bearable, and did not prevent me from going on with my lessons; this lasted until Easter, 1883. At this time Daddy, having gone to Paris with Marie and Leonie, had confided Céline and myself to my uncle and aunt.

One evening when I was alone with my uncle, he spoke of Mummy

¹ p. 24.

² p. 170.

³ pp. 53 ff.

and of memories of the past, with a tenderness which moved me deeply and made me cry. He himself was surprised to find me, at my age, expressing the feelings which I did, and he made up his mind to procure all sorts of distractions for me in the holidays. God had decided otherwise. That very evening my headache became extremely bad, and I was seized with a strange trembling, which lasted all night. My aunt, like a true mother, did not leave me for a single instant....How can I describe the misery of my dear father when on his return from Paris he found me in this desperate condition?...God was glorified by the wonderful resignation of my father and that of my sisters, especially by Marie. How she suffered because of me.

Meanwhile, my Mother (Pauline), the day for you to take the habit was approaching; no one spoke of it in my presence,...thinking that I should not be able to go....I knew that Jesus would not try his little fiancée by my absence; she who had already suffered so much from the illness of her little girl. And really I was able to kiss my dear mother, to sit on her knee, and to hide myself under her veil, and to be kissed by her....

Next day I was again violently attacked by the illness, which became so serious that, according to human reckoning, I ought never to have got better....

With what terrors the Devil inspired me! I was afraid of everything; my bed seemed surrounded by frightful precipices; certain nails in the wall of the room took the terrifying form of large black charred fingers, and made me cry out with fear. One day while Daddy was looking at me silently, the hat which he held in his hand was turned into—I cannot say what horrible shape, and I showed such terror, that poor Daddy left me sobbing....

Marie never left me...for I could not bear her to leave me....Ah! my dear sisters, how I made you suffer!

When my suffering was less acute I used to enjoy making wreaths of daisies and forget-me-nots for the Virgin Mary....One day I saw Daddy come into the room; he seemed much moved, and going up to Marie he gave her some money and with an expression of great sadness he begged her to write to Paris for a novena of Masses at the shrine of our Lady of Victories, in order to obtain the recovery of his poor little Queen.

One Sunday during the novena Marie went into the garden,...I began to call "Marie, Marie."...I saw her come in quite clearly, but alas!...I did not recognize her. This inexplicable forced fight caused indescribable suffering, and Marie suffered perhaps even more than her poor Thérèse. At last, after making vain efforts to get me to recognize her...my dear sister...prayed to the Virgin with all the fervour of a mother....I also turned to my heavenly mother. Suddenly the statue became alive.... The holy Virgin came towards me....Then without any effort I recognized my dear Marie....The little flower was reborn to life, a shining ray of her sweet sun had warmed her, and had delivered her for ever from her cruel enemy.

This account of her illness gives us the Oedipus conflict most clearly. It is present in its complete form¹. The positive attitude towards the mother is shown in the making of wreaths for the Virgin and the part that the Virgin plays in the final recovery, though here we must not forget the triumph over the mother in making her play this part; while the hostility to the father is fairly directly expressed. Still, in the main, the positive attitude is directed towards the father and the negative attitude towards the mother. The whole illness is a repetition of the two letters cited above.

The headaches begin when Pauline, who as we remember was chosen to represent the mother when the mother died and is addressed as Mother throughout the book, goes to be married to Christ. Thérèse writes²,

I must now speak of the painful separation which nearly broke my heart, when Jesus took my much loved little mother from me by force. I said to her one day that I should like to go away with her into a far-away desert; she answered that she had the same wish, but that she would wait until I was older. Thérèse took this unrealizable promise seriously.

But Pauline went to the convent (the desert, heaven) without her and so deceived her in two points. Firstly she did not take her with her, and secondly she went to have intercourse with the father herself. The result is her illness which makes amends for this, and fulfills the incestuous desires towards the father, and punishes the mother (Pauline), and punishes herself, of course, both for the one thing and for the other.

Then if we turn to her account of the beginning of the illness, she is at the breast of suffering, that is in the mother's arms, and is to be attacked by the devil, who cannot harm her because the heavenly mother is watching over her.

The severe outbreak of the illness is immediately prefaced by a conversation with the uncle about the dead mother. This *tête-à-tête* conversation activated the guilt, the enmity and the incestuous desires; the result is a night spent in a masked orgasm, an aunt kept in close attendance, and increased headache.

In the betrothal setting the father (Christ) figure is unseen but none the less present. She is taken on Pauline's lap, and the covering veil completes the womb imagery. The result of this enactment of her phantasy is an exacerbation of the symptoms. The working out of the drama in the recovery takes one directly back to the two letters cited above. She fails to see Marie, meaning that she is dead. "Oh, how I

¹ Freud, *Das Ich und das Es*.

² p. 50.

wish you would die my poor little mother...so that you may go to heaven." In the recovery, when the dying had had its turn, Thérèse looks at the "heavenly mother," that is, the mother is now in heaven, and "the little flower is reborn through a ray of her gentle sun" (the father).

The money given for the Masses which are to cause Thérèse to be reborn shows the father's love to her. The mother is a prostitute with whom the father has intercourse, because of the child carried in her womb.

It is unnecessary to say much about the aspect of the punishment of the sisters which is a part of the gratification of the illness, it is always mentioned in connection with her own sufferings and shows an identification. Pauline must suffer for marrying Christ, because the devil is jealous. A useful projection, but the angry devil is the angry God of her childhood, who terrifies her with his phallus. Here, however, is distinct penis envy. Her father is also made miserable.

In the original phantasy the castration of the father is expressed by the place of censorship. What could God do to her then? So the Virgin watches over her, and the devil cannot harm her.

The torpor of which she speaks in her illness, possibly represents the mother lying immovable in the coffin, and the death which takes her to heaven. Years later, when she was watching by the death-bed of the mother superior of the convent (not Pauline), she experienced a sort of torpor, and an awakening from it, at the moment of death, which she calls birth into heaven. She herself links up this death with her own mother's death¹.

The day when this venerable mother left her exile for the fatherland (*la patrie*)—note the expression—I received a very special blessing. It was the first time that I was present at a death-bed; it was really a most entrancing sight. But for the two hours that I spent at the foot of the bed of the dying saint, I was seized with a sort of torpor; I was full of trouble about it, and then at the moment that our mother was born into heaven, I felt filled with an indescribable joy and fervour, as if the blessed soul of our sainted mother had at that moment given me a share of the joy in which she already rejoiced; as I am sure that she went straight to heaven.

There can be no doubt that this phantasy played a large part in her vocation; she writes², "The good master transplanted her (Thérèse) to Mount Carmel, in the garden chosen by the Virgin Mary." Her favourite name for a nun is the "bride of Christ." "I have found my vocation,

¹ pp. 25 and 163.

² p. 8.

it is love! and this place, O my God, it is Thou who hast given it to me, in the heart of the Church my Mother, I shall be love...so I shall be everything¹."

Here we find that this child in the womb identification, if we may so call it, satisfies her extraordinary narcissism, of which the following is an amusing example. Her libidinal desires had been stimulated by hearing of the marriage of a cousin of whom she saw a good deal in her childhood. She said it aroused her to try more than ever to please her spouse, "the king of kings." She was at the time instructress of the novices, and in order to bring home to them the greatness of their marriage destiny, she wrote the following *lettre de faire part*².

God the almighty, Creator of heaven and earth, Sovereign Lord of the world, and the most Glorious Virgin Mary, Queen of the Heavenly court, invite you to the spiritual marriage of their August Son, Jesus, King of Kings and Lord of Lords, with little Thérèse Martin,...you are invited to the wedding reception when Jesus...will come in the splendour of His Majesty to judge the quick and the dead.

In the later years of her life the masochism is tremendously increased. Two years before her death she offers herself as "a victim in a holocaust to divine love³." This idea takes up a large portion of this part of the book, and helped her to hasten to her death.

On the eve of Good Friday, eighteen months before she died, she had obtained permission to watch by the sepulchre of Christ until midnight. Such a situation would inevitably have stimulated her incestuous desires, and an haemoptysis which took place about an hour later was greeted with joy as an intimation of going to rejoin her "well-beloved in heaven⁴." Next morning she mentioned what had happened, but made light of it and was allowed to continue fasting. The following night there was another haemoptysis which she regarded in the same light as the first, and no sort of remedy seems to have been given or any notice taken of it, and though later she was given treatment for a cough which she developed, she appears to have followed the severe rule of the convent as long as it was in any way possible for her to do so. As one reads the book one feels that the whole convent identified with her, and her phantasy became a communal phantasy.

The story of the last months of her life is unfortunately not by herself, and so the account of the phantasies underlying her actions is less complete, but we have one version of our phantasy which shows the increasing masochism of the last period⁵. "I know that God wants a little bunch

¹ p. 258.

² p. 160.

³ p. 176.

⁴ p. 186.

⁵ p. 291.

of grapes, that no one will offer Him....I pray...to the Virgin Mary to remind her son of his title of thief...so that he may not forget to come and steal me." Throughout the last months of her life she showed a particular devotion to the Virgin. One of the remarks reported from her last illness is¹, "The devil torments me, I cannot pray, I can only look at the holy Virgin." Her last words were, "My God,...I love you²." Her last action was to look towards and above the statue of the Virgin.

It is interesting to note that "Her great supernatural spirit enabled her to account herself happy to die in the arms of another Prioress (*i.e.* not her sister) in order to be able once more to practise faith in authority," or once more to repudiate the mother whilst retaining her³.

The chief mechanism involved in this phantasy seems to be a very complete identification with the mother, or even with the mother's genital organ⁴. The value of the phantasy is enormous. It enables Thérèse to have the incestuous relations with her father which she desires, and at the same time it serves as a reaction formation against the death wishes to her mother; but the purpose of the death wishes is fulfilled, because the mother has ceased to be an envied rival and has become a subservient intermediary. There is an exquisite irony in such a phrase as "the Queen of Heaven watched over her little flower," for the situation is "either you and I," or "neither you nor I." If her mother's jealousy forbids Thérèse gratifications with her father, her mother cannot have them either; if, on the other hand, her mother indulges in them, Thérèse as the genital organ is the chief beneficiary. But she is in no way to blame. She cannot help it if her mother is in heaven with her father. And so by living out her phantasy she attained a fairly happy solution to her conflicts.

¹ p. 286.

² p. 306.

³ p. 270.

⁴ This mechanism was put forward by Dr Ernest Jones when this paper was read before the British Psycho-Analytical Society. When I wrote the paper I thought it was a case of bisexuality, a strong homosexual component making it easy for Thérèse to shelter with her mother from her father, and it seems probable that her homosexual impulses would find satisfactions in the situation, and so help towards it, but in thinking the matter over I came to the conclusion that a much more important element was the identification suggested by Dr Ernest Jones, and he kindly gave me permission to incorporate his idea in this study.

ABSTRACTS

The Journal of Neurology and Psychopathology, vol. VI, May, 1925.

ISAAC M. ALTSHULER: *The Psychopathology of Lying*. "Nature," says the author, "resorts to falsehood," and gives as examples the spider spinning a web, a fox doubling on its track to 'fool' the hound, and the creatures who 'sham' death. Deception is a matter of self-preservation, an ego-urge. The child lies because it is physically weaker than the adult and by lying can develop a sense of security by bringing the grown-up to his own level of feebleness. The urge for lying is immense among children because they have so much in common with lower animals, and the pleasure in it is great because a great instinct (self-preservation) is gratified; lying is identified with self-preservation. The revolt of mankind against lying is explained on the ground that it reminds him of his feebleness. Imagination is the material of which a lie is composed; when the child grows up it acquires more experience of facts, "reality excludes imagination." Thus a child, having little experience, "lies apparently without reason." "When lying exceeds the permissible degree, we call it pathological lying." The author would dispense with the symptom-complex 'pseudologia phantastica' (he says it is found in "paranoia, imbecility, chronic alcoholism, psychoneuroses, hysteria and certain forms of sexual perversion") because it is so hard to differentiate from a 'normal' lie. There is no clinical evidence adduced to render this theory more acceptable than rival views which have the support of observation.

J. R.

Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases, vol. LXII, July, 1925.

JENS CHR. SMITH: *Atypical Psychoses and Heterologous Hereditary Taints*. If heterologous hereditary characters are united, they will, in the descending line, entail the occurrence of a considerable number of psychoses, about one-half of which are purely segregated as the pure psychoses of the separate dispositions, i.e. as manic-depressive or schizophrenic as the case may be, whereas the other half present combinations of the various phenotypes in the theoretically imaginable ways. Perhaps the manic-depressive and the schizophrenic dispositions are not altogether mutually independent. The figures on which these conclusions are based are not large (19 family groups).

J. R.

Annales Medico-Psychologiques, Douzième Série, Tome 1^{er}, February, 1925.

P. GUIRAUD ET M. SONN: *Délire systématisé avec hallucinations visuelles et considérations sur la psychologie des délires*. In chronic delirium there is almost complete syncytium with fusion of proximate elements. A well-marked feature in the case described is the presence of psycho-sensorial phenomena of a visual nature. Sketches and drawings are made representing the images which appear to the patient. In chronic delirium visual hallucinations are relatively infrequent but do occur.

Ibid. March, 1925.

E. MINKOWSKI: *Troubles mentaux, complexes et constitution*. A fairly detailed clinical report of four cases to demonstrate the differentiation of the epileptoid and the schizoid from the epileptic and the schizophrenic. In the cases described there is no repression of the Oedipus situation; there is an absence of censorship; the patients speak about incestuous relationships with a certain naïve cynicism. Some interesting observations are made as to the possibility of psycho-analysis in these cases. The author points out that it is necessary to mark out the indications and contra-indications for psycho-analytic treatment. In these epileptoid conditions psychotherapy can do little more than alleviate the symptoms. The writer discusses the effect of reading Freud's Introductory Lectures which a patient (a schizoid where the obsessional symptoms were only incidental) stated had cured him. In fact there was no change and at the most the reading could have given him some intellectual comfort.

A. STAROBINSKY: *États de dépression et carrière médicale*. Poses the question whether nervous symptoms are commoner in the medical than in other professions. The question is answered by the auto-description of a neurasthenic doctor's sufferings—apparently a case of mild paranoia.

Ibid. April, 1925.

AUGUSTE WIMMER: *Les troubles mentaux précurseurs de l'encéphalite épidémique clinique*. Clinical histories of seven cases; when following an attack of influenza there ensued mental disturbances—in some cases melancholia and suicidal tendencies; in one case a marked loss of memory, in another apathy plus an anxiety state. The neurological symptoms appeared at varying intervals after the preliminary mental ones—in one case not till five years later. The last case (apathy and anxiety) was followed, over a year later, by epilepsy.

Ibid. May, 1925.

H. COLIN: *Charcot*. A brief sketch of Charcot by the present editor of the *Annales* who was one of his pupils from 1887–1891 and was one of the weekly editors, with Jean Charcot and Blin, of the *leçons du mardi*. Charcot is presented as he appeared in family life among his friends and disciples.

PAUL COURBON: *Charcot et la Psychiatrie*. A summary of Charcot's chief services to psychiatry supported by quotations from his works.

H. CLAUDE ET G. ROBIN: *L'indifférence et le négativisme schizomaniaques*. Schizomania must be separated from dementia praecox with which it runs a danger of being identified if Bleuler's views on schizophrenia become accepted. The indifference and negativism shown in schizomania are very different, in motivation if not clinically, from what is seen in hebephrenic catatonia. In the latter there is absence of affect, in schizomania the affect is marked—it is a qualitative not a quantitative change. It is doubtful whether psycho-analysis, so often valuable in obsessional conditions, can help in schizomania, where the symptoms are a defence reaction against every attempt to get into touch with the external world; the condition is an outcome of the schizoid character.

M. D. EDER.

Journal de Psychologie, vol. XXII, No. 5, May, 1925.

P. JANET: *Les états de consolation et les extases*. The first part of the study of a patient who was seven years at the Salpêtrière and who presented a variety of mental states: doubts and obsessions, indifference, delirium, joy, ecstasy. The descriptions are partly obtained from observation, partly from the patient's (Madeleine's) own verbal and written statements. Side by side with motor inertia there was an extremely active phantasy. A complete drama is played; the whole life of a couple of persons, God and Madeleine, leading up to complete union with God: "I have no thoughts, no words, nothing but a cry: I love, I love, I love, I am loved, I am loved, I am loved."

A. VAN GENNEP: *Le cycle cérémoniel du carnaval et du carême en Savoie*. This is the first part of a detailed account of the customs of the Carnival ceremonies in Savoy, the result of a thirty years' study of life in this region carried out in every commune. The study begins with an exact geographical and chronological analysis of the varying ceremonies.

G. H. LUQUET: *Le Motif du cavalier dans l'art primitif*. A comparative study of the horseman as found in different parts of the world throughout history. Illustrations of the drawings of neolithic man from Spain, Cyprus, Hungary, etc. The resemblances and the differences between these drawings and those of children are briefly indicated as well as the differences between these and the drawings of the adult of civilisation.

C. CHAMIE: *Remarques sur le problème de la mémoire*. Recollection is not merely reproduction but a total transformation of what has been experienced. Memory can reproduce and transform. Man is better adapted to space than he is to time and it is his constant conflict with time that is the essential nature of mental activity.

Ibid. No. 6, 15th June, 1925.

P. JANET: *Les sentiments de joie dans l'extase*. A continuation of Madeleine's story during her state of ecstasy, showing that her joy and sense of complete well-being was entirely independent of the external world. Joy is usually associated with wealth, ease, power and health; it is difficult to reconcile this happiness, complete and sublime, with a life of misery and during the course of mental disease. Everything was a source of joy to the patient: all the senses, every movement of her limbs, gave unspeakable joy. Her direct sexual pleasure often found coarse expression. Recovered from the state of ecstasy, the poor woman was terribly ashamed and full of excuses. Aesthetic pleasures were likewise intensified as well as that of intellectual illumination. She understands everything: the problems of good and evil, "the metaphysical explanation of the Trinity, the meaning of the soul, just as well as the psychology of dreams and the principles of the higher mathematics." In sum, the ecstasy is characterised by complete immobility not due to paralysis but to withdrawal from the external world. This withdrawal brings about much depression and sadness. Internal activity is enormously increased: every representation, interpretation and the ceaseless talking all occur with intense belief in their reality. Madeleine comes to regard her intellectual activity, her sense of power and happiness, as a divine manifestation. (There are ten pages of Janet's text missing, owing to some error in binding; the abstract is therefore incomplete.)

H. WALLON: *La mentalité épileptique*. Describes the most general and constant mental characteristics of epilepsy for clinical diagnosis, bringing these

into relation with the physical conditions. Contrasted with the schizophrenic the epileptic is in contact with reality; he is ever struggling to realise his acts and thoughts. There is however as much inhibition as initiative. The cortical centres exercise their control. This cramping is also shown in the affective sphere; hence the fits of irritability. Motor expression is equally restricted; perseveration, an outcome of this, is specific to epilepsy. Wallon distinguishes the epileptic condition from stereotypy and ectopraxia.

A. BOREL: *Rêveurs et Boudeurs morbides*. Clinical descriptions of children and adolescents characterised by morbid sulkiness and dreaminess. To be distinguished from schizophrenia; their characteristics are due to a congenital mental constitution—the schizoid, and not to any acquired psychical defect. The ‘sulker’ pretends indifference to his surroundings, pretends nonchalance even when a prey to the most intense affect. He may even refuse food and thus in many respects his condition resembles that of megalomania and stereotypy.

Ibid. No. 7, July, 1925.

H. DELACROIX: *Remarques sur “Une grande mystique.”* Dom Joseph Sauton, a monk of Solesmes, sent a report on Mme Cécile Bruyère, the abbess of Solesmes, to the Inquisition in 1892. Sauton, who was a doctor of medicine, accused Mme Bruyère of being a spurious mystic; he classed her as a hysteric and found six mental diagnostic stigmata. The question of hysteria in relation to mysticism and the psychology of the mystic is examined and Sauton’s psychology is criticised. It is not unusual to find mysticism or sober spiritual ideas coexisting with extravagant emotional manifestations¹.

A. VAN GENNEP: *Le cycle cérémoniel du carnaval et du carême en Savoie*. A continuation of the article in the May number. The customs and rites of the different communes are considered from the ethnographical and psychological points of view. The writer’s position is that no universal explanation is valid in the consideration of the rites and ceremonies of people in an advanced stage of civilisation. The comparative method in anthropology requires great caution and must be used with repeated reference to the facts.

R. VAUZELLE: *De la comparaison chez l’enfant*. The faculty of comparing things begins in very early infancy. The child’s mind approaches every object submitted to him in obedience to a triple law: (1) a centrifugal impulse, (2) notice of the points of similarity, (3) basing some limited observations upon these resemblances.

M. D. EDER.

Psychoanalytic Review, vol. XII, No. 3, July, 1925.

SAMUEL D. SCHMALHAUSEN: *Psychoanalytic Studies*. I. *The Nihilist Instinct in Man*. Two instincts promote our dramatic interest in life: (1) instinct of self-continuance (embodying instincts of self-preservation and reproduction); and (2) ‘instinct’ of self-annihilation (embodying the instincts of curiosity and vanity); the driving force of the first is fear of death, of the second discontent with life... “The young man, warned away from danger, cannot restrain his mad desire to plunge in where wiseacres fear to experiment.”...The author sees in the impulse of the swimmer to go out of his depth, the motorist to drive fast and the runner to breast the tape, though

¹ [See book review: this *Journal*, vol. v, p. 248.—Edrs.]

the effort break him, evidences of a suicidal 'instinct.' II. *Inhuman Nature*. III. *A Study in Human Nature*. The article does not lend itself to abstracting because there is no common systematic way of thinking shared by author and reader, e.g. "illusion is the joy of worthwhileness" is expanded by the argument that war is an illusion but to the starved imagination it seems worth while, it braces to a vivid purposefulness—is in fact a great reality!

NOLAN D. C. LEWIS: *The Practical Value of Graphic Art in Personality Studies*. (I. *An Introductory Presentation of the Possibilities*.) Patients are encouraged to bring art productions for analysis, thus providing if not a 'royal road' (dream) at least a much neglected and useful path to their unconscious—an avenue of projection. The content of the productions is expressed in three levels, manifest content, latent content and deductive or derivative meaning, and by means of this objectification much is "brought to consciousness with greater facility than through dream analysis." The material so revealed supports the concept of the collective or archaic unconscious, for though the patients cannot give luministic associations to many of the archaic symbols (snakes, sun, moon, sea, embryonic shapes, etc.) the meaning can be derived from a study of early manifestations of culture. The patient's failure to associate, his ignorance of the meaning of these symbols, indicates that the content of the unconscious is not the product of individual repression. In connection with the practical application of this technique of picture analysis, the author summarises: (1) that all art is basically a confession and is created from unconscious motives; (2) graphic productions share with the dream the dream-work mechanisms of condensation, displacement, dramatisation, secondary elaboration, etc., and being permanent records afford exceptionally favourable therapeutic opportunity; (3) nearly all patients with tactful encouragement are able to draw some sort of pictures (resistance to the analysis is frequently encountered, however, in the refusal to draw or in the spiteful destruction of the drawings); (4 and 5) the pictures show by labels the manifest content, on analysis the latent content; and (6) the transference. [We may add a further reflection: the psycho-analytical situation has one merit over ordinary discourse—it reveals the deep roots of the transference-love and -hate, anything which draws the analyst's attention from the *undisturbed observation* of the manifestations of the transference, whether it be the technique of picture analysis or of dream analysis, is a disturbance or blunting of the delicate sensitiveness of the psycho-analytical situation. This is the one essential point that the paper appears to miss.]

J. R.

REVIEWS

Der triebhafte Charakter, Eine psychoanalytische Studie zur Pathologie des Ich. By Dr WILHELM REICH. Wien, 1925. Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. (Neue Arbeiten zur ärztlichen Psychoanalyse, No. iv.) pp. 132. Price 6 marks.

The exploratory methods of psycho-analysis have proved fruitful in so many extra-territorial waters that one is apt to overlook the strictly empirical necessities which lead to fresh annexations from the realms of academic psychology. In the case of characterological studies, the growth of a new scientific method can be very plainly observed. Psycho-analytic discoveries concerning character were in the first instance a by-product of psycho-analytic treatment of the neuroses. These sporadic observations soon multiplied and were found capable of loose systematisation such as that sketched by Abraham in his *Studien zur Charakterbildung* (1924). At the same time investigation of certain cases proving refractory during analysis showed that the difficulty was due, in many instances, to the existence of character peculiarities, and from that moment character research became an empirical necessity. This however involved more detailed understanding of Ego-structure and until Freud published his latest views on the nature of the Ego, character study marked time. The present volume by Wilhelm Reich of Vienna signalises the immense impetus given to psycho-analytical characterology by the publication of Freud's *Das Ich und das Es*. Its claims on our attention do not depend solely on the author's presentation of a subgroup of character abnormalities (indicated in the title). Reich has given us a very clear exposition of the most recent Ego-psychology and has linked this up to his own investigations by a critique of previous character studies. Moreover he has chosen his material from a group the boundaries of which are not limited by current clinical standards. Many of the types described acted at times in a manner which, under existing social conventions, would be vaguely termed criminal or delinquent, and Reich has had an invaluable opportunity of observing the dynamics of treatment under these difficult conditions. Hence his views on treatment alone would entitle the book to careful consideration. It should be added that the author has a quick and speculative intelligence, a vigorous method of presentation and the courage and enthusiasm necessary for tackling a most involved subject.

As has been indicated, the essay, although ostensibly concerned with one variety of character abnormality, has of necessity to deal with other groupings and with character processes in general. It soon becomes apparent, however, that the classification adopted by Reich gives rise to difficulties in correlation. For example, he places his 'instinctual' (*triebhaft*) character somewhere between the symptom neuroses and the psychoses, but does not consider that these comparisons of character abnormalities with states of health, neurosis or psychosis are of much value. A majority of his cases have symptoms of all sorts and, in many of their reactions, correspond closely to schizophrenias. An individual's character may be termed 'instinctual,' he says, when it is governed by actions and attitudes to environment which are dictated by the Repetition-compulsion (*Wiederholungszwang*). The impulses in 'instinctual' character are of a direct unmodified type (oral, anal, sado-masochistic, etc.) as compared with the distorted or inhibited gratification of impulses in other character types. Reich holds the accepted view that the feature by which neurotic character as a whole can be distinguished from a symptom construction is the degree of localization of the latter. A character disturbance is diffused throughout the whole personality, but, when the manifestations are more or less uninhibited, they may be distinguished by the term *triebhaft* and hence regarded as a special form of neurotic character. His types, moreover, usually exhibit obvious perversions of a sado-masochistic sort. Reich endeavours to give his special terminology some general utility by contrasting his 'instinctual' (*triebhaft*) character with 'instinctually-inhibited' (*triebbehemmt*) character types.

Unfortunately difficulties of classification cannot be resolved by the creation of two large groups made up of the most heterogeneous elements. There are many obvious advantages to be gained by classifying character changes in terms of the degree of modification which the impulses have undergone. But the disadvantages are equally apparent. Although Reich always distinguishes carefully between a symptom and a character abnormality, he is unable to give effect to this in his main character groupings, with the result that whilst he examines instinct credentials at the door, neurotic symptoms and perversions fly in by the window. In the reviewer's opinion Reich has sacrificed valuable clinical and etiological distinctions for the sake of preserving mechanistic unities of a theoretical sort. He has evidently found himself hampered by current conceptions of character abnormalities and would have given himself more elbow-room had he scrapped the entire conception of the 'neurotic' character as a main group.

The term 'neurotic character' arose quite naturally. During the psycho-analytic study of neuroses certain character traits were observed. These were found also in 'normal' individuals and were held to be due to the imprint left on the Ego during the various stages of libido development. But the neuroses and narcissistic neuroses themselves were found to be associated with disturbances of particular stages of libido development. So that an exaggeration of certain 'normal' character traits might suggest the existence of a predisposition to certain neuroses. In actual fact exaggerated character traits seemed to provide a neurotic 'atmosphere' in many cases, *e.g.*, exaggerated anal traits in obsessional neuroses. When patients presented no striking obsessional symptoms but were found on analysis to present exaggerated character changes of an obsessional type, it seemed simplest to call this pathological state a 'neurotic character state' or an example of 'obsessional' character. Following these lines of observation, it was easy to find evidence of hysterical, manic-depressive character traits, etc. It was clearly essential to understand why one person might present marked character changes with minimal symptom formation or another alternating character difficulties and neurotic symptom reactions; the more so indeed since there are grounds for assuming that repression does not play the same part in character as in symptom formation. There were of course many drawbacks to this clinical subdivision. It is easy to recognize a manic-depressive type of character but a 'pervert' character is somewhat of a contradiction in terms (perversion implying direct gratification of component sexual impulses) and of course many other character changes involving environment, *e.g.*, criminality, etc., elude the clinical classification altogether. In Reich's system these are all roped in, but, on the other hand, the dynamic relationship between character and symptom formation goes largely by the board. It could, for example, be asserted with a degree of plausibility that some of his cases were cases of perversion associated with marked character abnormalities rather than examples of *triebhaft* character associated with perversions.

Apart from this one must examine very carefully his contention that an 'instinctual' character grouping can be based safely on the relation of the condition to the Repetition-compulsion. It is true that the more unmodified the instinct drive, the nearer we approach to this compulsion, in the sense that instinct is itself a blind repetition, a stereotyped response operating irrespective of ultimate suitability. But the same can be said of habits, which Ferenczi regards as midway between instincts and conscious adaptations. On Reich's basis a great number of habits which conform in every respect to the admittedly wide standard of 'normality' would have to be included in his 'instinctual' group.

On the other hand it must be admitted that his method of classification has many advantages from the point of view of presentation. It enables the author to give a very instructive review of the processes of Ego-development and of the relations of the Super-ego to instinct modification in normal, neurotic and character cases respectively. If at times some obscurities appear, as, for example, in the relations of the Instinctual Ego (*Trieb-ich*) to the Real Ego, or where an identical reaction is regarded at one point as normal and at another as a neurotic characteristic (see reactions to the Father-ideal), these deficiencies are more than offset by the clarity with which the subject as a whole is treated. Indeed the only blemish on the pre-

sensation is due to the necessity already indicated, viz., that of constantly distinguishing not only symptom and perversion formations from character formations but the function of the former from the function of the latter. For example, when Reich remarks that "in sharp division between the sadistic impulse and guilt we see the typical mechanism of 'instinctual character,'" we are once more faced with confusion between the relations of a neurosis, a perversion and a character change respectively. Indeed it would seem that having called into being an 'instinctually-inhibited' character to act as foil to his 'instinctual' character, the author rather callously neglects half of his progeny. At any rate in most of his tables of comparison, 'instinctual' character is rarely contrasted with 'inhibited' character, but invariably with symptom formations, with which, from the point of view of function, no character sub-grouping need be compared.

This might be regarded as a captious criticism were it not for the subject-matter of the fifth chapter. This opens with the question: How does the 'instinctual' character come to exist alongside of persistent amnesias and repressions? Reich answers this by pointing out that, in normal cases, the impetus to instinct-modification, which is introjected from environmental influences in the form of the Super-ego, coalesces 'organically' with the Ego. This is not an immediate process and there is a normal phase during which the Super-ego is for the time being 'isolated.' In cases of 'instinctual' character, this 'isolation' proves permanent. It implies a miscarriage of dynamic repression and is itself, according to Reich, the equivalent of an act of repression. At this stage the author distinguishes between dynamic and systematic repression. Detached from their context, statements of this sort are liable to produce a feeling of bewilderment. It is only fair to say that many of the *phenomena* Reich describes and appraises theoretically have already been observed and given theoretical correlation by Freud when sketching the reactions of the Ego to Id-excitations and to Super-ego control. A typical example is that of the conflict in melancholia. It would seem however that Reich has been rather overcome by the strength of the opposing forces in his 'instinctual' character cases and has felt the necessity for a more vivid *nomenclature*. Or again, he may have been seduced by the charms of topical presentation. Freud however has shown us an example of caution in this respect when refraining from attempts to represent the position of the Super-ego in any topical diagram. At any rate, unless Reich uses the term 'systematic' in a different sense from that given by Freud in his description of the Unconscious, any distinction of a 'systematic' from a 'dynamic' repression seems remarkably like a confusion of thought. It is difficult to see how a system can be legitimately compared with a mechanism. Besides, it was unnecessary to find any original answer to the question Reich asks himself at the beginning of the chapter. Freud has already told us why character changes may exist alongside amnesias and repressions, i.e., that the processes are distinct, repression playing only a minor part, if any, in character formations. A more fundamental problem might have been stated thus: By what re-arrangement of forces does the individual with pathological character changes adapt the processes of 'normal' character formation to meet miscarriages in repression?

On the matter of technique one can have nothing but admiration for the skill and courage Reich has shown in handling his cases, to say nothing of gratitude for any suggestions he makes. These are mainly concerned with the necessity in such cases of a preliminary pedagogic phase in analysis to stabilize Super-ego abnormality. One hopes to get further information on this method in future publications from the same author. Perhaps in the interval the question of psychotic character traits will have been sufficiently ventilated to eliminate confusion as to character groupings or at least to obviate recourse to questionable if attractive additions to meta-psychological terminology.

EDWARD GLOVER.

The Influence of Tobacco Smoking on Mental and Motor Efficiency. By CLARK L. HULL.
(Psychological Monographs, No. 150.)

Investigations of the effects of tobacco on physiological or psychological processes have been fairly numerous. Those of a statistical nature have been fairly satisfactory as to method, the most carefully conducted, however, being that by Meylan of Columbia in 1910, in which the investigator declined to draw conclusions from his own data when he found them complicated by the fact that among his subjects (College men) the smokers tended more than the non-smokers to be the athletes and the fraternity men, both of which groups ranked low intellectually. The contrasting experimental investigations generally suffered from faulty mathematical treatment or insufficient precautions for elimination of accidental factors.

In a monograph issued by the Psychological Review Co. on *The Influence of Tobacco Smoking on Mental and Motor Efficiency*, Dr Clark L. Hull commences with a critical review of the researches that have so far been made. In an appendix, he himself corrects the results of defective methods of calculation which he found in several studies. For example, he shows that when the obstacles encountered by Meylan have been allowed for by modern methods of statistical analysis, proper computations from his data show that over and above the effects of athletics and fraternities, tobacco-using is represented by a reduction of 3.4 points in scholarship, but with a large percentage of probable error. The statistical method, however, remains always open to the criticisms that we can never be sure that other complicating factors like athletics and fraternities may not be present, and especially that, in comparing two separate groups of persons such as smokers and non-smokers, we can never be sure but selective factors may have been operative.

When, however, we come to the experimental method of investigation we are confronted by the task (which previous investigators have not surmounted) of conceiving an adequate method of control. Obviously, if the subject knows when he has been given the dose of nicotine and when the control dose, the results will be complicated by his expectations—and by any secret desires to influence the results.

Dr Hull therefore devised an exceedingly ingenious procedure and apparatus. These were proved by the subjects' introspections to have successfully hidden from all but one of the nineteen subjects experimented on (subsequently to preliminary work while perfecting the technique) the direct objects of the experiment and whether the subject was merely 'smoking' a control dose consisting solely of warm air. The data from the one exceptional subject were discarded.

On entering the laboratory, the subject saw various appurtenances of smoking, matches, etc., lying about, and a pipe being scraped and filled with tobacco. His heart beat was first measured. After that he was set at a series of tests, of which the real object was merely to ascertain his normal reactions for that day (since ability generally varies from one day to another) in order that all post-dosage performances might be measured in terms of this day's norm.

But the subject was misled into the belief that these preliminary tests were to be used as the measure of his non-tobacco performance, and that the subsequent tests were to measure his tobacco performance. He was now asked, on a spurious plea, to keep his eyes closed while being given the tobacco dose. 'Lest he should forget' this, a heavy blindfold, with big pads at the sides of the nose, was slipped over his head.

The experimenter now held a pipe to the subject's lips, from which the subject took three puffs, without inhaling. The pipe was withdrawn and re-presented according to a definite rhythm during twenty-five minutes or about the time needed to thus smoke one pipe. This constituted the daily dose. After this, the blindfold was removed, and the subject was made to repeat his previous tests three separate times, the last time being an hour and forty-five minutes after the dose.

On only about half the days was the pipe smoked by the subject, the one he had seen filled with tobacco. On the other days, this pipe was lit and smoked by the experimenter himself, in order to provide the requisite sounds and odour to deceive the subject. On these control days, the subject was given an exactly similar pipe, into the bowl of which had been fitted a clever electric heater. Porous asbestos

plaster, which had been dampened, a few hours before, with some drops of water, provided exactly the requisite humidity and resistance to suction and even an imitation of its sound. Tobacco smoke has probably no taste (salt, acid, bitter or sweet) apart from its odour. Its slight 'bite' on the tongue was imitated by a small amount of overheat.

Confirmed smokers puffed this device with satisfaction, and even blew 'smoke rings'! Introspections, afterwards signed by the subjects, showed that in no single instance did they suspect that they were not smoking tobacco. One smoker got most enjoyment on the control evenings, and said it would be hard to quit under such (control) conditions. Another commented upon the satisfaction felt afterwards. A third, a non-smoker, felt that such satisfaction as he found from one of the control nights 'constitutes a real habit.' These statements are strong testimony to the perfection of Hull's apparatus and technique. Beyond that, they witness to the important rôle played in smoking, by suggestion, oral erotism, etc.

Numerous other precautions were taken, such as engaging the subjects for 20 days of experimentation and then excusing them after the 18th day to avoid disturbances due to excitement at having reached the end of an arduous experiment. But I will now briefly give Hull's results. In these the smallest reliability considered seriously is one yielding 1 chance of error in 20.

Heart rate is (as was also found by both Payne and Dowling) uniformly stimulated by smoking, the effect being still evident after 1 hour and 43 minutes. Habituation to tobacco has little effect towards establishing a tolerance here.

The heart also, after smoking, is also more susceptible to the influence of excitement.

Tremor of the hand is markedly increased during a period of 1 hour and 23 minutes. Habituation seems actually to increase this effect.

Rate of tapping, on the other hand, is perhaps slightly improved in non-smokers, though slightly decreased in smokers, for one hour.

Resistance to fatigue from tapping is also greater in non-smokers after smoking, and for 1 hour and 40 minutes. There is a lesser effect in smokers.

Speed of cancellation may be slightly inhibited by tobacco.

Accuracy of cancellation, however, seems to be increased in approximately the same small ratio that speed is lost. (Reliability, 15 to 1.)

Speed or oral reaction to freshly learned material is improved 1 per cent. by smoking. (Reliability, 15 to 1.)

Rate of adding figures is decreased 2.77 per cent. in non-smokers. But in habitual smokers it is improved 5.21 per cent., a complete reversal of effect outlasting 1½ hours.

Accuracy of continuous mental addition is slightly lessened with non-smokers. The effect on smokers is uncertain.

Auditory memory span for digits shows loss of 5 per cent. or 6 per cent. in non-smokers, which loss is as great 1 hour 20 minutes after smoking as immediately after. Among smokers, the loss is about half as great.

Rate learning of geometrical characters and nonsense syllables is rendered 9 per cent. less efficient in both non-smokers and smokers, by a pipe. Recovery occurs in an hour.

In formulating his conclusions from these tests, Hull considers chiefly the results obtained with habitual users of tobacco, on the ground that "the effect of tobacco on people who don't use it is not in itself a practical problem." This means that the effects of the drug are rather minimized by him. On this point there occurs to me the only adverse criticism I shall venture to offer upon this careful investigation. Namely, where use of tobacco has developed a tolerance, or where the smoker as compared with the non-smoker appears to perform actually better under the stimulation of nicotine, we cannot be sure but that his gains at these times are the result of temporary easement of an unnatural craving set up by previous uses of the drug, and hindering him whenever it is not in process of satisfaction. It would seem that this point can only be settled by experiments in which the cumulative effects of smoking can be studied over a period of months or years.

PRYNCE HOPKINS.

Medical Education: A Comparative Study. By ABRAHAM FLEXNER, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1925.

This is an invaluable work on a timely subject. It is timely because the more unconventionally-minded medical men are now asking whether, on the one hand, medical education is struggling under the burden of traditions evolved in the days when medicine was almost purely empiricism, or, on the other hand, whether we have not drifted into a system that attempts to make the poor neophyte into an anatomist, a physiologist, a chemist, a physicist, a pathologist, a physician and a surgeon instead of just a reasonably competent healer of the sick. Educators are criticizing both existing and projected policies; they are searching for some scheme whereby the student may learn how to profit by the advances achieved in the laboratory side of medicine and yet not have his poor head crammed with such a mass of data as no specialist nor general practitioner would ever try to retain. At such a time it is well to know just what schemes of teaching medicine there may be, what their history is and how they work out in practice. Flexner has provided just this information in regard to the systems of France, Germany, Great Britain, the United States, Canada, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden and Denmark.

In general he distinguishes three main types. In France the student is an apprentice in a hospital designed primarily for treatment of the sick, adapted little or not at all for its teaching and neglecting the laboratory sciences fairly consistently. In Germany the teaching is done throughout in the University, whose clinics are as much a part of the University as are the laboratories for physics and chemistry and the clinicians whole time teachers rather than medical practitioners. In the English 'Hospital' system a certain compromise is reached and if the student attend one of the major Universities he gets a thorough training in the basic sciences and is then pitchforked into clinical work that may be inspired by quite different ideals and pursued by methods more empirical than 'scientific.' In the United States all kinds of mixtures exist from the disgraceful 'diploma mill' (now almost extinct) up to well organized schools of the University type. Further summary of the data presented would be out of place and futile. The book should be read. It suffices to say that the facts are presented with an extraordinary, even astounding, lack of bias. No trace of national prejudice is detectable.

Fitter material for a review is a discussion of the author's standpoint. No one, not suffering from a collecting mania, can work without having some programme, some *Tendenz* in mind. Flexner's ideals are manifest and avowed. The training of the medical student should be rational. First he should learn the 'normal' anatomy and physiology of the human body, being thoroughly grounded in physics and chemistry, and in the course of this instruction he should absorb the scientific attitude. 'Science' for Flexner seems to be accurate observation, hypothesizing, experiment and the expression of data in quantitative form. That he so restricts the meaning of scientific method he would doubtless deny, yet it seems to be implicit in his viewpoint. Armed with knowledge of the normal the student should attack clinical problems, applying laboratory methods and resolved to be scientific. Every medical man should be an investigator. In order that disease should be studied and taught scientifically it is advisable or necessary that instructors should give all their time to the clinic undistracted by private practice. Flexner seems to adopt this programme as unquestionably the best.

At the present phase in the evolution of medicine it would be unsafe to dogmatize either in support or criticism of Flexner's ideals. But it may be allowable to question his assumptions. In the first place is not his conception of science too narrow? Fundamentally it means that the study of functions which cannot be expressed in physical or chemical terms is unprofitable. It is one exhibition of the materialistic philosophy which reached its climax about the turn of the century. With this inspiration laboratory methods have refined the diagnosis of many diseases and improved treatment in a few. On the other hand it has led to a deterioration in clinical acumen. The tendency is for the patient to become, in the mind of the laboratory clinician, a mere accumulation of organs and chemical reactions rather than an

improperly functioning individual. The Reviewer has frequently seen a clinician of the old school reach a correct diagnosis, using only eye, ear and hand, that was unattainable by distinguished 'scientific' physicians who had insensibly come to rely more on laboratory procedures than on direct and reasoned observation of disease. An enthusiastic member of a medical 'unit' has given the Reviewer his opinion that 'whole time,' valuable as it may be for the investigation of certain aspects of pathology, is definitely inimical to the development of the highest degrees of clinical acumen. The tendency to lose sight of the individuality of the patient is an evil that will be recognized by the reader of this *Journal* without the emphasis of elaboration. There is no room for psychology in the laboratory concept of medicine.

Other objections may be raised against Flexner's ideal system. It is doubtful whether any but brilliant students are capable of the programme laid out for them. Who can learn all the mass of data presented in the basic sciences and have imagination to use them later? Again, it is questionable whether the normal form and function of the human body is ever truly learned except in comparison with other forms—the huge subject of comparative anatomy—or in contrast with the abnormal. Before any subject is really learned it must have some meaning. Otherwise all that is gained is the capacity to reproduce dry bones of knowledge in examinations. Under Flexner's system the meanings guiding the correlation of data taught in introductory medical studies are those supplied by non-medical men. It matters not whether the anatomist or physiologist has a medical degree. *Qua* anatomist or physiologist his interests are not clinical. In consequence the student is apt to be taught as if his future were to lie in the laboratory rather than in the clinic. The brilliant student can escape suffocation in the flood of facts with which he is inundated, he can learn to think biologically and later begins to think medically. But it is doubtful whether more than a handful have this capacity. The average student studies medicine with the ambition of becoming a doctor. This means that he is interested in what he sees to have a bearing on the practice of medicine; other facts have for him a bearing only on examinations. Time spent in acquiring information for the placating of examiners is lost time and one wonders how much of the many years now demanded in preparation for a medical degree is consumed in such exercises.

Medicine is a study of human beings and can therefore never be reduced wholly to quantitative or material terms. If it could be, it could be largely learned in books and didactic lectures, the only practical experience being that necessary for acquisition of the technique of physical examination. Interestingly enough the tendency of the most 'scientific' medical education has been towards the elimination of personal experience. Flexner, while praising the German system for the solid foundation laid in the earlier years of training, deplores the preponderance given to demonstration by the professor of *all* the data about a patient, little opportunity being given to the student to learn about patients at close quarters. He does not realize that, psychologically, this is the corollary of the theory that the human body can be regarded as a machine. An engineer having learned his mechanics and become familiar with one machine can grasp completely the nature of another slightly different one without ever seeing it, being merely told about it by another engineer. If medicine and engineering were thus comparable the German system would certainly be the best.

J. T. MACCURDY.

Psychologie des Säuglings. VON DR SIEGFRIED BERNFELD. Vienna: Julius Springer. G.M. 12 unbound, 13.20 bound.

It is general knowledge that quite a large number of babies have been born since man began to chronicle his experiences; that the largest proportion of these babies have been carefully and tenderly observed by their mothers, fathers, nurses, uncles, aunts, midwives, doctors; baby's every and earliest pucker, every cry, the first wrinklings that can be manufactured into a smile, the differentiations between the call and the first efforts at speech, every gesture, the movements of the eyes, the hands, the fingers, toes, the crawl, the rise and fall from the ground leading to the earliest steps—all these and much more have been lovingly observed, made the subject of triumphant comment over and over again by the fond onlookers in every part of the earth, among the highly cultured or the most backward of savages, in ancient pile-dwellings or modern tenement houses.

Despite this concentrated and devoted interest on the infant, no one until Dr Bernfeld has attempted to present a comprehensive survey of the babe's psychology, though there are several fragmentary and more or less disconnected observations such as the well-known works of Sully or Miss Shinn in English, of Preyer or Stern in German. Bernfeld's work is something quite different. The facts are given, culled from a number of observers, including his personal observations, gathered not only from civilised man but from primitive man and the savages, and given in much greater detail than is usual in psychological text-books, but the facts are used not as so many bricks to be tumbled out of a cart but as bricks put together to form a structure—towards the understanding of the infant's mind. It is well to know, for instance, that after the third month the baby brings the hand under the control of the eyes, but this relationship is worked out by Dr Bernfeld as part of the growing infantile mind and is brought into connection with a host of other facts.

The life of the suckling is considered by Bernfeld under the following divisions:

1. Birth—whose structure—a term Bernfeld uses somewhat in Driesch's sense of the organism as a whole—is characterised by the tendency to revert, to seek an equilibrium—the conservative tendency, as Dr Bernfeld calls it. The new-born is under the sway of the *R* impulses, as Bernfeld terms them; the impulse to seek the position of rest, of non-stimulation and of regression. To speak of the ego impulses or instincts in the suckling is misleading for these are only gradually developing and are not formed out of earlier components as is the libidinal material.

2. The First Quarter—with its beginnings of the sexual instinct; by libidinal cathexis three well-marked erotogenic zones—eyes, mouth, ears—have arisen. Biologically the child during the first quarter is still an ectoparasite but with more greed and energy than the new-born.

3. The 'Grasper Age'—the second and third quarters, when the instinct of possession begins to evolve; the hand comes to be used under the control of the eyes, the eyes drawn into the mouth-hand relationship. The instinct of possession is partly derived from the '*R* impulses,' partly from libidinal impulses, but there is a considerable residue which cannot be so readily allotted to one or other, whilst the relationship of these constellations one to the other gives rise to the most difficult and as yet unsolved questions in the psychology of the infant. It is in this period that the development of the libido becomes well-marked, with clear manifestations of sexual desires. The external world can be libidinally taken hold of, but in the interest of the instinct of possession; the primary ambivalence consists in the sexual interest being subordinated to the mechanism of the '*R* impulses.'

4. The Age of Weaning. If birth is to be regarded as the first great trauma in the life of the individual, weaning completes the second great trauma. With weaning comes the second great refusal and expulsion. First expelled from the womb, now from the breast.

It must not be thought that the book deals only with the affective side of the suckling; Dr Bernfeld points out that although psychology has given infinitely more consideration to cognition than to other mental conditions, even here it has dealt

scantily with the intellect of the suckling, so that the author has to content himself with a first sketch.

The questions of heredity, of the relationship of the infant to the external world, are discussed within the limits imposed by the nature of the book—a psychological study of the development of the child in reference to its impulses and instincts.

Within these limits Dr Bernfeld has, as I have said, written the first comprehensive account of the psychology of the suckling; he has been throughout careful to state the difficulties, the many lacunae which may make some of his tentative conclusions uncertain, but the main lines appear soundly constructed and in accordance with the derived knowledge of infancy obtained from the psychology of the adult.

M. D. EDER.

C A M B R I D G E
Printed by W. LEWIS, M.A.
at the University Press

The University of Chicago Press

Readings in General Psychology. By E. S. ROBINSON and FLORENCE RICHARDSON-ROBINSON. 675 pages, 8vo, cloth; 20s. net

Topical organization of some two-hundred selections from the writings of outstanding contributors to psychological thought. A solution of the reserve-shelf problem.

General Psychology. By WALTER S. HUNTER. (Revised Edition.)

352 pages, 12mo, cloth; 10s. net

A survey of psychological subject-matter from the behavioristic point of view. An introductory book with the emphasis upon the concrete experimental facts so far as they are available.

Psychological Tests in Business. By A. W. KORNHAUSER and F. A. KINGSBURY. 111 pages, 8vo, cloth; 9s. 6d. net

A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century. By JOHN T. MERZ. Four volumes per set, 75s. net

Studies from the Psychological Laboratory. By JAMES R. ANGELL.

Vol. I, No. 1, 52 pages, royal 8vo, paper; 1s. 9d. net

Vol. III, No. 2, 356 pages, royal 8vo, paper; 2s. 6d. net

The Mental Traits of Sex. By HELEN BRADFORD THOMPSON.

188 pages, 8vo, cloth; 6s. 3d. net

Heredity and Eugenics. By WILLIAM E. CASTLE, JOHN M. COULTER, CHARLES B. DAVENPORT, EDWARD M. EAST, and WILLIAM E. TOWER.

312 pages, 8vo, cloth; 15s. net

Makes clear the recent developments of knowledge in reference to evolution, heredity, eugenics, and related subjects. Five of the leading investigators in these fields have collaborated in its production.

General Cytology. A Textbook of Cellular Structure and Function for Students of Biology and Medicine. Edited by E. V. COWDRY.

754 pages, royal 8vo, cloth; 37s. 6d. net

The first single volume to state comprehensively the principles that govern cell structure and function. Written by thirteen eminent scientists.

Agents for the British Empire (except Canada)

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

London, Fetter Lane, E.C.4

CONTENTS

(All Rights reserved.)

	PAGE
M. HAMBLIN SMITH. Spinoza's Anticipation of Recent Psychological Developments	257
EDWARD GLOVER. The Neurotic Character	279
TRIGANT BURROW. Psychiatry as an Objective Science	298
DONALD E. CORE. Some Clinical Aspects of Certain Emotions	310
ELLA FREEMAN SHARPE. Francis Thompson: a Psycho-Analytical Study	329
I. F. GRANT DUFF. A Psycho-Analytical Study of a Phantasy of St Thérèse de l'enfant Jésus	345
ABSTRACTS	354
REVIEWS	359

The *British Journal of Psychology* is issued by the British Psychological Society in two Sections, a *General Section* and a *Medical Section*, now entitled *The British Journal of Medical Psychology*. Each Section will appear in parts quarterly, the size and price of each part varying with the amount of material available.

The subscription price, per volume of about 350 pages, Royal 8vo, payable in advance, is 30s. net per volume (post-free) for either section. Subscriptions may be sent to any Bookseller, or to the Cambridge University Press, Fetter Lane, London, E.C. 4.

Volumes I–IV, *Medical Section*, are now ready. Price for Volumes I and II in four parts, paper covers, 25s. net per volume; bound in cloth, 35s. 6d. net each. Volumes III and IV in four parts, paper covers, 30s. net. Quotations can be given for binding cases and for binding subscribers' sets.

Members of the British Psychological Society receive the *General Section* of the *Journal* gratis. Members of the *Medical Section* of the Society receive also the *British Journal of Medical Psychology* gratis. Information concerning Membership may be obtained from the Hon. Secretary of the *Medical Section* of the Society, Dr JOHN RICKMAN, 26 Devonshire Place, W. 1.

Papers for publication in the *British Journal of Medical Psychology* should be sent to Dr T. W. MITCHELL, Hadlow, Kent. Those for publication in the *General Section* of the *British Journal of Psychology* should be sent to F. C. BARTLETT, The Psychological Laboratory, University of Cambridge.

Contributors receive twenty-five copies of their papers free. Additional copies may be had at cost price; these should be ordered when the final proof is returned.

Quotations for binding cases and for binding subscribers' sets can be obtained from the publishers.

The Cambridge University Press has appointed the University of Chicago Press agents for the sale of both Sections of *The British Journal of Psychology* in the United States of America, and has authorised them to charge the following subscription price:—\$7.00 net for either *Section*.